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TRUST RECEIPT FINANCING UNDER THE
UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
Warren A. Heindl*
VERY INCREASE in the production of goods, particularly in periods
E when money becomes scarce, leads to a stimulation of interest
in methods of financing. Dealers in merchandise, especially those
in retail fields, then become forced to resort to one or more of the
varied devices known to business in order to acquire and maintain
stocks of goods for resale. Among such devices, that known as the
trust receipt was beginning to attain a deserved popularity prior
to the recent war. There is every reason to presume that it will
again become the vogue, perhaps even be more frequently used,
as conditions return to a more normal base. One thing likely to
check that development would be a hesitation born of ignorance
and confusion over the legal and economic factors dictating the
choice or rejection of that particular form of industrial financing.
Not even the drafting of a Uniform Trust Receipts Act,1
promulgated in 1933, has operated to dispel that ignorance, while
occasional articles and commentaries thereon 2 have not shed too
* Member, Illinois bar; Li. B., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1947; L1. M.,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1948.
1 Unif. Laws Anno., Vol. 9, pp. 665 et seq.
2 Notes and brief comments may be found in 4 Brooklyn L. Rev. 100, 41 Col. L.
Rev. 1134, 4 Ford. L. Rev. 108, 32 Il. B. J. 279, 12 N. Y. L. Q. 468, 15 Ore. L.
Rev. 171, 9 St. Johns L. Rev. 250, 17 St. Johns L. Rev. 136, 16 Temp. L. Q. 208, 18
Temp. L. Q. 406, 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 270, 20 Va. L. Rev. 689, 29 Va. L. Rev. 650.
and 45 Yale L. J. 1272. More comprehensive statements appear in Bogert, "The
Effect of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act." 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 26 (1935)
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much nor too complete a light on its operation. Pending proposals
to compile a commercial code designed to modernize and correlate
a number of uniform statutes dealing with commercial transac-
tions3 force the whole problem of the trust receipt into the fore-
ground, for any such code must necessarily take that business
device into account.4  Unfortunately, the present statute has not
had the seasoning granted to other uniform commercial measures, 5
has received less attention from the courts, and many of its pro-
visions have yet to receive judicial consideration. Clarification
and revision is undoubtedly needed,6 hence the following discussion
of what is and what is not permitted under the present law might
serve to point out at least the most obvious defects.
I. Tr.uST RECBnITS AT COMMON LAW
Those who have never considered a trust receipt, as well as
those who have but who feel a need for a renewal of acquaintance-
ship, may reach some understanding of inherent problems through
a short summary of fundamental usages and common-law origins.
In the period when industry and commerce operated on a sole-
proprietorship basis, inventories of goods, whether for manufac-
turing or resale purposes, were typically carried as wholly-owned
goods or bought on open credit. With the development of large-
scale industry, where open credit buying was not always feasible
Djorup, "How to Use Trust Receipts Now," 30 J. of Am. Bank. 23 (1937) ; "De-
fense and Uniform Trust Receipts," 33 J. of Am. Bank, 42 (1941); "Uniform
Trust Receipts Act," 33 J. of Am. Bank. 66 (1941); Djorup, "Aids in Financing
War Goods," 34 J. of Am. Bank. 27 (1942) ; "Financing Coal Dealers," 34 J. of
Am. Banking 54 (1942); "Auto Credit Safeguard," Bus. Week. Mar. 2, 1940, p.
24; Janousek, "The Advent of Trust Receipts," Commerce Rep., Sept. 24. 1938,
p. 848; Janousek, "Trust Receipts in the Philippines," Commerce Rep., Dec. 3,
1938, p. 1075; "California Uniform Trust Receipts Law," Com. and Fin. Chron.,
Vol. 146, p. 2781 (1938); Layton, "Beware of Laws Called Uniform," Credit &
Fin. Management, Vol. 40, p. 21 (1938); and Jacoby and Saulnier, "Financing
Inventory on Field Warehouse Receipts," Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, p. 11
(1944).
3 Short discussions of the proposed Commercial Code, by W. L. Beers, appear
in Bus. Lawyer, Vol. 2, p. 14, and Vol. 3, p. 12.
4 See Bus. Lawyer, Vol. 3, p. 12 at p. 13.
-', A table of dates of the enactment of the several statutes appears in Beers.
"The New Commercial Code," 2 Bus. Lawyer 14.
6 Speaking of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, Judge McColloch, in the Case
of In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 at 575, said it was a "perplexing maze of
technical phrases wholly incomprehensible without an extensive study of the
background and development of the security device known as the trust receipt."
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or desirable, utilization of security devices became necessary. At
first, protection was afforded through the chattel mortgage 7 and
the conditional sales agreement," both of which, from the legal
standpoint, provided adequate security combined with simplicity
in theory and operation, but they met with disfavor on the part of
businessmen and financiers; a disfavor growing from cumbersome
features not geared to the tempo of modern business.
The chattel mortgage, for example, following the pattern of
the real-estate mortgage, required notoriety for its effectiveness
because of the existence of recording statutes, and, as the mort-
gagee held what was essentially only a security lien, forced upon
the creditor an unwelcome compliance with formalities of fore-
closure in case of default.9 In addition, recording requirements
were disadvantageous in cases where the credit advanced was on
a short-term basis or where it was extended by a large scale busi-
ness but covering many separate and distinct transactions. Not
the least objectionable feature of the publicly-recorded chattel
mortgage was the fact that the debtor on such secured credit, who
would prefer to keep his financial status secret, especially to his
competitors, was forced to disclose the intimate details of his credit
operations."
In much the same way, the conditional sale device, wherein
title was reserved by the seller as security for the payment of the
price, had its drawbacks. The necessity for judicial foreclosure
in the case of default might depend upon the laws of the individual
states, for there is a conflict in this regard.1' Disadvantages of
recording might still be present, for most states require it in the
case of this type of security device also.12 The principal objection
to the conditional sale contract, however, lay in the fact that it
7 A discussion of the title and lien theories of chattel mortgages may be found
in Jones, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales (The Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., Indianapolis, 1933), 6th Ed., § 1.
8 Ibid., § 925.
9 Ibid., § 713 et seq.
1o 7 Harv. Bus. Rev. 357 at 359.
11 Jones, op. cit., §§ 1367-8.
12 Ibid., § 1008 et seq., lists the states requiring recording of conditional sales
agreements.
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could not be used with convenience where the financing was to be
furnished by an individual other than the seller.'8
Obviously, then, the ideal security device ought to contain the
following features: (1) acquisition by the lender of the full legal
title as security rather than some form of lien, thereby making
foreclosure upon default unnecessary; (2) simplicity of procedure
whereby sale and financing can be accomplished in one transaction,
even though the financing be provided by someone other than the
seller; and (3) obviation of the necessity for recording under the
various state statutes, yet still affording sufficient notice so as not
to unjustifiably deceive third persons.
The trust receipt was developed to fulfill the needs of business
and to provide the aforementioned desirable attributes of a secur-
ity device. The business methods utilized are relatively simple,
but the legal problems engendered thereby are often technical and
complicated. The typical transaction takes place as follows.'
4
The prospective purchaser, designated as the trustee, orders goods
from the seller, having previously arranged with a banking house
or finance company, named the entruster, to advance the necessary
funds. The purchaser may require financial assistance to the
extent of the full purchase price or, as is more usually the case,
for only eighty or ninety per-cent. of it; the balance he is to furnish
himself and has already placed the same on deposit with the
lending agency. The merchandise so ordered is then shipped under
a bill of lading made out to the order of the seller and by him
endorsed in blank, to which a draft for the purchase price has been
attached. When these documents arrive, the financer honors the
draft and acquires possession of the bill of lading. This is then
turned over to the purchaser but only after he has executed two
instruments: (1) a note in favor of the financer for the money
advanced toward the purchase price of the property, and (2) a
13 An attempt to pervert a conditional sales agreement to perform the functions
properly met by a chattel mortgage was nullified in Raymond v. Horan, Bailiff
of Municipal Court, 323 Ill. App. 120, 55 N. E. (2d) 99 (1944), noted in 23
CHioAGo-KENT LAw REvmw 58-9.
14 A domestic transaction is adequately illustrated by the case of In re James,
Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (1929). For use of trust receipts in financing the importa-
tion of goods, see Assets Realization Co. v. Sovereign Bank of Canada, 210 P. 156
(1914).
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trust receipt by which he acknowledges that the property being
turned over to him belongs to the financer and under which he
agrees to hold it in trust and according to the tenor of the instru-
ment. As a general rule, the trust receipt provides that the prop-
erty taken thereunder can be sold, warehoused, or manufactured
and then sold, the proceeds of sale being applied to the debt. Once
having possession of the bill of lading, the purchaser can obtain
the goods from the carrier and utilize them in the manner set forth
in the trust receipt.
Without attempting to analyze the foregoing transaction ex-
haustively,15 it is obvious that its main purpose is to lodge title
in the financer as security for the funds advanced, while permitting
the purchaser to obtain possession of the goods with the privilege
of sale.16 This gives him an opportunity to realize any surplus
as a profit for himself yet at the same time makes it possible to
obtain funds with which to liquidate the debt evidenced by the
note. The courts have recognized that this is the essential legal
effect of the transaction for the title acquired by the financer-
entruster is not defeated by transfer of possession to the pur-
chaser-trustee, since that individual acknowledges, in the trust
receipt, that title shall remain in the bank or credit company.
17
The relationship between the parties to such a transaction
must be considered not only (1) from the standpoint of the debt
owed by the purchaser to the financer, but also (2) with regard
to the security itself. As to the former, the note which the trustee
executes creates an obligation upon which he is bound without
reference to the security in his possession,' for that property is
15 A more complete analysis may be found in Frederick, "The Trust Receipt as
Security," 22 Col. L. Rev. 395 (1922); Hanna, "Trust Receipts," 29 Col. L. Rev.
545 (1929); Vold, "Trust Receipts in Financing of Sales," 15 Corn. L. Q. 543
(1929).
16 Carter v. Arguimbau, 31 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 3 (1884) : English Bank v.
Barr, 31 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 7 (1888).
17 Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 F. 252 (1912). The court, in In re
Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 F. 245 at 248 (1908), said: "But an examination of the
trust receipts discloses no intention on the part of the petitioners to waive or
surrender their property in the goods, but rather a clear intention to retain such
property, which intention, moreover, was fully acquiesced in .. "
1s Even if the goods are retaken and sold by the financer upon default, the
trustee is still responsible for any deficiency: Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk
Mfg. Co., 170 F. 819 (1909).
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held at his own risk,19 and the destruction thereof, or conversion
by a third party, will not release him from the debt.20 The usual
obligations of the ordinary credit transaction, therefore, are re-
tained in full force and effect. As to the latter aspect, the rights
and duties of the parties concerning the security itself are gov-
erned either by the trust receipt 21 or by the very nature of the
transaction. Therefore, while the trust receipt seldom, if ever,
provides that the financer's title may be defeated by payment of
the obligation, the courts have suggested that this should be the
effect, since he retains his interest in the property only for security
purposes. 22  Besides having the right to eventually acquire title
to the property, one other tangible benefit which the trustee obtains
is that of having actual possession of the goods. This, however,
is limited and subject to the usual provision that the holder of
the trust receipt may repossess the property at any time.23 Since
the very intent of the trust receipt agreement is to preserve the
security interest of the financer in the items turned over to the
trustee, 24 it is understandable that the former will demand the
observance of many duties by the latter with respect to the mer-
chandise. Among the more important of these duties are obliga-
tions on the trustee's part (1) to pay all taxes and other expenses
19 The rule that risk follows title may be abrogated by agreement and this is
usually provided for in the form of the trust receipt. See form used in the case
of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767
(1928).
20 C. I. T. Corporation v. Hawley, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 66, 93 P. (2d) 216 (1939).
21 In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dunn Motors, 172 Ga. 400 at 402, 157
S. E. 627 at 628 (1931), the court said: "They solemnly agreed, and their agree-
ment is evidenced by this trust receipt, that the motor vehicles are the property
of General Motors Acceptance Corp. They made this acknowledgement for a
valuable consideration; and as between the two parties, the party that advanced
the money, and the party that received it and used it, the latter is bound by the
acknowledgement and agreement."
22 There are no cases directly in point, but see opinions in Vaughan v. Massa-
chusetts Hide Corporation, 209 F. 667 (1913), Smith v. Commercial Credit Cor-
poration, 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 A. 637 (1933), and Mershon v. Wheeler. 76 Wis.
502, 45 N. W. 95 (1890).
23 See, for example, trust receipt form used in In re Cattus, 183 F. 733 (1910).
For decisions upholding the right to repossess, see Industrial Finance Corp. v.
Turner, 215 Ala. 460, 110 S. 904 (1927), Scott v. Industrial Finance Corp., 265
S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 181 (1924), and Shield Co. v. Cartwright. 172 S. W. (2d)
108 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
24 Most trust receipts contain the statement that the "intention of said agree-
ment is to protect, and preserve unimpaired, the title of.... ".See form used
in In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282 F. 816 (1922).
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which may accrue against the security;25 (2) to provide insurance
for the property; 2 (3) to keep the goods identifiable and separate
from those of the trustee ;27 (4) to refrain from encumbering the
property with liens, chattel mortgages or the like ;2S and lastly,
(5) to turn over, in kind, any proceeds of sale for application on
the secured debt.
29
As the trust receipt was seldom recorded, disputes over its
validity as against third persons quite naturally arose. Consider-
able litigation developed between the financer and third persons
such as purchasers, mortgagees, pledgees and creditors of the
trustee; all of whom, believing that the trust-receipt property
belonged to the trustee, attempted to acquire some form of interest
therein. It was contended, in behalf of the latter, that as the
entruster had failed to give notice of his secret lien, he should not
be allowed to maintain his title against persons acquiring some
subsequent interest. The answer varied with the jurisdiction.
Some courts determined that filing requirements were applicable,
as the trust receipt corresponded to a chattel mortgage,80 a device
in the nature of one,31 or a conditional sale. 2 Other courts held
25 A typical provision may be observed in the form used in Associate Discount
Corporation v. C. E. Fay Co.. 307 Mass. 577, 30 N. E. (2d) 876 (1941). Pursuant
thereto, it was held in T. D. Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corporation, 245 Mass.
106, 139 N. E. 525 (1923), that the financer was not liable for import duties.
26 See form used in Associate Discount Corporation v. C. E. Pay Co., 307 Mass.
577, 30 N. E. (2d) 876 (1941).
27 Ibid. Violation of this agreement, according to Peoples' Nat. Bank v. Mul-
holland, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917), may entitle the financer to all of the
property pursuant to the doctrine of confusion as applied to personal property.
28 See form used in case mentioned in note 26, ante.
29 Ibid.
30 Commercial Inv. Trust Corporation v. Wilson, 58 F. (2d) 910 (1932) ; Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp M. Sales Co., 233 Ky. 290, 25 S. W. (2d)
405 (1930) ; First Nat. Bank of Ocean City v. Eastern Motor Co., 109 N. 3. L. 372,
162 A. 660 (1932); Commonwealth Finance Corporation v. Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225,
116 A. 722 (1922); General Contract Purchase Corporation v. Bickert, 10 N. J.
Misc. 958, 161 A. 830 (1932) ; Garris v. Commercial Credit Co., 149 S. C. 498,
147 S. E. 601 (1929).
31 C. I. T. Corporation v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85 P. (2d) 713 (1938); In re
Williams, 287 Mich. 689, 284 N. W. 609 (1939); Carrolton Acceptance Co. v.
Wharton, 22 S. W. (2d) 985 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930) ; General Motors Acceptance
Co. v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. 1016 (Tex. Civ. App., 1925).
32 Peoples' Loan & Investment Co. v. Universal Credit Co., 75 F. (2d) 545 (1935)
Pacific Finance Corporation v. Hendley, 103 Cal. App. 335, 284 P. 736 (1930):
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767
(1928) ; Ahrens Refrigerator Co. v. R. H. Williams Co., 176 Okla. 5, 54 P. (2(1)
200 (1936); Commonwealth v. Williams, 93 Pa. Super. 92 (1928).
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that while there might be a difference between the trust receipt
and other security devices, still the general recording act of the
particular state was broad enough to apply.3 3  In such jurisdic-
tions, failure to record rendered the security title of the financer
invalid against such third parties.3 4
But the same problem received different treatment in other
states where the courts held that there was an intrinsic difference
between the trust receipt and a chattel mortgage or a conditional
sales agreement. That distinction was predicated on the fact
that a trust receipt transaction required three parties for its
consummation whereas the other security devices involved but two;
moreover, as between a trust receipt and a chattel mortgage, the
financer obtained his interest from the seller rather than from the
debtor who never did have title. The fact that the debtor had
possession of property in which a hidden title rested in a third
party was deemed not to be as conducive of fraud upon creditors
as would have been the case under an unrecorded chattel mort-
gage.3 5 Similarly, the tri-partite feature took the trust receipt
from the class of conditional sales as the individual holding title
could not be considered a seller in the technical sense; he merely
financed the transaction.36 In these jurisdictions, therefore, re-
cordation was regarded as unnecessary, and the courts consistently
33 In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 F. 657 (1918); In re Richheimer, 221 F. 16
(1915), cert. den. 238 U. S. 624, 35 S. Ct. 662, 59 L. Ed. 1494 (1915).
34 Commercial Acceptance Trust v. Bailey 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 P. 743 (1927)
Auburn Co. v. Namor Corporation, 112 Fla. 89, 149 S. 801 (1933) ; Maxwell Motor
S. Corp. v. Bankers Mortgage & S. Co.. 195 Iowa 384, 192 N. W. 19 (1923) ; Motors
Bankers Corporation v. C. I. T. Corporation, 258 Mich. 301, 241 N. W. 911 (1932) ;
Karkuff v. Mutual Securities Co., 108 N. J. Eq. 128, 148 A. 159 (192-8) ; Dennis-
town v. Barr, 31 Abb. N. C. 21, 28 N. Y. S. 255 (1893) ; General Motors Corp. v.
Seattle Ass'n, etc., 190 Wash. 284, 67 P. (2d) 882 (1937).
35 In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F. (2d) 678 (1928); Armstrong v.
Greenwich Motor Corporation, 116 Conn. 487, 165 A. 598 (1933); Walton v.
Commercial Credit Co., 68 S. D. 151. 299 N. W. 300 (1941) ; Commercial Credit
Co. v. Schleger-Storseth Motor Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 702 (Tex. Comm. App., 1930):
Ivy v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 Wash. 360, 23 P. (2d) 19 (1933).
36
In re Bell Motor Co.. 45 F. (2d) 19 (1930), cert. den. 283 U. S. 832, 51 S. Ct.
365, 75 L. Ed. 1445 (1931) ; Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co.. 170 F.
819 (1909).
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upheld the unrecorded trust receipt against trustees in bank-
ruptcy37 as well as other creditors of the trustee.38
Even in those states where an unrecorded tri-partite trust
receipt transaction was deemed valid as against creditors, the
courts nevertheless reached different conclusions regarding other
third parties who had attempted to acquire an interest in the trust-
receipt property upon the giving of actual value. Where a bona-
fide purchaser bought the goods from the trustee, the decisions
were unanimously in his favor, the courts holding that by allowing
the trustee to have possession with an actual or an implied power
to sell, the financer should be estopped to assert his title.3 9 It has
been noted that one of the express duties of the trustee was not
to mortgage or pledge the property. Serious questions have arisen
as to the status of an individual giving value and taking an interest
by way of mortgage or pledge. Here, however, the decisions were
divided, some courts holding that as no express nor implied power
to pledge or mortgage existed there could be no basis for an
estoppel ;40 but opposite conclusions have been reached on the basis
of Factors' Acts4 ' or the Bills of Lading Act.
42
As the trust receipt became popular, attempts were made to
divorce it from its tri-partite feature. Each, however, was thwarted
37 General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (1935):
Hamilton Nat. Bank v. McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912 (1932); Houck v. General
Motors Acceptance Corporation. 44 F. (2d) 410 (1930) ; In re James, Inc., 30
F. (2d) 555 (1929), reversing 30 F. (2d) 551 (1927) ; In re K. Marks & Co.. 222
F. 52 (1915) ; Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 F. 252 (1912) ; In re Cattus,
183 F. 733 (1910); In re Coe. 183 F. 745 (1910); Charavay & Bodvin v. York
Silk Mfg. Co., 170 F. 819 (1909) ; In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 F. 245 (1908):
Armstrong v. Greenwich Motor Corporation, 116 Conn. 487, 165 A. 598 (1933)
Walton v. Commercial Credit Co., 68 S. D. 151. 299 N. W. 300 (1941).
38 Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 104 (1888); Brown v. Billington,
163 Pa. 76, 29 A. 904 (1894); Mershon v. Wheeler, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 95
(1890).
39 Handy v. C. I. T. Corp., 291 Mass. 157, 197 N. E. 64 (1935) : Clark v. Flynn,
120 Misc. 474, 199 N. Y. S. 583 (1923) : Jones v. Commercial Investment Trust,
64 Utah 151. 228 P. 896 (1924). See also Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corpora-
tion, 81 Fla. 687, 88 S. 876 (1921).
40 Tropical State Bank v. Sunshine Motor Co.. 137 Fla. 703, 188 S.' 595 (1939)
Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motors Co.. 337 Mo. 177, 85 S. W. (2d) 56
(1935); Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887). But see contra,
Monroe v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 75 F. 545 (1896).
41 Blydenstein v. New York Secur. & T. Co., 67 F. 469 (1905) : Industrial Trust
Co. v. Webster Nat. Bank, 258 Mass. 17, 154 N. E. 30 (1926).
42 Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913).
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by the courts, it being consistently held that three parties were
necessary for a true trust receipt transaction. Thus, if the owner
of personal property sold it and gave possession to the buyer under
a trust receipt, reserving to himself a security interest, the courts
classed'this arrangement as a conditional sale.4 3  Similarly, if an
individual borrowing money executed a trust receipt giving as
security a property right in goods he already owned, that trans-
action was treated as a chattel mortgage." As to pledged property
retaken under a trust receipt, there was a divergence of opinion,
one court deciding that the pledgee 's interest was lost and could
not prevail as against creditors of the trustee,45 while another held
that the trust receipt preserved the pledgee's interest even though
the pledgee was out of possession.
46
Even where the tri-partite feature was present, the transaction
would be scrutinized closely to see if the business procedure was
such that title to the merchandise actually did pass to the financer
from the seller. If the bills of lading were made out directly to
the financer, title passed to him. 47  He likewise acquired title if
they were made out to the order of the seller, were endorsed in
blank, and then delivered to him. 48 If, however, the bills of lading
were made out to the trustee so that ownership lodged in him, the
financer's interest was treated as being obtained in such a way as
to result in a chattel mortgage,49 which would probably fail for
non-observance of technical requirements attaching to that device.
This summary of common-law doctrines serves to illustrate
the need which existed in a confused and conflicting field of law.
43 In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F. (2d) 750 (1924) ; Townsend v. Ashepoo
Fertilizer Co., 212 F. 97 (1914) ; White v. General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tion, 2 F. Supp. 406 (1932).
44 In re A. E. Fountain, Inc., 282 F. 816 (1922); Universal Credit Co. v.
Gasow-Howard Motor Co., 73 S. W. (2d) 909 (Tex. Civ. App., 1934); Texas Bank
Y. & T. Co. v. Teich, 283 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926).
45 Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195. 228 P. 441 (1924).
46 In re Breuil & Co., 205 F. 573 (1913). See also Canal-Commercial T. & S.
Bk. v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 161 La. 1051, 109 S. 834 (1926).
47 Assets Realization Co. v. Sovereign Bank of Canada, 210 F. 156 (1914).
48 In re James, Inc.. 30 F. (2d) 555 (1929).
49 In re Draughn & Steele Motor Co., 49 F. (2d) 636 (1931) ; In re Schuttig, 1
F. (2d) 443 (1924) Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Callahan. 271 Mass.
556, 171 N. E. 820 (1930). Contra: In re E. Reboulin Fils & Co., 165 F. 245 (1908),
but note that some of the bills of lading there involved were made out directly
to the dealer.
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To answer that need, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws, in 1933,
presented to the various state legislatures a set of rules designed
to govern trust receipt transactions, now commonly referred to
as the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Twenty-one states have seen
fit to enact these provisions into law albeit with some amendment
and modification ;50 the remainder preferring, for the time being,
to operate under the common-law principles above set forth. In
the interest of comprehension, it is proposed, in the following
discussion, to present a complete analysis of each provision of the
uniform act and of the pertinent decisions thereunder as well as
of the more significant modifications which have been adopted.
The arrangement will follow the general outline of the Act, with
only such minor deviations as may be desirable for purpose of
clarity.
II. TRUST RECEIPTS UNDER UNIFORM ACT
A. CREATION OF RELATIONSHIP
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, while it serves to modify
some of the formalistic rules pertaining to trust receipts and also
permits of their use in certain instances not recognized at common
law, does not alter the basic functions of this type of security
device for the only purpose of the trust receipt still is to permit
one individual to have actual possession of property while another
retains an interest therein. The party having possession is, by the
statute, designated as the "trustee," 51 while the one possessing
5ODeering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, §§ 3012-16; Conn. Gen. Stat., 1939 Supp., Ch.
230a; Ida. Laws 1945, Ch. 73; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%,4, § 166 et seq.; Burn's
Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, § 51-601; Md. Anno. Code, 1943 Supp., Art. 95%; Mass.
Anno. Laws, Ch. 255A; Minn. Stat. Anno., Ch. 522; Mont. Laws 1945, Ch. 147;
Nev. Comp. Laws, 1941 Supp., § 7719; N. H. Rev. Laws 1942, Ch. 263; N. J. Stat.
Anno., Tit. 46, Ch. 35; McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y.. Pers. Prop. Law, Art. 3-A;
N. D. Laws 1945, Ch. 320; Ore. Comp. Laws Anno., Tit. 75: Purdon's Pa. Stat.
Anno., Tit. 68, Ch. 15; S. D. Laws 1945, Ch. 169; Williams' Tenn. Code Anno.,
§ 7792; Utah Code Anno. 1943, Tit. 81A; Va. Code Anno. 1942, 1946 Cum. Supp.,
§ 3848 (70); Rem. Wash. Rev. Stat., 1943 Supp., Tit. 82-B, §11548-30.
51 Uniform Trust Receipts Act, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 166(14).
The term also includes any party succeeding to that individual's interest. The
term "trustee" should not be confused with the term used in equity jurisprudence
for the party taking possession of the property, while called a trustee, is not one
in the technical sense of the word as he does not acquire a legal title which he
holds for the benefit of a beneficiary. See In re Cullen, 282 F. 902 (1922), and
Frederick, "The Trust Receipt as Security," 22 Col. L. Rev. 395 at 399. (Editor's
Note: In the interest of brevity, the abbreviation UTRA will hereafter be used
in conjunction with this article for the fuller phrase "Uniform Trust Receipts
Act.")
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the property interest is referred to as the "entruster." 5 2  It is
not, however, every type of possession in the former nor every
type of interest in the latter which will satisfy the requirements
of the Act. There are limitations pertaining to each.
Only certain classes of property may be held by a trustee under
a trust receipt, to-wit: goods, documents, and instruments.5 3 The
first of these terms has reference to any tangible personal chattels
except such as may have become annexed to realty54 and is suffi-
ciently broad to cover raw materials, manufactured goods, or any
intermediate product. The term "document" is intended to refer
to "any document of title to goods," 5 5 so the trustee may not only
obtain possession of the goods themselves but also of any docu-
ment representing such goods as, for example, a bill of lading or a
warehouse receipt. Thus, if property is stored or in the hands
of a carrier it can still be made the basis of a trust receipt trans-
action. The term "instrument," on the other hand, covers a wide
variety of commercial paper including instruments as so defined
by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and also stocks, bonds,
debentures or other paper customarily exchanged in the ordinary
course of business.
56
Mere possession of any of the above items does not necessarily
signify a trust receipt transaction, for the trustee must have
acquired the property for one of the limited and specified purposes
provided in the Act. If possession is given for other reasons,
the arrangement is not a trust receipt transaction.57 In the case
of the first two classes, possession is permitted in order that the
trustee might sell or exchange the goods or documents, procure
their sale or exchange,55 or deal with the items in such manner as
52 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%. § 166(3). The term also includes
any successor in interest.
5 UTRA § 2-1(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1) (a).
54UTRA § 1: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 166(4). The definition of the
term excludes choses in action and money.
5 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 121 , § 166(2).
56 ,UTRA §1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, §166(5). The term does not
include document of title.
57 UTRA § 2-3; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 167(3).
58 UTRA § 2-3(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(3) (a).
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to prepare them for an eventual sale, as by having the goods
processed, manufactured, loaded and shipped, or unloaded and
stored. 59 While instruments may be released under a trust receipt
for sale, exchange, or the procuring of such, 60 they may also be
turned over for purpose of delivery, depositing, registering, pre-
sentment, collection, or renewal."
Conversely, a trustee's possession of any of the designated
property, even if for the purposes prescribed by the Act, is not
alone sufficient for the entruster must have a property interest
in these items, although it is not necessary that he be the owner.
On the contrary, the Act is explicit in specifying that the latter's
property right is to be for security only so ordinary bailments and
consignments, where possession is acquired by the bailee or con-
signee but full title is retained by the bailor or consignor, do not
amount to trust receipt transactions. 6 2 That "security interest,"
in turn, has been defined as any property interest acquired by the
entruster for the purpose of securing the performance of an obli-
gation.6 3 There is no attempt made in the statute to catalog this
interest in accordance with any common-law scheme of classifica-
tion, but it is clear that as long as some kind of an interest is held
for the purpose of securing some type of obligation it will fall
within the provision, whether it be full ownership, a security title,
or merely a pledgee's interest.
6 4
In the acquisition of that security interest the entruster must,
however, have given new value65 which is defined as including new
59UTRA § 2-3(b) 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 167(3) (b).
60 UTRA § 2-3(a) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(3) (a).
6' UTRA § 2-3(c) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/, § 167(3)(c).
62 UTRA § 15; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 180.
63 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(12). The obligation may be
owed by the trustee or by some third party.
64 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(12). Prior to the statute.
courts were not in harmony as to the type of interest held by the entruster. Some
felt he had full legal title, others merely a security title. The more enlightened
treated it as a special type of ownership not comprehended by any common-law
term. A discussion of the problem may be found in In re Bettman-Johnson Co.,
250 F. 657 (1918); In re Richhetmer, 221 F. 16 (1915), cert. den. 238 U. S. 642,
35 S. Ct. 662, 59 L. Ed. 1494 (1915); and In Frederick, "The Trust Receipt as
Security," 22 Col. L. Rev. 395 at p. 399 et seq.
6r UTRA §§ 2-1(a) and 2-1(b); I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1), sub-
sections (a), (b) and (c).
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loans or advances, the incurring of a new obligation, the release
of a prior security interest which is still enforcible, 6 or the relin-
quishing-of a claim to the proceeds of property which formed the
basis of a prior trust receipt transaction.67 Obviously, then, the
consideration passing between the entruster and trustee must be a
present one, so no valid security interest in trust receipt property
can be based on a past indebtedness or pre-existing claim,68 nor
would the extension or renewal of such an obligation be sufficient
as it is not possible to substitute a secured obligation for an exist-
ing unsecured one. 69 In much the same manner, once property
is held under a trust receipt, obligations thereafter created or addi-
tional advances made cannot be secured by it.7°  There is reason
to believe, however, that if at the time the parties entered into the
original transaction they also entered into a binding commitment
that future advances were to be made such advances, when made,
could be secured by the trust receipt property.7I There is one
exception and that is where the entruster's security interest par-
takes of the nature of a pledgee's interest acquired before the
trust receipt transaction was entered into. If such pledged prop-
erty be released under a trust receipt, the surrender may be deemed
some form of equivalent for new value whether the property was
originally pledged to secure an old debt or for a new loan.
It is apparent, then, that the trust receipt transaction under
the statute is not confined to one type of dealing but may be utilized
66 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 166(7).
67 As the Act gives the entruster the right to the proceeds of property in which
he has a security interest, UTRA § 10, Iil. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 175, the
release or surrender of such a right is considered the giving of new value.
68 UTRA § 14; Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 179.
69 See definition of "new value" set forth in UTRA § 1. Under the Illinois
statute, however, such a renewal or extension is considered to be the giving of
new value: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%/, § 166(7).
70 UTRA § 14 states: ". . . nor shall the obligation secured under any trust
receipt transaction extend to obligations of the trustee to be subsequently created."
See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/, § 179.
71 UTRA § 14 also declares that the property may be security for "... any new
value given or agreed to be given as part of such transaction." Italics added.
It would behoove both parties to make certain that the new advances originally
made are sufficient to fulfill the needs of the trustee or else to execute a specific
agreement that additional loans may later be made, using the same property as
collateral. Unless this is done, the trustee might find himself in a position where
more money is necessary or would be beneficial but cannot be obtained as the only
collateral security he can give is already held subject to a trust receipt.
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in two separate and distinct ways: either (1) for the financing of
purchases of goods where possession of the property is delivered
to the trustee while the entruster retains a security interest therein,
or (2) where property once pledged is returned to the pledgor
under circumstances which would, at common law, have defeated
the pledgee's rights. These differing usages call for distinct treat-
ment.
1. The Trust Receipt as a Financing Device
Consideration of the trust receipt as a financing device first
requires a determination of the type or types of businessmen
entitled to utilize it. The class of persons who may become trus-
tees is easily discernible if reference is made to the purposes for
which possession of property may be obtained under a trust re-
ceipt. It has already been indicated that, at least with regard to
goods and documents, such purpose contemplates an acquisition
for eventual resale so the ordinary consumer appears definitely
excluded, thereby limiting the class of trustees to dealers, manu-
facturers, jobbers, and the like. In much the same way, the defini-
tion of an entruster specifically excludes an individual who sells
merchandise on credit, retaining title to the property under a con-
ditional sales contract or an interest therein by way of purchase-
money mortgage.72 It is, then, self-evident that no seller can ever
become an entruster with reference to the property he sells, so
the class of entrusters is narrowed to third persons not interested
in selling for profit but rather only in the business of providing
financing for purchases being made from others. In theory, any
one other than the seller of property could become an entruster
but for all practical purposes, particularly since this type of
financing is apt to require large sums of capital, the entruster
will usually be either a bank or some other corporation dealing
in commercial credit.
72 UTRA § 1; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 166(3). The express exclusion
of conditional vendors and purchase money mortgagees shows specifically that the
drafters of the Act intended that the trust receipt should be treated as a distinct
type of security device not to be associated with or confused by doctrines relating
to either the mortgage or the conditional sale. In those states which have enacted
the Uniform Act, therefore, it should no longer be possible for courts to confuse
this newer device with the older forms.
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In any discussion of the use of a trust receipt to finance pur-
chases, the word "purchases" is used in its ordinary sense, i.e.
as denoting newly acquired property in contrast to old stocks or
inventories already in the possession of the trustee. Prior to the
statute, courts confined trust receipt financing to the acquisition
of new property, considering that if it was used to refinance old
inventories it would be likely to serve as a fraud upon creditors
of the trustee and upon other third parties. They, having prior
dealings with the owner and knowing him to be such, would have
been unduly imposed upon if, subsequently, another person was
permitted to acquire an interest in the inventory while allowing
possession thereof to be retained by the apparent owner without
giving notice of the secret lien.73 The framers of the present Act
have taken the same position and actually intended that the device
authorized by the statute was to be employed solely in financing
newly acquired property.7 4 No one, therefore, could be misled
for the trustee, obtaining possession subject to the security interest,
had never been an owner. Unfortunately, the Act does not declare
that trust receipt financing is to be confined for use with this type
of property and, as will be seen later, this represents one of its
greatest failings. Keeping in mind the foregoing general prin-
ciples applicable to the two types of financing transactions recog-
nized by the Act, the first where the purchaser ordering the goods
arranges for the financing prior to the actual delivery of the items,
and the second where the documents of title to such property are
already in his possession before he finds financial assistance neces-
sary, it is now possible to analyze each in detail.
The first of these follows the general pattern developed at
common law with the trustee ordering the goods from the seller
and the entruster paying either the full purchase price or a portion
thereof and acquiring a security interest in the items bought under
the familiar tri-partite arrangement, but cumbersome and highly
73 In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F. (2d) 678 (1928) ; Armstrong v.
Greenwich Motor Corporation. 116 Conn. 487, 165 A. 598 (1933) ; Ivy v. Commer-
cial Credit Co., 173 Wash. 360, 23 P. (2d) 19 (1933).
74 See comment in Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act to be
found in 9 Unif. Laws Anno. 665, § A, par. 3.
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artificial requirements such as that the bill of lading under which
the goods are shipped must be made out to the seller, endorsed
in blank by him, and delivered to the entruster, or else be made
out directly to the latter, have been eliminated. It is now possible
for the entruster to acquire his security interest from either the
seller or the trustee ;T5 the property may be delivered to the trustee
either by the entruster or a third person such as the seller; and
the security interest can be acquired by the entruster either at
the time the goods or documents are delivered to the trustee or
promptly thereafter.76 In this fashion, the parties are no longer
compelled to make certain that the security title vests in the en-
truster before the trustee acquires possession of the documents
of title or the goods.
While these changes are highly desirable, they do raise some
technical questions. It is possible, under the foregoing provisions,
that the entruster might pay the purchase price directly to the
seller and acquire possession of the goods, or at least of the docu-
ments of title, taking it upon himself to deliver the same to the
trustee. Under these circumstances it could be argued that the
entruster, having thereby bought the property, would then be
engaged in reselling to the trustee and, as the security interest he
retains may include title,77 such a course of dealing would have all
the attributes of a conditional sale. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that the entruster does not actually sell the property to the
trustee; he merely finances the purchase. His purpose in dealing
with the latter is wholly different from that of a seller for he is
not interested in where the goods were bought nor in what items
were purchased.
It might also be argued that by allowing the interest of the
entruster to be acquired from the trustee after that individual
has obtained actual possession, the Act violates the old theory
that only new acquisitions of property may be financed by trust
receipts. Where the entruster obtains his interest after delivery
75 UTRA § 2-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 167(1).
76 UTRA §2-1(a); Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121'/2, § 167(1) (a).
77 See definition of security interest in UTRA § 1, I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%,
§ 166(12).
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to the trustee, however, he must do so promptly,7" by reason of
which the possession and full title of the trustee is not present
for a long enough period of time to be apt to mislead third persons.
Again, it might be argued that this type of transaction would
closely resemble that of a chattel mortgage, yet here two distinc-
tions are to be noticed. First, as possession under a trust receipt
can only be retained for some purpose enumerated by the Act,
presupposing that there is to be some affirmative action on the
part of the trustee with respect to the property, the arrangement
differs from the ordinary chattel mortgage which does not limit
the mortgagor's possession and is satisfied by a mere retention of
the goods. Second, since the Act does not offer the same amount
of protection against claims by third parties as does the law per-
taining to chattel mortgages, it is unlikely that the ordinary mort-
gagee, should he be possessed of a valid chattel mortgage, would
seek benefit under this statute.
It is conceivable that an individual purchasing goods might
reach the point of obtaining the bill of lading or other document
of title before he finds himself in need of financial assistance. He
may have paid the full purchase price to the seller and now be in
need of new value or, having purchased on a credit basis, is now
unable to meet the obligation when it falls due. Some of the state
statutes take this into consideration by providing that an entruster
may give new value and obtain a security interest in documents
actually shown to him or to his agent at the place of business
of either, even though such documents be retained by the trustee.79
7sUTRA §2-1(a) (iii) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121'/, § 167(1) (a).
79 It will be noted that in the text of the Uniform Act the term "instruments"
and not the word "documents" appears in connection with the definition of this
type of transaction: UTRA § 2-1(b). The Act, as it now reads, would only per-
mit an entruster to obtain a security interest in instruments but not in documents
already in the possession of the trustee. A reference to the Commissioner's note
under this section, however, reveals that the term "documents" was accidentally
omitted from the final draft, and it was recommended that legislatures should
include it in their enactments: 9 Unif. Laws Anno. 677, foil. § 2. The recommenda-
tion was followed in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Washington.
In the foregoing states the transaction described in the body of the article is
clearly possible. The states of Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Virginia did not change
the text so their statutes follow the Uniform Act. Even so, It will be remem-
bered that in that type of transaction where the property is delivered to the
trustee, the Act does permit the entruster to obtain his security interest after the
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This seeming violation of the principles underlying the common-
law tri-partite arrangement would not be so serious if the term
"documents" was limited to bills of lading for then the financial
advance would be made on newly-acquired goods, goods which
had but recently arrived and were now waiting to be claimed
from the carrier. But the term "documents" includes any docu-
ment of title, is comprehensive enough to embrace a warehouse
receipt, and therefore permits the trustee to warehouse a portion
of his old inventory and then use the warehouse receipt as the
basis for obtaining advances upon his old stock. Such a result
is inconsistent with the basic theory behind trust receipt financing,
and it would have been desirable for the framers to have expressly
limited the use of the trust receipt to transactions involving newly
acquired property.
There is occasion to note, in that regard, that the Illinois
statute makes it even easier to employ the trust receipt in financing
old inventories for it does not confine trust receipt financing to
instances where the items in the possession of the trustee at the
outset are simply documents, but specifically permits such a trans-
action in reference to tangible goods already owned by and in the
trustee's possession. 0 As there is no provision that the tangible
goods must have been recently acquired, it would therefore permit
an entruster to obtain a security interest by making advances on
property which has been in the trustee's possession for a consider-
able period of time,"' thus serving to break down still more the
separation between the trust receipt and other financing devices.
goods, documents, or instruments have been delivered, provided he does so promptly:
UTRA § 2-1(a) (iii). It might be urged that this would allow a trustee to ar-
range for financing after the property is in his possession, and, therefore, the
omission of the term "documents" would be of little consequence. Uncertainty
may be engendered, however, by the provision that the security interest must be
acquired "promptly."
so Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1) (c). Similar provisions may be
found In Conn. Gen. Stats., 1939 Supp., Ch. 230a, § B-1(c), and Burns' Ind. Stat.
Anno. 1933, § 51-602-(1) (c).
a' Deering Cal. Civ. Code, 1941 Supp., § 3014.5, p. 96, makes this possible at
least with regard to automobiles for an amendment to the general statute provides
that an entruster may obtain a security interest in new or used cars In the
possession of a dealer and specifically declares that it makes no difference
whether or not the dealer had been owner before the trust receipt transaction.
See also Ore. Laws 1947, Ch. 93. amending Ore. Comp. Laws. Anno., § 75-101 et seq.,
in this respect. But see the case of In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (1948), to
the effect that authority to subject automobiles already owned to a trust receipt
will not extend to other types of property such as electrical household appliances.
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2. Trust Receipts and Pledged Property
A prime disadvantage to the use of the pledge is that once
property has been delivered to the pledgee, the pledgor loses an
asset which, if properly utilized, might provide funds that could
be applied on the very debt for which the article was pledged.
Obviously, it would be advantageous to all parties concerned to
permit the pledgor to retake possession of this property, at least
for the limited purpose of disposing of it and applying the pro-
ceeds to the satisfaction of his obligation, but the difficulty en-
countered at common law lay in the fact that, by returning the
pledged property, the pledgee forfeited his interest therein and
had no claim to it as against the purchasers or creditors of the
pledgor . 2 It is apparent, then, that a pledgee would be acting
very unwisely to part with possession unless he could retain an
interest in the property as against third parties. At this point,
the present Act renders an excellent service by permitting the
trust receipt device to be used in connection with the surrender
of goods, documents, or instruments by one who already has an
interest therein by way of pledge,83 provided always that the ar-
rangement conforms to the other requisites of a trust receipt
transaction.
Delivery to the pledgor for one of the purposes prescribed
by the Act, which includes the sale of pledged property, and thus
makes possible an application of the proceeds on the secured debt,
4
obviates defects in the common-law pledge. But the purpose for
which instruments may be made the basis of a trust receipt trans-
action is not limited to sale but may extend to other affirmative
acts, so pledged paper could be released to the pledgor in order
that it might be deposited, registered, presented for collection, or
82 Schumann v. Bank of Cal., National Ass'n, 114 Ore. 336, 233 P. 860 (1925):
Colby v. Cressy, 5 N. H. 231 (1830).
83 Goods, documents, or instruments may be delivered to a trustee where the
entruster already has a security interest in them: UTRA § 2-1 (a) (i), Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 167(1) (a). By definition, a security interest includes
the interest of a pledgee: UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 166(12).
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that one having a pledgee's interest in goods,
documents, or instruments may deliver them to the pledgor under a trust receipt.
84UTRA § 2-3(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 167(3) (a).
TRUST RECEIPT FINANCING
renewed.8 5 A stockbroker, for example, might retake pledged
securities, sell them during a favorable market, purchase other
stock, and return the substitute collateral without jeopardizing the
rights of the entruster8
Another available type of transaction might well be discussed
under this heading as it is, in effect, a simultaneous pledge and
trust receipt transaction. Under this arrangement an individual
can, by advancing new value, acquire a security interest in instru-
ments which are shown to him or his agent at either's place of
business but which instruments are to be retained by the owner.
8 7
Theoretically, the instruments are pledged for the new value ad-
vanced and then immediately withdrawn under a trust receipt
delivered to the pledgee-entruster as evidence of the fact that
he has acquired an interest therein. Here, again, the purposes
for which possession is retained by the pledgor-trustee must cor-
respond to those enumerated in the Act or the arrangement is not
a trust receipt transaction, but the use of the trust receipt in this
manner can prove invaluable where immediate possession of the
collateral by the pledgor would be either necessary or convenient.
3. Execution of the Trust Receipt
After due attention has been given to see to it that the trans-
action involves the right type of parties, covers only permitted
purposes, is based upon a proper consideration and fits into one
of the recognized classifications for its use, there is one further
step necessary to the creation of a trust receipt relationship. The
trustee should sign and deliver to the entruster a writing (1)
stipulating that the latter holds a security interest in goods, docu-
ments, or instruments delivered to the former or retained by him,
and (2) containing a description of those articles.8 There is no
indication as to how complete the description must be, but reason
would dictate that it should be sufficiently detailed to designate
85UTRA §2-3(c); Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/, §167(3)(c).
86UTRA §2-3(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121h, §167(3)(a).
87 UTRA § 2-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/_, § 167(1)(b).
88 UTRA § 2-1(b) (i); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1) (c) (I).
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the exact goods, documents or instruments involved. Except for
the requirement that the trust receipt must be signed by the trus-
tee, no other formality is necessary to its execution."'
This requirement for written evidence operates as a statute
of frauds and inures to the benefit of purchasers and levying
creditors by protecting them from collusion between an alleged
trustee and a purported entruster where, actually, no trust receipt
transaction ever existed. Failure to take a trust receipt at all
renders the statute inapplicable and deprives the entruster of its
limited protection. 0 In this connection, an important question
presents itself, i. e. when should the writing be received? The
answer seems to be that it depends entirely upon the nature of
the transaction involved. If goods, documents, or instruments are
delivered to the trustee, the trust receipt should be received simul-
taneously with such delivery, as it is from that time on that the
entruster is concerned with preserving his security interest. On
the other hand, if the property is already in the trustee's posses-
sion, the writing should be delivered at the time the entruster
provides new value, since it is then that he acquires a security
interest which requires protection.
There is one situation, however, where the giving of new value
or delivery of goods, documents, or instruments need not be accom-
panied by the receiving of a trust receipt and that is where either
are performed in pursuance of and in reliance upon a contract
to execute a trust receiptY1 Such a contract, if in writing and
signed by the trustee, may be deemed the equivalent of a trust
receipt,9 2 and may be executed either prior to or concurrent with
the delivery of the property or the giving of new value.93  There
is obvious advantage in such a contract at least in the first type
of transaction for while, at the time preliminary arrangements are
being made, the entruster and trustee may be in direct touch with
89 UTRA § 2-2; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%A, § 167(2).
90 Associates Discount Corporation v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N. E. (2d)
876 (1941).
91 UTRA § 2-1(b) (ii) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 167(1) (c) (II).
92 UTRA § 4-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 169(1).
93 UTRA § 2-1(b) (ii); II. Rev, Stat. 1947. Ch. 121 . § 167(1) (c) (II).
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each other, it is conceivable that when the new value is sent or
credited to the trustee neither the entruster nor any of his agents
may be present to demand and receive a trust receipt. In the case
of delivery of goods, documents, or instruments, however, the
contract would seem to serve little purpose for if the trustee is
available to accept delivery he can just as readily sign and deliver
the trust receipt.
A cursory examination of the section authorizing a contract
to give a trust receipt 4 might lead to the belief that every such
contract is equivalent to a trust receipt. A careful analysis will
disclose, however, that this is not the case. The Uniform Act
specifically states that such a contract is equivalent to a trust
receipt where goods, documents, or instruments are delivered to
the trustee in reliance thereon.9 5 This would suggest that a con-
tract to give a trust receipt would not be effective as a trust receipt
if the transaction was one where the trustee already had posses-
sion of the property. There may be a logical reason for this dis-
tinction. Where an entruster attempts to obtain a security interest
in instruments or documents which are in the possession of the
trustee, the Act makes it necessary that such property be exhibited
to him or his agent at either's place of business. 96 As this would
necessitate that either the entruster or his agent be in personal
touch with the trustee, a trust receipt could well be demanded at
the time the new value was given and there would be no need for
the protection afforded by a contract.9 7  Conversely, a contract
to give a trust receipt is effective as a trust receipt where, in
pursuance thereof, goods, documents, or instruments are delivered
by the entruster.98 As the Act recognizes that the trustee may
receive property either from the entruster or from a third person, 99
it would seem that if the latter made the delivery, even though
94 UTRA § 4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 169.
95 UTRA § 4-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 169(1).
96 UTRA § 2-1(b); Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1) (b).
97 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 169(1), makes no distinction, considering the
contract to give a trust receipt as the equivalent of a trust receipt in either
situation. See also Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. 1944, § 51-604-1.
98 UTRA § 4-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y, § 169(1).
9 UTRA § 2-1(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 167(1) (a).
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pursuant to a written contract, that contract would not be equiv-
alent to a trust receipt. It is submitted that none of the distinctions
mentioned have any real basis for their existence so, for the sake
of clarity and understanding, the section should be rewritten
with an eye to making all contracts to give trust receipts equivalent
thereto.'
Assuming that a valid trust receipt has been brought into
existence pursuant to the foregoing requirements, it is now pos-
sible to examine into its operation and effect both as it concerns
the immediate parties and as it may serve to bind third persons.
B. RIGHTS BETWEEN IMMEDIATE PARTIES
The rights and duties of the entruster and trustee arising
from a trust receipt transaction must, of necessity, be segregated
into two classes: (1) those created by the fact that the trustee is
indebted to the entruster, and (2) those created by the fact that
the security for that obligation is in the possession of the trustee.
The first represents nothing more than a debtor-creditor relation-
ship, and the terms of the obligation, such as the maturity date,
the amount owed, and the rate of interest, are the items which
determine their rights and duties with respect to the indebtedness.
Obviously, there is nothing in this which is peculiar to trust receipt
law and, therefore, it is understandable why the Act does not pur-
port to govern the parties with reference to the debt. All that
need be remembered in regard to the obligation itself is that it
remains due and owing no matter what happens to the security,2
unless it is in some manner cancelled by the creditor.
As the primary interest in any discussion of trust receipts
revolves around the rights of the parties with reference to the
trust receipt property, it is essential to determine the origin of
these rights. The trust receipt itself has always been one source.
1While UTRA § 4-2. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/_, § 169(2), directs that the
contract to give a trust receipt, if in writing, may be specifically enforced in
equity, the wise entruster will obviate unnecessary litigation by insisting upon
a formal written and signed trust receipt in every instance. Is there not occasion.
however, to provide statutory basis for specific performance of an oral contract
to give a trust receipt provided the oral contract has been performed sufficiently
to take the case out of a typical statute of frauds?
2 C. I. T. Corporation v. Hawley, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 66, 93 P. (2d) 216 (1939).
TRUST RECEIPT FINANCING
The Act, recognizing this fact, provides that ". . . the terms of
the trust receipt shall, save as otherwise provided by this Act,
be valid and enforceable. "3 Since there are provisions governing
the right of the parties with regard to (1) repossession of the
trust receipt property, and (2) default, the statute functions as
a second source, supplanting the terms of the trust receipt in these
two instances.
1. Terms of the Trust Receipt
Many of the forms utilized by various entrusters provide that
the trustee is to hold the property at his own risk ;4 in other words,
if it is lost through damage or depreciation, the trustee and not
the entruster will bear the loss. Accordingly, whatever befalls the
property, the debt is still due and owing.5 This would seem to
be an inherent feature of the trust receipt device and would prob-
ably be present even though no provisions concerning risk were
embodied in the agreement. Of course, if the property is actually
destroyed, the entruster also stands to suffer a loss. He not only
loses his security but as, in most cases, the trustee is counting on
the proceeds from the sale thereof to retire the indebtedness, the
entruster may also lose the source of payment. In order to protect
himself against such eventuality, it has been the practice to stipu-
late that the trustee is to insure the goods, making the policy
payable to the financer,6 thereby providing a secondary fund out
of which the debt may be satisfied. In rare instances, the entruster
has been known to agree to insure the property himself.
7
Along with the above, the entruster will often provide that
all expenses which accrue against the trust receipt property such
as taxes, storage charges, and the like, must be paid by the trustee.8
3 UTRA § 5; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 170.
4 See trust receipt used in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Miyberry,
195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928).
5 See case cited in note 2, ante.
6 See trust receipt in Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 F. 252 (1912).
7 Note provision In receipt in Armstrong v. Greenwich Motor Corporation, 116
Conn. 487, 165 A. 598 (1933).
8 See forms used in C. 1. T. Corporation v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85 P. (2d) 713
(1938) Associate Discount Corporation v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N.
E. (2d) 876 (1941) ; B. C. S. Corporation v. Colonial Discount Co., 169 Misc. 711.
8 N. Y. S. (2d) 65 (1938).
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Even if these provisions were not inserted, it would appear that,
since the entruster is merely financing the purchases, there would
be no question as between the parties but what the trustee should
be liable for such charges for the entruster's interest is essentially
only one for security purposes and charges of that character typi-
cally fall on the real owner.
The entruster will also attempt to forestall any third person
such as a mortgagee or pledgee from being able to claim rights
in the trust receipt property. It will be recalled that these in-
dividuals were usually given preference over the entruster at com-
mon law and, as will be seen later, this is still true to a limited
extent even under the Act. It therefore behooves the entruster
to attempt to bring to the actual notice of third parties the fact
that the property, although in the possession of the entruster,
is trust receipt property. To that end, he may require the trustee
to place and maintain tags upon the property identifying it as
that of the entruster and, if the property is to be manufactured
or processed, may provide that it should be kept identifiable after
such operation as well as while in the raw state. 10
Where' the trustee is given the liberty of sale his authority
is often limited by the agreement. For instance, the entruster
may provide that the trustee is only to sell on written consent,"
or only for cash, 12 or for a specified sum.18  In some cases it may
be provided that the trustee is not to sell until the full debt is
paid. 14  It must be remembered, however, that while these pro-
visions are binding upon the trustee, they have no effect upon
third parties such as purchasers unless actually brought to their
9 Consider form found in C. I. T. Corp. v. American Nat. Bank, 256 Il. App.
38 (1930).
10 Brown v. Green & Hickey Leather Co., 224 Mass. 168, 138 N. E. 714 (1923);
Peoples Nat. Bank v. Mulholland, 228 Mass. 152, 117 N. E. 46 (1917).
11 Note provision in trust receipt used in C. I. T. Corporation v. Seaney, 53
Ariz. 72, 85 P. (2d) 713 (1938).
12 See trust receipts used in Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 F. 252 (1912),
and in Armstrong v. Greenwich Motor Corporation, 116 Conn. 487, 165 A. 598
(1933).
13 See forms utilized in Associate Discount Corporation v. C. U. Fay Co., 307
Mass. 577, 30 N. E. (2d) 876 (1941), and in Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co.,
37 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 99 P. (2d) 1083 (1940).
14 General Motors Corporation v. Kline, 78 F. (2d) 618 (1935).
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attention."5 When a sale does occur, the entruster is naturally
interested in the proceeds as they provide a means of liquidating
the obligation owed him. It is, therefore, more than likely that
he will stipulate in the trust receipt that the proceeds are to be
turned over to him.16 At common law, if after the trustee acquired
the proceeds he became bankrupt, the entruster could not claim
them unless he could identify the very proceeds arising from the
sale. 17 The Act, as will be seen later, has modified this rule some-
what, but it is still customary to insert a provision requiring the
trustee to keep the proceeds of any such sale separate and iden-
tifiable and forbidding him from intermingling them with his own
property. 8
There is one peculiarity in all trust receipt agreements: they
never expressly indicate that the security title of the entruster
is to be defeated by full payment of the debt as is customary in
real-estate mortgages. However, most courts would recognize
that this is an implied term of the contract since all that the
entruster has is an interest to secure the performance of an obliga-
tion and should have no further rights after performance has been
had.' 9 Absence of express language on the point, in the trust
receipt or in the statute, may well be excused.
2. Repossession and Rights Upon Default
As previously mentioned, the conditions of repossession and
default are not governed by the terms of the trust receipt, but by
the Act itself. At common law, after default upon the obligation,
the entruster could simply seize the trust receipt property without
the necessity of conforming to any formalities, sell it, and apply
the proceeds upon the debt. This was accomplished by embodying
15 UTRA § 9-2(a) (i); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 174(2) (a) (II).
16 See form in Armstrong v. Greenwich Motor Corporation, 116 Conn. 487, 165
A. 598 (1933).
17 In re Mulligan, 116 F. 715 (1902) ; Vaughan v. Massachusetts Hide Corpora-
tion, 209 F. 667 (1913).
18C. I. T. Corp. v. American Nat. Bank, 256 Il. App. 38 (1930).
19 There are no cases directly in point, but see opinions in Vaughan v. Massa-
chusetts Hide Corporation, 209 F. 667 (1913); Smith v. Commercial Credit Cor-
poration, 113 N. J. Eq. 12, 165 A. 637 (1933); Mershon v. Wheeler, 76 Wis. 502, 45
N. W. 95 (1890).
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a provision in the agreement permitting the taking of the prop-
erty at any time, a right recognized by the courts upon the theory
of title in the entruster.20  In most cases today, however, the en-
truster does not advance up to the full value of the property and
the trustee has a financial investment therein which should be
protected by regulating the former's right to dispose of the prop-
erty on default. The framers of the present Act, realizing this,
have made it mandatory for the entruster to abide by certain
formalities before he can realize upon his security.
As between the trustee and entruster, the latter is given the
right to possession upon default. 21  The term "default" raises
the problem of whether it simply denotes nonpayment of the debt
at maturity or includes any breach of the various terms of the
trust receipt, but as the Act also permits the entruster to take
possession according to the tenor of the agreement,22 and since
the writing usually provides for repossession "at any time,'
'23
"whenever the entruster feels insecure," 24 or "upon demand," 25
it is obvious that the right of possession need not depend upon
the existence of a default as that term is customarily used. Merely
by embodying one of the aforementioned provisions in the trust
receipt and exercising the option, the entruster can acquire an
absolute right to possession. One might be led to the conclusion
that this absolute right is far too arbitrary but it must be men-
tioned that the entruster is not completely protected for the Act
merely offers a limited safeguard against the rights of third
persons. Considerable faith must be placed in the honesty and
integrity of the trustee, and if this reliance should prove un-
founded, the existence and exercise of an absolute and immediate
20 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dunn Motors, 172 Ga. 400, 157 S. E. 627
(1931) ; Scott v. Industrial Finance Corporation, 265 S. W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1924). See also Industrial Finance Corporation v. Turner, 215 Ala. 460, 110 S.
904 (1927).
21 UTRA § 6-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212. § 171(1).
22 Ibid.
23 B. C. S. Corporation v. Colonial Discount Co., 169 Misc. 711, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
65 (1938).
24 Associates Discount Corporation v. C. E. Fay Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N. E.
(2d) 876 (1941).
25 Scott v. Industrial Finance Corporation, 265 S. W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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right to regain possession might be the only way to prevent serious
loss.
In opposition, it is unlikely that options of this character would
be exercised capriciously for, by indulging in such practices, the
entruster would not only jeopardize his reputation, risk the loss
of further financing opportunities, but would gain no appreciable
advantage. The Act does not permit the entruster to sell the
property until there has been a default,20 so any trustee who had
been imposed upon could, by meeting his obligations promptly,
prevent a sale of his property and, upon payment of the entire
debt, demand its return. 27  It is probable, of course, that the
trustee may have been relying upon the proceeds from the sale
of the very goods held under the trust receipt to liquidate the debt
so that, by being deprived of the property, he will be forced to
default. If he could not obtain refinancing, the entruster would
eventually be permitted to sell the property but even so any sur-
plus arising from such sale must be returned to the trustee,28 hence
there is little opportunity for financial gain to the entruster or loss
to the trustee, except as property sold under distress circumstances
may fail to produce its true worth.
Having determined that the entruster has an absolute right
to possession which he can ordinarily exercise at any time he
desires, the next question is: by what methods can he retake the
property? It is possible that the trustee will return it upon a
simple demand, particularly if he intends to utilize this financing
device in the future, for any difficulty encountered by one entruster
would adversely affect the trustee's credit standing with others
in the business. If not, the Act makes it possible for the entruster
to seize the property without legal process if this can be accom-
26 UTRA § 6-3(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 171(3) (b).
27 When the entruster takes possession of the property, he holds it as a pledgee:
UTRA §6-3(a), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 171(3) (a). One of the duties of
a pledgee is to return the property as soon as the debt is paid. and a refusal to
do so upon demand would constitute a conversion: Brown. A Treatise on the
Law of Personal Property (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1936), § 103.
28 UTRA § 6-3(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%. § 171(3) (b).
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plished without a breach of the peace.20  The problem as to what
constitutes a breach of the peace depends entirely upon the facts
in a given situation and, therefore, will not be discussed. 0 A far
more important item is whether the seizure must be preceded by
a demand. A retaking by the vendor under a conditional sales
contract would seem to present an analogous situation, and in this
respect the courts have held that if the agreement embodies a
provision for demand, it is necessary. 1 If it specifically states
that no demand is essential, then none is required.32 If no refer-
ence is made either way, courts have decided that a demand is not
a requisite.88 An entruster who cannot acquire possession of the
property without legal process will have to avail himself of one
of the various forms of action provided by law. Since he has both
a right to immediate possession and some type of interest in the
property, it is apparent that replevin would be an appropriate
remedy, 4 or in some states statutory detinue.35
Once the entruster acquires possession, he holds the property
as a pledgee, but with the additional right to sell in the manner
prescribed by the Act and also to exercise a forfeiture of the
trustee's interest under certain circumstances. 6 It is only logical
that the entruster should be treated as a pledgee for, at this point,
the relationship between the parties closely resembles that of
pledgor-pledgee; the entruster having possession of property as
security for a debt or obligation owed to him while the rights of the
trustee have not yet been entirely extinguished. The rights and
29 UTRA § 6-2; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 171(2). In North Dakota, under
Laws 1945, Ch. 320, § 6-2, there has been substituted a provision that possession
may be obtained ". . . in any manner permitted by law for taking possession of
personal property subject to lien."
30As to what is considered peaceful taking in the case of repossession of prop-
erty by a mortgagee or a conditional vendor, see Jones, The Law of Chattel
Mortgages and Conditional Sales (The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1933), 6th
Ed., §§ 705, 1339 and 1340.
a' Young v. Corbitt Motor Truck Co., 148 S. C. 511, 146 S. E. 534 (1929).
a2 Vorenberg v. American House Hotel Co., 246 Mass. 108, 140 N. E. 297 (1923).
33Wooley v. Williams, 105 Conn. 671, 136 A. 583 (1927); Proctor v. Tilton, 65
N. H. 3, 17 A. 638 (1889).
34 These are the requisites for the maintenance of such an action in Illinois:
Gazelle v. Doty, 73 Ill. App. (1898) ; Persels v. McConnell, 16 Il. App. 526 (1885).
35 This type of action was held appropriate in Industrial Finance Corporation
v. Turner, 215 Ala. 460, 110 S. 904 (1927).
36 UTRA § 6-3(a) ; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 171(3) (a).
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duties of a pledgee under such circumstances, not being peculiar
to trust receipt transactions, are amply treated elsewhere and do
not warrant repetition.
7
One point does become significant, however, for the entruster's
right to sell the trust receipt property is limited to a "default," 3 8
a term which requires some discussion for upon it hinges the
entruster's privilege of sale. Does it simply mean nonpayment
of the obligation, or does it have reference to any breach of the
many provisions which may be embodied in a trust receipt ? That
term has been defined, in standard dictionaries, as the "omission
or failure to fulfill a duty, observe a promise, discharge an obliga-
tion, or perform an agreement." Using this broad definition,
reason would dictate that the entruster could exercise his privilege
of sale upon the breach of any provision of the trust receipt, and
not solely because of nonpayment of a debt due and owing. The
advisability of utilizing this broad definition can be argued either
way. Observing the situation from the entruster's point of view,
each of the provisions embodied in the trust receipt were written
in for his protection and, if they are not complied with, he is not
receiving the safeguards contracted for. Under those conditions
he should be able to withdraw from the arrangement and, if the
debt due him cannot be satisfied by any other method, he should
have the privilege of selling the security. On the other hand, it
might be urged that since the main purpose for allowing a sale
is to permit the entruster to realize upon the security only when
he is unable to do so on the obligation, sale should be confined
to those circumstances. The mere fact that one of the minor
provisions of the trust receipt might have been breached does not
necessarily mean that the debt will not be paid. It can only be
noted, however, that this remains one of the unsettled points on
the subject but doubt might be removed if the obligation contained
a clause permitting acceleration in case of breach of any of the
conditions of the trust receipt.
37 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Personal Property (Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc., New York, 1918), 5th Ed., § 401 et seq.
38 UTRA § 6-3(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211Y, § 171(3) (b).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Before any privilege of sale can be exercised, the entruster
must notify the trustee in writing five days prior to the disposal
of the goods,39 which notification may be served personally or
mailed to the last known business address of the trustee.40 While
the sale may be either a public or a private one, the entruster can
only become a purchaser of the trust receipt property at the
former,41 hence the notice ought to be adequate for the purpose
as well as specific with reference to the time and place. Since
bidding at a public sale is apt to be more spirited and there is
less likelihood that the entruster could, through collusion, purchase
the property at a fraction of its actual value, the former method
would seem more desirable from the standpoint of the trustee who,
while entitled to any surplus, is also liable for any deficiency.
The funds realized from either type of sale are to be applied
(1) to pay the expenses thereof; (2) to pay the cost of taking,
keeping, and storing the property; and (3) to satisfy the indebted-
ness, priority being given in that order.42 The first item is self-
explanatory; the second allows the entruster to secure reimburse-
ment for all expenses he has incurred with reference to the prop-
erty up to the time of its sale, and would probably include all neces-
sary attorney's fees and court costs ;43 the third, coupled with the
next provision to the effect that the trustee is entitled to any sur-
plus and liable for any deficiency, is merely a restatement of the
common law.
44
It is conceivable that an entruster might dispose of trust
receipt property in the absence of a default or in a manner con-
trary to the requirements of the Act. His action would be in
derogation of the trustee's rights and could well form the basis
of a suit. However, the trustee's recourse is only against the
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. The right to such notification belongs only to the trustee, so no one
else can object if it is not properly given: C. I. T. Corporation v. Commercial
Bank of Patterson, 64 Cal. App. (2d) 722, 149 P. (2d) 439 (1944).
41UTRA § 6-3(b) ; II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 171(3) (b).
42 Ibid.
43 A provision calling for reasonable attorney's fees is often included in the
trust receipt. See form used in C. I. T. Corporation v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85
P. (2d) 713 (1938).
44 Charavay & Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 F. 819 (1909).
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entruster, the Act providing that a "purchaser in good faith and
for value from an entruster in possession takes free of the Trus-
tee's interest, even in a case in which the Entruster is liable to
the Trustee for conversion. "145 As both "purchaser '" and 'value"
are defined terms under the Act,46 there can be no dispute as to the
class of individuals protected by this provision.
Sale by the entruster is not the only method by which the
trustee's interest in trust receipt property may be lost. The par-
ties to the transaction may, after default, enter into an agreement
whereby the trustee surrenders his interest in the property ;47 even
a complete forfeiture is conceivable. As the Act specifically forbids
the inclusion of a forfeiture clause in a trust receipt except as to
certain items,48 the operation of these two provisions would seem
inconsistent except as a careful analysis of the trustee's position
makes the distinction apparent. At the time he enters into the
agreement, being a necessitous man, he would be prone to accept
any conditions that the lender might impose and needs protection
against ill-advised action. After default, no longer obliged to
accept every proposal dictated by the entruster, he is in a position
to judge for himself which course would benefit him most. Settle-
ment at that time by agreement is reasonable as it facilitates the
winding up of the transaction and makes unnecessary the fore-
closure formalities set forth in the statute.
Since the entruster usually advances eighty to eighty-five per-
cent. of the purchase price, the trustee will have an investment
of only fifteen to twenty per-cent. in the property he holds under
a trust receipt. Any substantial depreciation in its value will
almost always wipe out his interest, leaving barely enough to
45 UTRA § 6-3(c); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 171(3) (c).
46 " 'Purchaser' means any person taking by purchase. A pledgee, mortgagee
or other claimant of a security interest created by contract is, in so far as con-
cerns his specific security, a purchaser and not a creditor." UTRA § 1; Ii. Rev.
Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 166(11). "'Value' means any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. Any antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for
money or not, and whether against the transferor or against another person,
constitutes value where goods, documents or instruments are taken either in
satisfaction thereof or as security therefor." UTRA § 1; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 1211, § 166(15).
47 UTRA § 6-4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 171(4).
48 UTRA § 5; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 170.
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cover the indebtedness due the entruster. The Act takes this into
consideration and provides that the parties may embody a clause
in the trust receipt whereby the trustee, upon default, is to forfeit
his entire interest in the property but then only if the property
consists of goods "manufactured by style or model."4 9 Merchan-
dise of this, character suffers a large depreciation in a relatively
short period of time for new models or styles are placed on the
market periodically, thereby rendering the old obsolescent if not
obsolete. Where property of this type is involved, the trustee's
interest has usually been wiped out by the time any default takes
place so it is understandable why the Act should -permit the
trustee to agree to forfeit his interest on default and make fore-
closure unnecessary. This privilege may be exercised at the elec-
tion of the entruster, and its presence should have no effect upon
his other remedies. ° Where a forfeiture is claimed, the entruster
must be willing to permit a cancellation of the indebtedness on a
sliding scale. If the default occurs upon the maturity date of the
original obligation, at least eighty per-cent. of the purchase price
or of the indebtedness, whichever is larger, must be cancelled.5 1
If it occurs on the maturity date of the first renewal, then the
cancellation must be at least seventy per-cent. of the alternative
figure mentioned. In the case of any further renewal, the figure is
sixty percent. 52
49UTRA §6-5; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, §171(5). For an example of
this type of clause, see trust receipt used in Commercial Discount Co. v. Los
Angeles County, 16 Cal. (2d) 158, 105 P. (2d) 115 (1940).
5o The Illinois statute makes certain of this by providing that the right to
exercise the forfeiture privilege is ". . . an alternative to the remedies herein-
before provided. . . ." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212/2, § 171(5).
51 UTRA § 6-5. Both the Illinois and Indiana statutes merely provide for the
cancelling of 80% of the indebtedness and do not provide for the alternative of
cancelling an amount equal to 80% of the purchase price, if that should be
larger: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 171(5) ; Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno.
1933, § 51-606(5).
52 There is ambiguity in the language of UTRA § 6(5) since it is not too clear
whether the 80% factor relates to both purchase price and original indebtedness
or simply to the former. If to both, a loan not exceeding 80% of the purchase
price would seemingly be extinguished by forfeiture, but a loan for a larger
amount would not be so extinguished and would still leave the trustee subject to
a deficiency. The procedure is not entirely comparable to the strict foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage.
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C. EFFECT ON THIRD PARTIES
The operation of a trust receipt transaction between the im-
mediate parties having been considered, the next item of impor-
tance is to determine its effect, and the effect of the entruster's
security interest in the property, upon third persons. In that
respect many questions may arise but, as the present Act divides
such third persons into two categories, to-wit: creditors and pur-
chasers, these several problems can best be considered under those
sub-headings. The first group includes not only individual cred-
itors but also those represented by a trustee in bankruptcy, a
receiver in insolvency, or an assignee for the benefit of creditors.
The term "purchasers," on the other hand, takes in every type
of individual who for value acquires a specific interest in the trust
receipt property while it is in the possession of the trustee and
includes purchasers, mortgagees, pledgees, subsequent entrusters
and the like.
1. Creditors of the Trustee
The crux of the conflict in the earlier decisions concerning the
validity of an unrecorded trust receipt as against the trustee's
creditors represented merely a difference in the attitude of the
various jurisdictions concerning the necessity of protecting credi-
tors of the trustee against the secret lien of the entruster. Outside
of this difference, the cases are in harmony for it was never con-
tended that the primary parties were not bound by their agree-
ment, and the conclusion to protect bonafide purchasers from this
type of lien nowhere met with opposition. As to creditors, how-
ever, the situation was entirely different. Some courts were will-
ing to sacrifice them to the needs of business while others declined
so to do, believing that unless the trust receipt was recorded the
creditors of the trustee should have the right to levy upon the
property in order to satisfy their claims. The former group treated
the trust receipt as a valid security device even though not re-
corded; the latter, seeking to protect creditors, drew various
analogies between it and a mortgage or conditional sale agreement,
leading to an insistence upon recordation. The task of reconciling
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these two views, each of which has merit, was a problem faced by
the framers of the present Act. Undisputably, business needs de-
manded a type of security device fashioned along the lines of the
common law trust receipt; on the other hand, the needs of creditors
could not be entirely disregarded. The problem was solved by first
recognizing that all creditors did not stand in the same position;
some were entitled to more consideration than others. For that
reason, the Act draws a dictinction between individual levying
creditors or those represented by either a trustee in bankruptcy or
a receiver in insolvency on the one hand, and those obtaining a
specific lien against the property for work and services on the
other. The former are given a limited amount of protection, while
the latter are fully safeguarded.
a. General Creditors
As against the ordinary general creditors of the trustee, the
security interest of the entruster is valid for thirty days after
delivery of the goods, documents, or instruments, irrespective of
whether such creditors have actual or constructive notice of its
existence. 3 No creditor can satisfy his claim out of the trust
receipt property during that period and, as a consequence, the Act
creates an absolute and unconditional secret lien for a limited time.
State legislatures enacting this provision must have felt that the
advantage to be gained by doing away with the necessity for
recording a security device so frequently utilized in connection with
short-term loans would far outweigh the ill-regarded aspects of
the secret lien. It is not for the courts to question their wisdom.
5 4
The precise duration of that secret lien, however, is not easy
to fix. The Act provides a method for its calculation, but to
understand the operation of the statute one must recall that there
are two kinds of transactions falling within its scope. The first
occurs where goods, documents, or instruments are delivered to
53 UTRA § 8-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 173(1). Idaho does not recog-
nize the thirty-day period of validity without recordation: Ida. Laws 1945, Ch. 73,
§ 8-2.
54 See comment in In re Boswell, 96 F. (2d) 239 (1938), affirming 20 F. Supp.
748 (1937).
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the trustee; the second where the items are in the trustee's posses-
sion at the outset. 55 It is necessary that these be treated separately,
as the Act draws a distinction between them in determining the
commencement of the thirty-day period.
In the first type of transaction, the date the property is deliv-
ered to the trustee becomes the controlling date.5 6 Where the trust
receipt is used to finance a single purchase and the goods are all
received by the trustee on the same date, there is no complication.
If the items are purchased under a contract making provision for
several shipments, however, a new thirty-day term would seem-
ingly commence with each delivery, covering the property received
in that particular delivery. It might be difficult to ascertain the
precise article received on any given date, especially where the
chattels are similar in style and model and have no other identify-
ing features, and in the absence of separate trust receipts covering
each separate delivery there could be no end to the confusion which
might result.
The seemingly simple and understandable statutory language
also leads to other problems. The first is whether, after the thirty-
day period has elapsed, the entruster could repossess the items,
redeliver them under another receipt, and thus obtain the benefit
of another term. As the framers of the Act used the word "deliv-
ery" and not I I redelivery, " I the choice in language may be adequate
to take care of the situation particularly when coupled with the
necessity for new value to support each trust receipt. Certainly,
such practice, even if possible within the wording of the statute,
would scarcely conform to its spirit for the practical effect thereof
would be to permit a secret lien of unlimited duration. Another
problem involves somewhat similar circumstances except that the
original articles are not redelivered but substituted property is
given over. It might be argued that as the second lot of goods are
new articles the entruster should be given the benefit of another, or
really a distinctly new, term. If the second lot is, in reality, merely
55 UTRA §§ 2-1(a) and 2-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121h, §§ 167(1) (a) (b)
and (c).
56 UTRA § 8-1; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 173(1).
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a substitute, however, the situation should not be treated any dif-
ferently than if the original articles had been redelivered.
Still another variation might arise. Suppose an entruster
delivers a bill of lading under trust receipt to the trustee in order
that the latter may obtain possession of the goods from the carrier
for storage or processing. The thirty-day secret lien, at least as to
the bill of lading, would commence as soon as that document was
delivered and received. The goods having been stored, or processed
and stored, the warehouse receipt is then turned over to the
entruster in lieu of the bill of lading. In order to sell the property,
the ultimate aim in most trust receipt transactions, the trustee later
acquires possession of the warehouse receipt under another trust
receipt and, through it, the precise goods previously handled. The
question is, does the release of the warehouse receipt initiate
another thirty-day period, or is it part and parcel of the first
delivery of the bill of lading? The documents are different, but the
goods represented thereby are the same. The solution is difficult,
and the answer cannot be obtained from a reading of the Act.
Complicating matters still further, it is readily conceivable
that the trustee might retain the articles for less than the thirty-
day period, turning them back or having them retaken by the
entruster and the latter keeping them for some part of the remain-
ing portion of that time. If the entruster should restore the goods
to the trustee, it might be argued that the interval during which the
entruster held possession should not be counted as the Act permits
a secret lien for a thirty-day period and time should cease to run
when the necessity for a secret lien is suspended and not commence
again until the entruster returns the property. Such an argument
would seem to be out of the realm of practicality as it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to compute the thirty days on such a
basis, but again the statute fails to supply a precise solution and
obviously needs clarification.
A different method of computation is used where, at the outset,
the property is already in the possession of the trustee. Under
most statutes, such a trust receipt transaction is permitted only in
reference to instruments and documents. There the period com-
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mences from the time the papers are actually shown to the en-
truster, or he gives new value, whichever is prior.5 7 The date at
which new value is given is important because it is then that the
entruster acquires an interest and needs the protection afforded by
the Act. It is difficult, however, to comprehend the reason for
beginning such protection from the moment of exhibiting the in-
struments or documents, if that date was prior to the giving of
new value, unless the framers were attempting to protect the
entruster from the time he contemplated acquiring a security in-
terest. From a business standpoint this is convenient, and perhaps
necessary, for an individual might not be in position to transfer
new value at the instant when the documents or instruments are
exhibited to him but could well do so on a later occasion. During
the interval between viewing the papers and the ultimate delivery
of the consideration, creditors might have attached or made a levy
upon the property. The entruster, but for this provision, would be
required to ascertain whether anything of this nature had taken
place, and such investigation would slow down business procedure,
particularly where parties are separated by distance.
But again, peculiarities are introduced at least in those states
which do not confine this type of transaction to documents and
instruments but also apply it to goods.58 In two such states, a
distinction is made as to the time at which the thirty-day period
starts. In the case of goods and documents, the time is figured
from the date at which new value is given, but if instruments form
the basis, the transaction is treated in the same manner as in the
Uniform Act, i.e. the period is calculated from the time of exhibit-
ing them or the giving of new value, whichever is prior.5 9 There is
no legitimate foundation for the drawing of a distinction between
documents and goods on the one hand and instruments on the other
in fixing the computation of the thirty-day period, and such artifi-
cial distinctions ought to be abolished.
57 UTRA § 8-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 173(1).
58 Conn. Gen. Stats., 1939 Supp., Ch. 230a, § B1(c); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.
1211/, § 167(1) (c) ; Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933, § 51-602-(1) (c).
59111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, §173(1); Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. 1933,
§ 51-608(1).
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Still another peculiar situation exists in Illinois where the
term "new value" is defined to include the renewal or extension of
advances or loans,60 whereas these are expressly excluded under
the Uniform Act.61 As the giving of new value determines the
commencement of the thirty days in most instances, it would be
possible in Illinois, by making the original obligation run for less
than thirty days and then by granting a renewal at maturity to
prolong the transaction into an unlimited secret lien.
In many instances, a period of thirty days will be ample time
in which to accomplish the purposes for which the trust receipt
transaction was entered into and a secret lien for a longer period
is neither necessary nor desirable. This would be true more often
than not in cases involving instruments as the purpose for which
possession thereof is given usually contemplates delivery, collec-
tion, or some other activity which can be consummated rapidly.
Such is not always true in situations concerning goods or docu-
ments. As a result, the entruster will need to consider the measures
to be taken to preserve his security interest against creditors after
the initial thirty days have elapsed. The Act furnishes two alterna-
tives. He can, of course, re-acquire possession of the trust receipt
property promptly and, so long as he retains that possession, his
interest is safeguarded.62 This method will not be satisfactory in
the majority of cases, as the very reason for the trust receipt is to
allow the trustee to have possession. The other alternative, then,
is for the entruster to give notice of his interest by utilizing the
procedure established by the Act.
63
An entruster who has complied with the recording provisions
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(7).
61 UTRA § 1.
62 UTRA § 7-2; II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 172(2). Section 1 of the Uni-
form Act, IRl. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(9), declares: "'Possession' as used
in this act with reference to possession taken or retained by the Entruster, means
actual possession of goods, documents, or instruments, or, in the case of goods,
such constructive possession as, by means of tags or signs or other outward marks
placed and remaining in conspicuous places, may reasonably be expected in fact
to indicate to the third party in question that the entruster has control over
or interest in the goods."
63 UTRA § 13; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 178. The statute merely pro-
vides for filing where goods or documents are in the possession of the trustee
under a trust receipt; no provision is made for filing where Instruments form
the basis of the transaction.
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within the thirty-day period is protected against acts by any of the
trustee's creditors after that period has lapsed.6 4 If filing does not
take place until after the term, the recording provides valid
prospective notice but does not relate back.6 5 As a consequence,
during this intervening period, the entruster's interest lies un-
protected, and a lien creditor who becomes such during that time
without notice of the entruster's rights may attach or levy for the
entruster's interest is void as to him.
66
The term "lien creditor" is defined as one acquiring a specific
lien by attachment, levy, or other similar judicial process, includ-
ing a distraining landlord.6 7 He is, in other words, a general cred-
itor who has attempted to satisfy his claim out of the property
held, and believed to be owned, by the trustee. As his right to seek
satisfaction out of the trust receipt property depends upon the ac-
quisition of his lien during the unprotected period, it becomes im-
portant to determine the exact time he becomes a lien creditor.
The Uniform Act provides that a creditor's lien attaches as of the
date the process is issued, provided it results in a levy or attach-
ment within a reasonable time thereafter. 8 The term "issuance,"
when used in conjunction with legal processes or writs, is usually
understood as referring to the time of the delivery thereof to the
requisite executing officer 69 and the Massachusetts statute specifi-
cally recognizes this definition.70 Unfortunately, the Illinois statute
possesses no such provision and reference must be made to the
general laws of the state in determining the time at which a general
creditor becomes a lien creditor. The answer depends entirely
upon the type of proceeding. For instance, a judgment becomes
effective as a lien upon personal property as soon as the execution
64 UTRA § 7-1(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 172(1) (a).
65 UTRA § 7-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 172(1) (b).
66 UTRA § 8-2; IM. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 173(2).
67 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(6).
68 UTRA § 8-3 (a). The provision was omitted in the Illinois statute.
69 Oskaloosa Cigar Co. v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 89 N. W. 1065 (Iowa, 1902) ; Mills
v. Corbett, 8 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 500 (1853).
70 Mass. Anno. Laws, Ch. 255A, § 8, provides: "For the purpose of this para-
graph the date of the Issuance of an original writ in an action at law shall be the
date when it was placed in the hands of an officer for the purpose of making an
attachment of the goods."
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process is handed to the executing officer. 71 In attachment pro-
ceedings, the lien acquired by the judgment relates back to the time
when the property was first levied upon.72 In the case of a distress
proceeding by a landlord, the lien attaches only when there is an
actual seizure under the distress warrant.
7 3
Notice of the entruster's security interest will always defeat
the rights of levying creditors, in spite of the fact that no filing has
taken place after the expiration of the thirty-day period7 4 but the
term "notice" is not defined and a problem arises as to what kind
of notice will suffice. Must the creditor have actual knowledge that
the property he is about to levy upon is held under a trust receipt,
or is it sufficient for him to know that his debtor finances purchases
in this manner so that he might well suspect that the articles are
so held? Where the Act requires the presence of actual notice of
the entruster's security interest, as in the case of purchasers in the
ordinary course of trade,7 5 it uses that specific term. There may be
indication from this fact that any type of notice should serve to
defeat the rights of a levying creditor, but uncertainty on the point
is not desirable.
The failure of the entruster to file or take possession of the
property after the thirty-day period has elapsed also voids his
security interest as against all ordinary creditors represented by
either an assignee for their benefit, a receiver in equity, or a trus-
tee in bankruptcy, 76 provided the representative attains his posi-
tion at a time subsequent to the expiration of the thirty-day period
and prior to any filing. Acquisition of status is determined in the
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 77, § 9. See also Grimes v. Rodgers, 263 Ill. App.
429 (1931).
72 Juillard v. May, 130 11. 87, 22 N. E. 477 (1889); Smith v. Clinton Bridge
Co., 13 Ill. App. 572 (1883).
73 Powell v. Daily, 163 Il1. 646, 45 N. E. 414 (1896); National Cash Register
Co. v. Wait, 158 Ill. App. 168 (1910).
74 UTRA § 8-2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 173(2).
75UTRA § 9-2(a) (ii) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 174(2) (a) (II).
76 UTRA § 8-3(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 173(3). In accordance with
this provision, the court in In re McManus Motors, 27 F. Supp. 113 (1939), held
that trust receipts more than thirty days old were void as against a receiver
where no statement had been filed. On the other hand, where in accordance with
the Act a statement had been filed, the trustee in bankruptcy had no claim to the
trust receipt property. See also Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal.
App. (2d) 439, 99 P. (2d) 1083 (1940).
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case of an assignee for the benefit of creditors as of the time of
the assignment; in- the case of a receiver, from the time of his
appointment; and if he is a trustee in bankruptcy, from the time
the petition was filed either by or against the insolvent trustee.7
7
Personal knowledge on the part of the representative of the en-
truster's security interest, either prior to or at the time of his
appointment, does not defeat the rights of the creditors repre-
sented. Only if, and when, all of the creditors have notice can it be
said that their right to claim the benefit of the trust receipt prop-
erty would be in jeopardy, 7 so the practical effect of this provision
is to make a trust receipt transaction void as to the three types of
representatives if the entruster fails to file after the lapse of the
permissive secret lien. It might be noted that the same doubt exists
here as to just what will constitute "notice" as was pointed out
above.
b. Creditors Claiming Artisan's Liens
The rights of the ordinary general creditors of the trustee
having been considered, it is now important to give thought to the
second type of creditor whose position with respect to the en-
truster's security interest is regulated by the Act. He is the indi-
vidual who obtains a lien against the trust receipt property in the
ordinary course of business for work done or services expended
thereon.79  The case of T. D. Downing Company v. Shawmut
Corporation° was probably the inspiration for the separate section
of the Act dealing with this type of creditor. The defendant there
concerned financed the importation of goods for an importer under
a typical trust receipt arrangement. Upon arrival, the goods were
placed in a bonded warehouse where they had to remain until the
requisite customs duties were paid. The importer was not in
financial position to meet these duties and could not obtain posses-
sion of the property. The plaintiff, a customs broker, made it a
77UTRA §8-3(b) (i), (ii) and (iii); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2 , §173(3)(1), (11) and (111).
78 UTRA § 8-3(b) ; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 /2, § 173(3).
79 UTRA § 11; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 176.
8o 245 Mass. 106, 139 N. E. 525 (1923).
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practice to furnish funds for the payment of duties so that imports
could be removed from the warehouse, advances being made only
so long as the value of the merchandise still in bond was sufficient
to cover the credit extended. Several advances were made to the
importer for customs charges before that party defaulted upon his
trust receipt obligation. The defendant-entruster, apparently hav-
ing paid the customs duties on the property which still remained
in the bonded warehouse, demanded delivery of the balance of the
goods and the plaintiff allowed him to take possession. Thereafter,
a suit was instituted against the defendant to recover the customs
duties paid by the plaintiff on behalf of the importer. The court
held that there could be no recovery against the defendant as he
had only financed the purchase and no principal-agent relationship
existed between him and .the importer. The court went on to state
that it was unnecessary to determine the extent of the plaintiff's
lien upon the property, for he had lost it when he allowed the
merchandise to be removed and surrendered to the defendant. The
refusal to pass upon the question, however, left the impression that
a lien might have been upheld had possession been retained.
Situations of this character are not uncommon, for much of the
property received under a trust receipt is either to be stored,
shipped, processed, or manufactured in preparation for sale.
These operations will, in all probability, be carried out by persons
other than the trustee, and the question is whether or not they can
exert a lien against the property for their charges. Section 11 of
the Uniform Act provides that an individual may acquire a specific
lien against trust receipt property for services of this character,
regardless of whether the entruster has or has not filed in accord-
ance with the statute. The entruster, however, does not become
personally liable for the debt. It is understandable why this type
of creditor should receive more consideration for he either enhances
or at least preserves the value of the merchandise through his
labor and services, but the type of lien that he can assert is limited
in two respects. It must be a specific lien for work and services
rendered upon the very goods he is now holding, and the work done
on the chattels must have been "in the usual course of the Trus-
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tee's business preparatory to their sale.""' The second limitation
does not restrict the lien appreciably for almost every operation
could be construed as being one preparatory for the eventual dis-
position of the goods, but it might possibly be argued that the
entruster would not be forced to respect the lien if any of the
services or work were of an extraordinary or unusual nature, not
rendered "in the usual course" of the trustee's business opera-
tions.
Although the entruster is not personally liable on the obliga-
tion for which a lien might be asserted, in actual practice it might
be well for the entruster to consider paying the charges and taking
possession of the trust receipt property to prevent greater loss
through foreclosure of the lien of the artisan. Against that
eventuality, the trust receipt should be so drafted as to provide not
only that the trustee should pay such charges but that, if he does
not, the entruster might have an election to pay the same and add
the amount thereof to the secured indebtedness.
2. Purchasers from the Trustee
While, generally speaking, the entruster's security interest is
effective against all individuals for thirty days and, if the filing
requirements are complied with, for a year thereafter,8 2 there are
some limitations to this rule as it applies to persons who acquire
some type of interest in the trust property by giving value to the
trustee. In this category fall all purchasers, mortgagees, pledgees,
lessees, and subsequent entrusters for the Act makes it possible
for them to acquire the property free from the entruster's interest
under certain circumstances. These individuals are not treated
alike, however, as the Act, while generically designating them as
"purchasers," divides them into three categories, to-wit: (1) those
who acquire any type of interest in negotiable paper, (2) those who
purchase in the ordinary course of business, and (3) those whose
interest is acquired not in the ordinary course of business. A con-
sideration of the rights of each requires separate treatment.
81 The requirement in UTRA § 11, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 176, that the
lien be a specific one eliminates the possibility of a claim for a general lien and
explains why a landlord's lien is excluded from this category.
82UTRA § 7-1(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 Y2, § 172(1) (a).
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a. Purchasers of Negotiable Paper
Due to commercial necessity, negotiable instruments and docu-
ments have long been set apart from ordinary types of property,
the law doing its utmost to protect purchasers of such paper, even
though they acquire the same from one without title. There is no
logical reason why this approach should be abrogated where the
negotiable instrument or document is purchased from one holding
it under a trust receipt, so when the question arose at common
law it was held that the negotiable aspect of the documents enabled
the purchaser from a trustee to acquire a title free of any rights
reserved by the entruster. s3 The Act, following this lead, also
provides that purchasers of negotiable instruments who buy from
the trustee, for value and in good faith, acquire their interest free
from that of the entruster's without regard to whether or not there
has been a filing.
s4
Determination of the exact type of instrument or document
falling within the purview of this section is essential. It must be
negotiable, but the Act recognizes two classes: (1) those which are
technically and actually negotiable, and (2) those which by common
business practice are traded in as if negotiable.8 5 Instruments or
documents falling into the first classification are easily catalogued.
The term "instruments" includes any negotiable paper as defined
by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and also such items as
stocks, bonds, and similar commercial paper, 6 any of which, if
negotiable, would come within the scope of this section. The term
"documents" is defined as any document of title to goods, 8 7 and
would embrace warehouse receipts and bills of lading, both of
which can be negotiable. Docuinents or instruments falling into the
83 Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (1913).
84UTRA § 9-1(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 174(1) (a).
85 Ibid.
86 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(5). In General Motors Ac.
Corp. v. Associates Disc. Corp., 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 972 (1942), reversed on other
grounds in 267 App. Div. 1032, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 242 (1944), it was held that a
conditional sales contract was not a negotiable instrument within this section and,
therefore, the transferee of such paper could not claim the protection of a
purchaser of a negotiable instrument.
87 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(2).
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second category cannot be readily enumerated but included therein
would be all paper which, though lacking the technical attributes
of negotiability, have been treated as negotiable by custom and
business usage. Whether or not any particular non-negotiable in-
strument or document falls within this latter classification would
involve a question of fact dependent upon the amount of traffic in
that type of paper and on the ease of its transferability.
The individual acquiring an interest in any one of the above-
mentioned instruments or documents must be a purchaser 8 and,
from the definitions of "purchase" and "purchaser" contained
within the Act, it is ascertainable that either (1) a party purchas-
ing full title, (2) a pledgee under a legal or equitable pledge, and
(3) any other individual claiming a security interest under a con-
tract, would meet the requirement.8 9 It would also appear that
anyone taking an interest in documents or instruments by way of a
subsequent trust receipt transaction would fall within this group
for the term "purchaser" seems to be sufficiently broad as to
include a subsequent entruster. The validity of this conclusion is
borne out by a specific provision in the Act stating that where an
entruster obtains a security interest in property which is already
held under a trust receipt, priorities are to be determined on the
basis of this very section dealing with purchasers."" There is only
one difficulty. An entruster, in order to obtain a security interest in
property already in the possession of the trustee, is obliged to give
new value,91 while all that is demanded of a person invoking this
section is that he give value. Since the former, however, is a more
valuable type of consideration than the latter, it is unlikely that the
specifying of value would exclude the possibility of giving new
value so it can reasonably be assumed that one acquiring a security
SS UTRA § 9-1(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 174(1) (a). A purchaser is
defined as anyone taking by purchase: UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 ,
§ 166(11). "Purchase" is also a defined term and includes an acquisition of an
interest through a sale, lease, mortgage, or pledge, be it legal or equitable: UTRA
§ 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(10).
8s The term "purchaser" also includes a "claimant of a security interest created
by contract," according to UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(11).
90 UTRA § 2-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 167(1).
01 UTRA § 2-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 167(1) (b) and (c).
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interest in negotiable instruments or documents under a subse-
quent trust receipt transaction is a "purchaser" for this purpose.
Before any purchaser can come within the scope of this Act,
thereby obtaining its protection, he must have (1) acted in good
faith, and (2) given value for his interest. Good faith is not a
defined term under the Act but needs little consideration, as it is
well-known throughout the lawY' "Value," on the other hand, is
defined as any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract,
including an antecedent claim against the trustee or third party
where the interest in the trust receipt property is taken in satis-
faction of that claim or as security for it.93 No distinction seems
to be made between cases where the transferor of the interest is
bound to satisfy the claim against a third party or where he does
so merely as an accommodation.
The discussion so far has concerned itself with those nego-
tiable documents or instruments which were either delivered to the
trustee by the entruster or were in the trustee's possession at the
outset of the transaction. It may happen, as it did in one case,
94
that the trustee is given a bill of lading under a trust receipt and
with it acquires possession of goods which he then stores, obtaining
a negotiable warehouse receipt. If that paper is subsequently de-
livered to a purchaser in good faith and for value, should he be
given the same protection he would have received if the original
bill of lading had been transferred to him? Carrying it one step
farther, suppose that under the above circumstances the bill of
lading had been acquired by the trustee for the purpose of obtain-
ing possession of the goods either to sell or have them processed,
nothing being said about storage. A subsequent warehousing by
the trustee would be in breach of the agreement, but what of the
rights of a purchaser of the negotiable warehouse receipt? A
trustee selling goods, documents, or instruments, which he has
92 Black Dict., citing a number of cases where the term has been used under
various circumstances, defines it in substance as an honest attempt not to take
advantage of any one plus the absence of any information which would render
the transaction unconscionable.
93 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 166(15).
94 Commercial Nat. Bank v. Canal-Louisiana B. & T. Co., 239 U. S. 520, 36 S. Ct.
194, 60 L. Ed. 417 (1916).
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obtained under a trust receipt, might receive negotiable documents
or instruments in full or part payment. If these were to be nego-
tiated by him, would the transferee be given the protection of this
section? Fortunately, all these questions are adequately answered
by the Act for it declares that documents or instruments taken in
substitution for goods, documents, or instruments, or which repre-
sent them, or are proceeds thereof, shall be treated in the same
manner as those which originally formed the basis of the trust
receipt transaction. 5 It is obvious, therefore, that in any one of
the supposed cases mentioned above the purchaser of the nego-
tiable instruments or document, if taken in good faith and for
value, would not be bound by the entruster s security interest.
b. Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Trade
The Act also limits the entruster's security interest with re-
gard to buyers in the ordinary course of trade. Individuals in this
class take free of the latter's security interest where the trustee
has been given "liberty of sale," whether such sale takes place
within or after the thirty-day period and regardless of filing. 6 As
to them, the entruster's security interest is of little consequence,
but their rights will depend entirely upon the content given to two
terms, i. e. "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" and "liberty of
sale," so both must be considered at length.
Analyzing the definition of the first term, it may be noted that
a purchaser is a "person to whom goods are sold." ' 97 He must
take an interest in the goods, so one acquiring an interest in goods
actually displayed and delivered to him as buyer would clearly fit
the definition. However, such an interest may also be obtained by
the taking of a document of title. If that document of title be a
negotiable one, the purchaser's rights may be determined under the
preceding sub-section. If the document is of a non-negotiable type,
95 UTRA § 9-1(b); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Oh. 121 ; § 174(1) (b).
96 UTRA § 9-2(a) (i) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 174(2) (a) (I).
97 UTRA § 1; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 166(1). The term "person" in-
cludes "an individual, trustee, receiver or other fiduciary, partnership, corpora-
tion, business trust, or other association and two or more persons having a joint
or common interest," according to the section cited. See also Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(8).
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he may still be classed as a buyer in the ordinary course of trade
for a sale of paper of this type is, in reality, a sale of the goods it
represents. Under this line of reasoning, such a purchaser would
also be protected. To be a "buyer," however, there must have
been a "sale," a term which indicates the passage of full title as
distinguished from the acquisition of only a partial interest. It is
for this reason that the definition of such a "buyer" specifically
excludes a pledgee, mortgagee, or lienor 9s and, upon the same rea-
soning, a subsequent entruster or lessee would have no standing
under this section for neither acquires a full title to property.
Not every individual obtaining full title by purchase of goods
held under a trust receipt is protected. The sale, it should be
remembered, must be one arising in the ordinary course of trade.
Consistent with this requirement is the exclusion of a transferee
in bulk99 for any transaction whereby substantially all of the trus-
tee's business is purchased is clearly not in the ordinary course of
business. But the purpose for which the purchase is made has no
effect in determining whether or not the purchase was in the ordi-
nary course of trade. It was argued, in two cases,' that an auto-
mobile dealer should not be considered a buyer within this term
for it had reference only to a private individual purchasing for his
own use or consumption and the purchases there made were for
resale. The courts refused to make the distinction contended for.
Passage of full title in the usual course of business for value
is not alone enough for the Act specifically provides that there must
also be delivery of the goods to the buyer.2 This requisite makes
certain that only legitimate vendees will be protected and excludes
the possibility of an entruster losing his interest through a trans-
action which is actually not a sale. The absence of delivery of
98 Ibid.
99 A transferee in bulk includes a "mortgagee or a pledgee or a buyer of the
Trustee's business substantially as a whole," under UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 1212, § 166(13). Compare the expression "substantially as a whole," with
the more precise definition of a "bulk sale" to be found in the Bulk Sales Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/, § 78.
1 Colonial Finance Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A. (2d) 841 (1939) ; Gen-
eral Finance Corporation v. Krause Motor Sales, 302 Ill. App. 210, 23 N. E. (2d)
781 (1939).
2 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 166(1).
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property alleged to have been sold is a fairly positive indication
that such was not the case. It will be noted, however, that the Act
does not mention whether the vendee has to receive the goods
simultaneously with the sale, or whether he may do so subse-
quently. A requirement for simultaneous delivery might work a
hardship where a purchaser makes full payment of the purchase
price but is unable to take actual delivery until later. In the mean-
time, the entruster could repossess the chattels and thus defeat the
rights of the vendee. This failure to make a definite stipulation as
to when delivery should take place will probably result in the courts
concluding that it should take place within a reasonable time after
sale. The use of such a test would protect a legitimate purchaser
while, at the same time, prevent any collusive transaction from
defeating the security interest of the entruster.
A purchaser, in order to be considered a buyer in the ordinary
course of trade, must give new value.3 Fortunately, however, the
framers took into account the fact that many sales are made on a
credit basis and have specifically provided that such shall consti-
tute a purchase for new value.4 Aside from this, the definition of
"new value'' 5 is unsatisfactory. It does not specifically include
payment of the purchase price by cash, although this is obviously
new value. The only item mentioned in the definition which comes
close is the phrase "new advances," but "advances" is hardly a
suitable term for denoting payment of a purchase price.6 This fact
led the court, in Colonial Finance Company v. DeBenigno,7 to state:
"The Act does not attempt an inclusive definition of new value.
It goes no farther than to specify that certain things shall be and
other things shall not be regarded as within that term."8 If this
is a true statement as to the actual purpose of the definition, it
3 Ibid.
4 UTRA § 9-3; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 174(3).
5UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 166(7).
6 It more nearly means a loan, a gift, or moneys given which are to be repaid:
Vail v. Vail, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 69 (1850).
7125 Conn. 626, 7 A. (2d) 841 (1939).
S 125 Conn. 626 at 634, 7 A. (2d) 841 at 844. There would appear to be some
basis for this contention as UTRA § 1 merely states that "'new value' include8
... " followed by a specification of certain items. Italics added.
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would appear that any type of consideration, except that which is
specifically excluded,9 would come within the term.
Two courts have already held that since the term does not
exclude a pre-existing claim, articles taken in satisfaction thereof
have been received for new value. In the first case, 10 a defective
automobile was returned, the buyer receiving a credit. Later, this
credit was applied upon the purchase of another vehicle which was
in the dealer's possession under a trust receipt. It was contended
that the purchaser was not a buyer in the ordinary course of trade
because he had not given new value. The court, however, held that
release of a pre-existing claim or debt was sufficient to support
this type of transaction. In the second case," the full purchase
price for an automobile was paid upon the expectation that deliv-
ery would be made in the near future. The salesman absconded
with the funds. The court held that when a new car was accepted
by the purchaser in satisfaction of the pre-existing claim against
the dealer for the money paid, it constituted the giving of new
value. What actually occurred in the above cases was that the
purchase price was paid before delivery, but it was no less a pay-
ment on the price than if it had been made simultaneously with the
delivery. The automobiles received by the purchasers merely con-
stituted the ultimate fulfillment of contracts on which the sellers
were bound. It is submitted, however, that if the claims in exchange
for which the cars were received had arisen in any other way, the
release thereof might not have been considered the giving of new
value. The release of a pre-existing debt is specifically included
under the other class of consideration termed "value."' 1 2 If such
a release also comes within the definition of "new value," the
result would be to cloud any intended distinction between the two
terms and would eventually lead only to confusion. It is un-
9 The Uniform Act, Section 1, specifically excludes extensions or renewals of
existing obligations or obligations substituted for existing obligations from the
definition of new value. The Illinois statute, on the other hand, includes re-
newals or extensions within the definition: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 166(7).
10 Colonial Finance Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A. (2d) 841 (1939).
11 Commercial Discount Co. v. Mehne, 42 Cal. App. (2d) 220, 108 P. (2d) 735
(1940).
12 UTRA § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 166(15).
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fortunate, therefore, that the framers were not more explicit so
any contemplated change in the Act should include an indication
as to whether or not the listing of specific instances under the two
definitions is to be considered as exclusive of other instances.
In order to gain the protection afforded by this section, a buyer
must also acquire his title to the goods in good faith and without
actual notice of any limitations put upon the trustee's right to
sell.13 Only actual notice can defeat the rights of this purchaser,
and it has been held that this means actual notice that the article
the party is about to purchase is held under a trust receipt. Merely
having general knowledge that the seller often acquires property
under this type of device is not sufficient.
14
The common law protected bonafide purchasers from the en-
truster's secret lien on the basis of estoppel. Some of the earlier
courts held that the entruster, by giving possession to a trustee
who dealt in this type of property, was estopped without reference
to whether or not the right to sell had been given.' 5 Others, how-
ever, determined that possession had to be coupled with liberty of
sale.' 6 The framers of the present Act have recognized that the
second is the sounder of the two views. The Act makes it necessary
that the trustee have the liberty to sell before a purchaser can
acquire the property free of the entruster's interest, but indicates
that consenting or allowing the goods to be placed in the trustee's
stock in trade or in his sales room is to be regarded as equivalent
to "liberty of sale.' 7 An interesting question arises in this
13 The requirement of good faith is embodied in the definition of a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade: UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 166(1).
The fact that no limitation upon the right to sell is binding upon a purchaser
unless he has actual knowledge of such is contained both in the definition of a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade and in the section concerning the rights
of purchasers: UTRA § 9-2(a) (ii), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 2, § 174(2) (a) (II).
14 Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 729,
137 P. (2d) 729 (1943). General knowledge that the party from whom a pur-
chaser was made acquired property under a trust receipt was never sufficient to
give him notice at common law: Commercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co.,
10 Cal. (2d) 718, 76 P. (2d) 1181 (1938).
15 General Credit v. Universal Credit, 99 F. (2d) 115 (1938); Tharp v. San
Joaquin Valley Securities Co., 20 Cal. App. (2d) 20, 66 P. (2d) 230 (1937) ; West-
ern States Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 104 Cal. App. 19, 285 P. 340 (1930).
16 Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corporation, 81 Fla. 687, 88 S. 876 (1921);
Handy v. C. I. T. Corporation, 291 Mass. 157, 197 N. E. 64 (1935) ; Clark v. Flynn,
120 Misc. 474, 199 N. Y. S. 583 (1923).
17 UTRA § 9-2(c) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 174(2) (c).
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connection. Suppose the trustee agrees to store the property in a
warehouse and not to mingle the merchandise with his own stock
but, in breach of the agreement, he retains it at his place of busi-
ness and sells to a purchaser who in all other respects is a buyer
in the ordinary course of trade. There was no consent nor even
a conscious allowance of the intermingling. A court faced with
this type of problem might well decide for the purchaser on the
ground that since the entruster allowed the trustee to take pos-
session he might have foreseen the breach of the argument and
the resultant sale to an innocent third party. It is apparent that
an entruster allowing articles out of his possession under a trust
receipt has little or no protection against buyers in the ordinary
course of trade unless the entruster sees to it that suitable tags or
other labels are affixed to, and maintained on, the trust receipt
property so as to give actual notice of his rights.
As was indicated previously, even if the trustee sells on credit
to a buyer in the ordinary course of trade, that individual takes
free of the entruster's security interest. This, of course, leaves a
debt due and owing on the purchase price. The Act, in effect,
subrogates the entruster to the rights of the trustee with respect
to this ob ligation, and also allows him to take possession of any
security therefor.' While he is thereby given a right of action
against the purchaser, it is a limited one, for the entruster is sub-
ject to any defense or set-off which accrues before the purchaser
becomes aware of the entruster's interest and which he could have
exercised as against the trustee. 19 The framers have applied the
old undisclosed-principal doctrine to a situation which obviously
demands it.2° It would be inequitable to allow the entruster to
recover the unpaid balance of the price where the trustee, had he
brought the action, could not have succeeded.
While the framers, in effect, have treated the entruster as an
undisclosed principal insofar as is necessary in order that he may
is UTRA § 9-3; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 174(3).
19 Ibid.
20 It is a generally accepted doctrine that where a third party contracts with an
undisclosed agent, he may set off a debt or claim due to him from such agent in
a suit by the principal: Foreign Trade Banking Corporation v. Gerseta Corp., 237
N. Y. 265, 142 N. E. 607 (1923).
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bring an action against a purchaser in the ordinary course of
trade, the same is not true where the purchaser seeks relief
because of some breach of contract or warranty arising out of his
dealings with the trustee. The Act provides that an entruster
"holding a security interest shall not, merely by virtue of such
interest or his having given the trustee liberty of sale or other
disposition, be responsible as principal or as vendor under any
sale or contract to sell made by the trustee."'1  This too is rea-
sonable since, in reality, the entruster is neither principal nor
vendor. The purchaser, having dealt with the trustee and not in
reliance upon anything said or done by the entruster, should not
have the right of action against the latter unless, in fact, the
entruster was an undisclosed principal.
c. Purchasers Not in the Ordinary Course of Trade
The rights of those obtaining full title to trust receipt prop-
erty have just been considered. These individuals, it will be re-
membered, were designated as "buyers in the ordinary course of
trade." Another sub-section of the Act covers the rights of those
who deal with the trustee in respect to trust receipt property but
who do not buy in the ordinary course of trade.22 It is apparent
that the parties falling within the scope of this classification are
such persons as pledgees, mortgagees, transferees in bulk, who
are expressly excluded from the former category,23 and also
lessees who, though considered purchasers, 24 are not such in the
ordinary run of things for they take an interest less than full
title. The same reasoning would appear to include a subsequent
entruster,25 and this conclusion is bolstered by the provision that
21 UTRA § 12; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 , § 177.
22 UTRA § 9-2(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 174(2) (b).
23 See definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" as set forth in
UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 166(1).
24 The term "purchaser" includes anyone acquiring by purchase, and the term
"purchase" is defined as a taking, among other things, by lease: UTRA § 1, Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 166(10).
25 The definition of purchaser is broad enough to take into account one acquir-
ing an interest as an entruster, but as he acquires only a security title, he cannot
be considered a buyer in the ordinary course of trade. That classification, as
has already been seen, applies only to those who obtain full title. The natural
conclusion, therefore, is that a subsequent entruster must fall into the class created
by UTRA § 9-2(b), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121y, § 174(2)(b).
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where two entrusters become involved with the same property,
priorities are to be determined according to the section regulating
the rights of purchasers.
28
As in the preceding sub-section, the provisions of the present
one merely make reference to goods, inferentially indicating that
a purchaser not in the ordinary course of trade can obtain an
interest in only this type of property. If such language were
strictly construed, it might be contended that a pledgee of a non-
negotiable document, for example, would enjoy no rights under
the statute as against the original entruster. However, since a
document is merely a document of title to goods, 27 it can be argued
quite logically that, by obtaining an interest in such document, a
pledgee is acquiring the same sort of interest in the goods repre-
sented thereby. If so liberal an interpretation is not desired, some
modification of the Act would seem necessary.
There is obvious reason for treating pledgees, mortgagees,
transferees in bulk, lessees, or subsequent entrusters in a dif-
ferent fashion than an ordinary consumer who purchases mer-
chandise from a dealer's stock in trade.28 The former are usually
much better acquainted with business practices, are in a position
to make inquiry, and are bound by recordation if filing has taken
place.29 If, however, an entrister fails to file, the following rules
are declared to apply, to-wit: (1) during the first thirty days, any
purchaser not in the ordinary course of trade, except a transferee
in bulk, may obtain an interest in the trust receipt property free
26 UTRA § 2-1; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 167(1).
27 See definition of "document" set forth in UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.
121/2, § 166(2).
28 As a general rule, the courts at common law did not extend to the mortgagee
of trust receipt property the same protection of the estoppel theory as they gave
to a purchaser: Tropical State Bank v. Sunshine Motor Co., 137 Fla. 703, 188 S.
595 (1939) ; Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motor Co., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S. W. (2d)
561 (1935). See also Moors v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887). For a
contrary decision, however, see Monroe v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 75 F. 545
(1896).
29 UTRA § 9-2(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 12112, § 174(2) (b). This would ap-
pear to be a simple and understandable provision, yet two courts in deciding for
an entruster as against a buyer not in the ordinary course of trade failed to take
advantage of the fact that in both instances the buyer took his interest after
filing had occurred. Their decisions, while correct, were based upon other grounds.
See C. I. T. Corporation v. Commercial Bank of Patterson, 64 Cal. App. (2d) 722,
149 P. (2d) 439 (1944); National Funding Corporation v. Stump, 57 Cal. App.
(2d) 29, 133 P. (2d) 855 (1943).
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from the entruster's security interest if he gives new value, acts
in good faith, and without notice ;30 (2) after the thirty days have
run, any of the above, including a transferee in bulk, can take
an interest in the property free from any interest of the entruster
merely by giving value.31 While new value is not necessary, good
faith and lack of knowledge are still required.
There is one requirement which is common to all buyers not
in the ordinary course of trade and that is that the property must
be delivered to the purchaser before the entruster files.32 This
requirement, while consistent with some transactions, is not con-
sistent with others. For instance, a pledgee or lessee would ordi-
narily take possession of the pledged or leased property, as would
also be the case with a transferee in bulk taking full title. On the
other hand, an individual acquiring an interest by means of a
chattel mortgage or subsequent trust receipt transaction would
generally permit the mortgagor or trustee to retain possession of
the goods. It would appear that in these latter cases the provi-
sions of the Act do not take into account the distinct characteris-
tics of the several security devices, and to insist upon the require-
ment of delivery would make it practically impossible for either a
mortgagee or subsequent entruster to acquire his interest free
from that of the original entruster, even though he acted in good
faith and without notice.
d. Purchasers of Non-negotiable Instruments
It is apparent that none of the provisions of the Act so far
discussed have any application to a purchaser acquiring an inter-
est in non-negotiable instruments in the possession of a trustee
under a trust receipt. The only sub-section having to do with
instruments had reference only to those of negotiable type.
33 It
30 UTRA § 9-2(b) (i); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 174(2) (b) (I). Unlike
the case of creditors, who are also bound by filing, there is no period of grace
as to this class of individuals. It behooves an entruster, therefore, to file im-
mediately even though the transaction is to be consummated within a short period
of time if he wants protection against purchasers not in the ordinary course
of trade other than transferees in bulk.
31 UTRA § 9-2(b) (ii) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 174(2) (b) (II).
32 UTRA § 9-2(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 174(2) (b).
33 UTRA § 9-1(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121%, § 174(1) (a).
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may have been felt that a transaction involving this kind of paper
would never arise, but logic dictates otherwise. For instance, it is
not out of the realm of possibility that a non-negotiable bond or
other commercial instrument, having been pledged, might be re-
turned to the pledgee under a trust receipt for one of the purposes
specified in the Act. That individual, in breach of his agreement,
might repledge or sell it to a third party. Any attempt to deter-
mine the rights of the entruster, and the third party, by reference
to the Act would meet with failure. There is not even a general
statement in the Act covering non-negotiable instruments. One
thing is known, however, and that is that there are no provisions
for filing where an instrument is the basis of a trust receipt
transaction. Therefore, any purchaser of this type of interest
would not be bound by constructive notice. The Act does provide,
however, that for any case not covered by it the general rules of
law and equity are to prevail as to trust receipt transactions.
3 4
Unfortunately, there were no cases prior to the statute involving
a purchaser of a non-negotiable instrument held under a trust
receipt so reference would have to be made to general rules. The
only conclusion that can be drawn is that, in all probability, there
being nothing on the face of the non-negotiable instrument to indi-
cate that the holder thereof has it under a trust receipt, anyone
buying it or acquiring it in pledge from the trustee-payee would
be protected on the basis of estoppel.
3. Pledged Property in Possession of Pledgor
While the Uniform Trust Receipts Act primarily concerns
itself with transactions involving the use of trust receipts, it is
not confined thereto but also provides for certain types of devices
resembling the trust receipt but lacking some of its technical
attributes. Among these are pledges, or agreements to pledge,
where the property has not been delivered to the pledgee, 35 and
cases wherein a person, having a pledgee's interest in goods,
documents, or instruments, subsequently delivers them to the
34 UTRA § 17; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 182.
35 UTRA § 3-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211 2 , § 168(1).
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individual having the beneficial interest for "a temporary and
limited purpose. "8 6 Devices of this character might differ from
a trust receipt as defined by the Act in that the purposes for
which the arrangement was entered into might not correspond to
those required for trust receipts, 7 or there might be a failure to
take a written instrument evidencing the arrangement. 88
When any of these allied devices are utilized, a purchaser,3 9
including subsequent entrusters, of pledged property without
notice and for value takes free from the pledgee's interest pro-
vided the pledgor has possession at the time of purchase. 40 The
statute does, however, modify earlier doctrines insofar as the
rights of creditors of the pledgor are concerned. A pledge with
the property in the possession of the pledgor was always valid as
against general creditors 41 but became invalid when those creditors
attempted to satisfy their claims out of the property.42 It fol-
lowed that if the pledge, or contract to pledge, was entered into
prior to the four-month period, it did not constitute a preference
that could be set aside by a trustee in bankruptcy provided actual
delivery or surrender to the pledgee took place some time prior,
if only the day before, bankruptcy proceedings were instituted.
43
The Act makes substantial changes in that rule for a pledge
is valid against any creditor of the pledgor for a period of ten
days from the time the pledgee has given new value for his in-
36 UTRA § 3-3; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 168(3).
37 It will be remembered that UTRA § 2-3, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 167(3),
limits the purposes for which a trust receipt transaction may be entered into.
38 Such a writing is required by UTRA § 2-1, fll. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2,
§ 167(1).
39 The term "purchaser" includes one taking by purchase, a mortgagee, a pledgee,
or a lessee: UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, §§ 166(10) and 166(11).
40 UTRA § 3-2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 168(2). That provision is nothing
more than a restatement of the common law doctrine that a pledgee without
possession had no standing against third parties: Robertson v. Wade, 17 Tenn.
App. 457, 68 S. W. (2d) 487 (1934).
41 Johnson v. Burke Manor Bldg. Corporation, 48 F. (2d) 1031 (1931) ; Gamson
v. Pritchard, 210 Mass. 296, 96 N. E. 715 (1911) ; Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154
N. C. 1, 69 S. E. 743 (1910).
42 Peoples Bank v. Continental Supply, 213 Ky. 44, 280 S. W. 458 (1926) ; Rowell
v. Claggett, 69 N. H. 201, 41 A. 173 (1897) ; Ackerson v. Babcock, 132 Wash. 435,
232 P. 335 (1925).
43 In re Automobile Livery Service Co., 176 F. 792 (1910) ; McDonald v. Aetna
Indemnity Co., 90 Conn. 415, 97 A. 332 (1916) ; Davis v. Billings, 254 Pa. 574, 99
A. 163 (1916).
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terest,"4 so no creditor, whether with or without notice of the
pledge, who attempts to levy upon the pledged property within
that ten-day period has any standing as against the pledgee.
Short term advances, often beneficial and necessary in commercial
dealings, are thereby made possible even though delivery of the
pledged property may, for some reason, be delayed. After the ten-
day period has lapsed, or in cases where the pledge is based simply
upon value and not new value, the pledgee has no protection
against the pledgor 's lien creditors 45 without notice unless he per-
fects his pledge by taking possession of the property.46 Even
then, such possession does not relate back to the time the agree-
ment to pledge was entered into, 47 so it is no longer possible for a
pledgee who takes possession of the property within the four-
month period prior to bankruptcy to argue that such transfer
should not be set aside as a preference merely because the agree-
ment was entered into before that period.
D. ENTRUSTER 'S RIGHT TO PROCEEDS
It has been necessary to postpone more than incidental consid-
eration to the problem of the entruster's right to the proceeds
arising from the trust receipt property until after full considera-
tion of the operation of the trust receipt device not only as be-
tween the immediate parties but also as to third persons. Having
considered that operation as it dealt with the specific property
44 UTRA § 3-1(a) ; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 168(1) (a).
45 "Lien creditors" are those who have obtained a specific lien through attach-
ment, levy, or other judicial process, including distraint for rent, according to
UTRA § 1, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 166(6). The section under consideration,
speaking of lien creditors, makes specific reference to those who "become such as
prescribed in section 8." That section declares that a lien creditor becomes such
when the process is issued: UTRA § 8-3 (a). There is no comparable provision
in the Illinois statute, but see above for a discussion of this problem as it concerns
Illinois creditors.
46 UTRA § 3-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 168(1) (b). An interesting
problem arose in Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F. (2d) 974 (1945). The
defendant obtained an interest as a pledgee in property which was in the possession
of a prior pledgee. That individual agreed to deliver this security to the defendant
as soon as his own debt was paid. The court held that the pledge to the defendant
was perfected at the time it was made, although he did not take actual possession.
What really happened was that the possession of the first pledgee inured to the
benefit of the second; therefore the pledge could not be set aside as a preferential
transfer under the Bankruptcy Act.
47 UTRA § 3(1) (b), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 1, § 168(1) (b), contains a specific
declaration on the point.
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entrusted, it is now possible to examine the situation as it affects
proceeds arising therefrom. One important feature of the trust
receipt is that it makes possible a "selfliquidating" debt particu-
larly when the security for the obligation is placed in the posses-
sion of the trustee with liberty to sell or dispose of it. From the
point of view of the entruster, this can be extremely beneficial
provided he can, in some manner, control the proceeds after they
reach the hands of the trustee. To this end, the entruster invari-
ably embodies a provision in the trust receipt making it manda-
tory upon the trustee to turn all such proceeds over to him.
4 8
Unless this provision is subsequently waived, there can be no
question as to its binding effect upon the trustee, but whether it
will be sufficient to prevent creditors of that individual from
levying on or attaching these assets while still in the trustee's
possession is another question. Since these proceeds might take
the form of other goods or negotiable paper, it might also become
important to protect the same against purchasers who might at-
tempt to acquire an interest therein. It being important to the
entruster that his security interest in the original property should
attach to the proceeds thereof, the Act, in its usual complicated
manner, seeks to afford him a measure of protection in that
direction also.
The pertinent section purports merely to protect those en-
trusters who have not given the liberty of sale or those who,
having conferred this right, require that the trustee account for
the proceeds. 4 9 It is obvious that should the entruster fail to
reserve the right to demand an accounting at the outset or subse-
quently waive such privilege, he cannot claim the benefits thereof.
It is important, therefore, to determine under what circumstances
such a waiver can materialize. The Uniform Act specifically pro-
vides that this prerogative may be surrendered either by word or
conduct, and the failure to demand an accounting within ten days
after the entruster has been apprised of the fact that proceeds do
exist constitutes a waiver.50 This clause has been omitted from
48 See, for example. the forms used in B. C. S. Corporation v. Colonial Discount
Co., 169 Misc. 711, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 65 (1938).
49 UTRA § 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 175.
5o UTRA § 10(c).
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the Illinois statute, however, so mere inaction on the entruster's
part cannot deprive him of his reserved right in the proceeds
although he can undoubtedly surrender such privilege. A waiver
of the right to demand an accounting would unquestionably inure
to the benefit of attaching creditors and other third parties and
it might also have a profound effect upon the rights of the trustee.
Of course, by no stretch of the imagination, could such a waiver
free him from the obligation of the indebtedness owed to the
entruster, but it would make it possible for him to deal with the
specific proceeds as he saw fit without the necessity for turning
the same, in kind, over to the entruster.5 1
Presumably no alert entruster will suffer such surrender of
his right either by words, conduct, or delay, hence it is essential
to determine the scope of the right provided by this section. It
cannot be emphasized too strongly that he is not given an un-
limited right to those proceeds even though he attempts to reserve
such. His claim to them is only recognized to the extent that, and
as to those individuals against whom, his security interest in the
trust receipt property was valid at the time of its disposal.5 2 This
is only equitable for it would be manifestly unjust to permit him
to claim the proceeds arising from goods, documents, or instru-
ments in which he did not have a valid security interest. It will
be remembered, however, that as to some individuals the en-
truster's security interest is never valid, and it would logically
follow that the entruster could not have any claim to the proceeds
as against this class of persons. To fully understand the signifi-
cance of this provision, it is necessary to apply it to practical
illustrations.
The most likely controversy to arise with respect to proceeds
from the sale of property held under trust receipt is where indi-
vidual lien creditors or general creditors represented by a trustee
in bankruptcy or a receiver attempt to satisfy their claims out of
these assets. It will be remembered that the entruster's security
interest in the specific property is valid as against all creditors
51 There has been no attempt made to consider whether a prosecution for embezzle-
ment or larceny by bailee would lie. The provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/,
§ 183, would be inapplicable because of the waiver.
52 UTRA § 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 175.
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of the trustee for thirty days without filing and for a specified
period thereafter if prompt filing takes place. If the property
should be sold at any time during this period of validity, the
security interest would attach to the proceeds and none of the
creditors could satisfy their debts out of any accounts receivable,
funds, or property received in part or full payment of the pur-
chase price. Conversely, if the sale had been consummated after
the thirty-day period of grace but before filing, the creditors with-
out notice would now prevail over the entruster in regard to the
proceeds, as the disposition took place at a time when the latter's
security interest was invalid.
Once determining that the entruster has a right to the pro-
ceeds, it must be considered to what extent he can enforce that
right against the assets in the hands of a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy. The common law limitation that he had to be able to
identify the proceeds 53 has been modified somewhat by the Act.
If he can show that the proceeds from a sale were received by the
trustee within ten days of (1) the appointment of a receiver or
the filing by or against the trustee of a petition in bankruptcy or
judicial insolvency, or (2) a demand by the entruster for a prompt
accounting, he may receive the value of such proceeds even though
they are not identifiable.5 4 It is true that whether or not the pro-
ceeds are received by the trustee within ten days of insolvency or
the filing of such petitions is beyond the control of the entruster,
but by making a demand for an accounting within ten days of the
time the trustee acquires the proceeds, he can insure himself of a
preference as against the general assets of that individual, even
though the bankruptcy or insolvency takes place subsequent to the
ten-day period. It will be noted that, unlike the period in respect
to waiver, this ten days starts running not from the time when the
entruster obtains knowledge of the existence of the proceeds, but
rather from the trustee's actual receipt thereof. Thus, it is im-
portant that the entruster stay in close touch with developments
in order that he be able to make prompt demand for an accounting.
53 Vaughan v. Massachusetts Hide Corporation, 209 F. 667 (1913) ; In re Mulligan,
116 F. 715 (1902).
54 UTRA § 10(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 175(b).
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There may be occasions where the trustee receives a nego-
tiable instrument or even a negotiable document as part of the
proceeds of a sale. These might be sold or pledged by him, and the
problem presents itself as to whether or not the entruster could
enforce his right to these proceeds against the purchaser or
pledgee. This, of course, depends upon the validity of the en-
truster's security interest as to this class of individuals. Gen-
erally, purchasers of such paper, giving value and taking without
notice, would acquire the property free of the entruster's interest
even if there had been a filing.55 It follows, therefore, that the
entruster cannot claim the proceeds against these individuals and
ttLis inescapable conclusion is verified by another section of the
Act which specifically states that any purchaser of negotiable
paper, even though obtained by the trustee as proceeds of goods,
documents, or instruments, acquires his interest free from that of
the entruster.
56
As often happens in the case of automobile transactions,
which make up a substantial portion of trust receipt financings,
the dealer possessed of cars under a trust receipt may sell one,
take the purchaser's old vehicle in trade, and then sell that too.
The used car would certainly be considered part of the proceeds
of the original sale, so questions will arise over the extent to which
the entruster's right to proceeds will attach to it. If the individual
buying the traded-in automobile possessed all the requisites of a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade, the entruster's right to the
proceeds could not be enforced for his security interest is never
valid against such a party,57 but if the purchaser lacked any of
the elements of a buyer in the ordinary course of trade his right
to the used automobile would have to yield to those of the
entruster.
Under a similar set of circumstances, it might occur that the
transferee of the trustee, instead of purchasing the traded-in
article outright, acquires some lesser interest in it, either as a
mortgagee, pledgee, lessee, or subsequent entruster. Here again
55 UTRA § 9-1(a) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/_, §174(1) (a).
56 UTRA § 9-1(b) 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 174(1) (b-).
57 UTRA § 9-2(a) 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 174(2) (a).
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the status of the parties must be determined in the light of the
entruster's security interest at the time the trustee sold the origi-
nal article. Not being purchasers in the ordinary course of trade,
if the original sale had taken place after there had been a filing,
they could acquire no rights in the proceeds, since at that time the
entruster's security interest was valid against them.58 The deci-
sion in the California case of Peoples Finance & Thrift Company
of Visalia v. Bowman,59 however, would appear to refute this con-
clusion. In that case a dealer acquiring an automobile under a
trust receipt sold it, taking a secondhand car in part payment.
The plaintiff advanced money on this car under a subsequent
trust-receipt transaction. Upon learning of this, the original en-
truster seized the vehicle and precipitated an action by the plain-
tiff. The court decided for the plaintiff, basing its decision on an
estoppel theory, by indicating that since the plaintiff did not have
actual notice of the defendant's prior trust receipt or his right to
the proceeds, he should not be bound by either. From the facts of
the case, it would appear that the original entruster had filed in
accordance with the Act and, therefore, presumably his security
interest should have been valid as against any subsequent en:
truster" and ought to have attached to the proceeds of any sale
as against such an individual. The decision appears erroneous
and probably indicates a lack of understanding of this section
engendered by its complexity. There are periods, however, during
which a purchaser not in the ordinary course of trade is not bound
by an entruster's security interest,6' so, if the trustee has disposed
of the trust receipt property during these periods, it would follow
that this type of purchaser would obtain as valid an interest in
the proceeds thereof as he could have obtained in the property
itself.
58 The entruster's security interest is always valid as against purchasers other
than buyers in the ordinary course of trade where he has filed in accordance with
the Act: UTRA § 9-2(b), Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 174(2) (b).
59 58 Cal. App. (2d) 729, 137 P. (2d) 729 (1943).
60 An entruster obtaining a security interest in property which is already held
under a trust receipt is considered a purchaser not in the ordinary course of trade.
See above for a discussion of this point.
61 UTRA § 9-2(b) ; IH. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 174(2) (b).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
E. NOTICE REQUIREM£ENTS
Some emphasis has already been given to the fact that the
entruster, to preserve his interest in the trust receipt property,
should give notice of his rights. In that regard, it will be remem-
bered that the public recording requirements for both the chattel
mortgage and the conditional sale contract were considered to be
drawbacks to the utilization of such devices first, because each
separate transaction had to be filed, resulting in inconvenience
and expense; second, any person interested had to gear his opera-
tions to the delay made necessary to complete a search of existing
records; and third, information concerning the debtor's financial
conditions, usually kept secret by the debtor if possible, was
publicized. When the framers of the Act decided to require
recordation in the case of trust receipts, they attempted to obviate
these difficulties yet still provide an adequate source of informa-
tion for third parties so that they would not be harmed by lack
of actual knowledge of the debtor's operations. With this in mind,
the filing procedure established makes it unnecessary to record
each trust receipt transaction, for the single filing of a statement
to the effect that the entruster is engaged in, or intends to engage
in, trust receipt activities with a named trustee is deemed suffi-
cient warning. This statement is designed to cover all individual
transactions entered into between the parties for a period of one
year. Recordation of this type is sufficient to permit any indi-
vidual to ascertain whether or not a given party utilizes the trust
receipt device to obtain possession of property, and the type of
property so covered; hence, armed with this much information he
is in a position to deal with the trustee accordingly.
62
As the statement referred to is intended to cover several trust
receipt transactions, it is apparent that in some cases the filing
will occur before new value is given. This raises the question of
whether the entruster's security interest, once obtained, dates
62 The filing provisions are only applicable to trust receipt transactions involving
goods or documents. Recordation is apparently deemed unnecessary in the case of
instruments for the entruster, by making appropriate notations upon such paper, can
bring his security interest to the attention of any third party intending to deal
therewith.
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from the time of filing or from the time the new value is given.
In the Illinois case of Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Company
63
the court was asked to determine the effect of filing before actual
credit advances were made. Both the plaintiff and the defendant
therein were automobile financers. Each had filed the requisite
statement under the Act showing an intention to engage in trans-
actions with the same dealer, the plaintiff's filing being prior to
that of the defendant. The defendant financed the purchase of
certain automobiles for this dealer and, subsequently, the plain-
tiff made credit advances on the same vehicles. In an action be-
tween the two, the only question raised was as to which held the
prior security interest. The Appellate Court ruled that the plain-
tiff acquired an inchoate security interest from the time his state-
ment was filed and, as soon as credit was given, it ripened into
an actual lien which related back to the time of the original filing.
That decision was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court, how-
ever, which court held that the date when the security interest
attaches is to be determined not by recordation but by the actual
advancement of credit; hence it gave priority to the defendant
who came on the scene later but was the first person to give actual
value.
The statement to be filed should be signed by both entruster
and trustee and should then be enrolled with the Secretary of
State or some comparable state officer, 64 which central filing sys-
tem serves the convenience of those who are bound by the con-
structive notice. 65  The form to be used is simple, 6 requires only
a minimum of information and reveals little or nothing which
might provide advantage to the trustee's competitors. The state-
ment should contain: (1) the name of the entruster and trustee
together with the principal place of business of each, within or
63 318 Ill. App. 95, 47 N. E. (2d) 568 (1943), reversed in 385 Ill. 211, 52 N. E. (2d)
695 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 99 and 145.
64 UTRA § 13-1 ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/ § 178 (1).
65 In Pennsylvania, the filing must be both with the Department of State and the
Prothonotary of the county in which the trustee's principal place of business Is
located: Purdon's Pa. Stat. Anno.. Tit. 68, § 563-1.
66 UTRA § 13-2, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211, § 178(2), provides a form which
may be used. It is not mandatory.
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outside the state ;o,7 (2) a statement that the entruster "is engaged,
or expects to be engaged, in financing under trust receipt trans-
actions the acquisition of goods" by the trustee ;68 and (3) a
description of the goods financed. 69
The filing officer is directed, by the statute, to index the state-
ment according to the name of the trustee, and to note the date and
hour of filing.70 Presentment for filing together with payment of
the fee is considered equivalent to recording, 71 despite the claim
made in one case that, because the trust receipt statement did not
bear the required file-mark, it was to be deemed a nullity.
72 It
would also seem that the filing would be equally good even though,
through some dereliction of duty on the part of the filing officer,
the statement might never be catalogued. While the filing is
effective for one year,73 there may be a refiling at the expiration
of that term either by the recording of another statement or by
an affidavit, signed by the entruster, containing the same informa-
tion required in the original statement.
7 4
If the trust receipt should come within the purview of some
other recording statute, the entruster is not burdened by the
necessity of complying with both statutes but has an election.
75
67 UTRA § 13-1(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 178(1) (a). It is thereby
made possible for anyone desiring to deal with the trustee to communicate with the
entruster and inquire directly as to the nature of the entruster's interest, if any.
He need not rely on an affidavit of the trustee, as is the case under the Bulk Sales
Act.
68 UTRA § 13-1(b) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 178(1) (b). The term "acqui-
sition of goods" would indicate that this type of security device is only to be utilized
in the financing of new purchases and not in obtaining advances upon old inven-
tories in the trustee's possession.
69 UTRA § 13-1(c) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121Y2, § 178(1) (c). This information
would necessarily have to be of a general character since the statement may cover
transactions entered into during a full year. A description by serial, style, or model
number would usually be impossible for, at the time of filing in advance, the exact
items' to be acquired by the trustee generally are not known. See the generality of
the language used in In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (1948).
70 UTRA § 13-3; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/4, § 178(3).
71 UTRA § 13-4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 ., § 178(4).
72 Middleton v. Commercial Inv. Corporation, 301 Ill. App. 242, 22 N. E. (2d) 723
(1939).
73 UTRA § 13-4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 178(4).
74 UTRA § 13-5; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121 Y2, § 178(5), declares: "Any filing of
such further statement or affidavit shall be valid in like manner and for like period
as an original filing, and shall also continue the rank of the Entruster's existing
security interest as against all junior interests."
75 UTRA § 16; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 181.
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There are several types of statutes under whose filing provisions
a trust receipt might conceivably fall. At common law it was
held that the general recording acts of some states were broad
enough in scope to cover a tri-partite transaction.7 6  Since, under
the present statute, a bi-partite arrangement is also recognized,
filing requirements for chattel mortgages or conditional sales
contracts might be considered applicable, even though the trust
receipt lacks some of their technical aspects. The entruster,
however, obtains no further protection by adhering to a different
recording statute, since those individuals not bound by filing under
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act are not to be bound by recording
under any other act.77  It might be said, therefore, depending
upon the terms of individual statutes, that the only differences
between filing under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act in contrast
to proceeding under general recording laws will have to do with
the extent of the information required and the period for which
the recording is effective. The simplicity of the former, to say
the least, counts in its favor.
F. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Brief attention should be given to certain miscellaneous pro-
visions of the Act not capable of treatment elsewhere. It con-
tains the customary provision that it shall not operate retro-
actively and that it shall only govern transactions entered into
after its effective date.78  The importance of the effective date
was brought out vividly in a case decided by a federal court sit-
ting in Massachusetts.7 9  Prior to the adoption of the Act, that
state had regarded an unrecorded trust receipt in the same light
as an unrecorded chattel mortgage.8 0 The question came up as
to the validity of unrecorded trust receipts against a trustee in
bankruptcy. Some of the trust receipts were executed before,
76 In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 F. 657 (1918).
77 UTRA § 16; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/2, § 181.
7s UTRA § 21; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211 , § 186. The statute became effective
in Illinois on July 1, 1935.
79 In re McManus Motors, 27 F. Supp. 113 (1939).
80 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556, 171 N. E. 820
(1930).
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others after, the effective date. The court came to the obvious
conclusion that those made before were invalid for failure to
record, but the later ones were to be upheld.
A companion provision states that the Act should control
notwithstanding any other laws,8' thereby serving to repeal all
conflicting laws. It was accordingly argued, in the case of In re
Boswell,"2 that the Act had, by implication, annulled several other
statutes dealing with liens and mortgages. In support thereof
it was urged that as the new Act permitted secret liens, the trust
receipt would become so popular that the more cumbersome de-
vices such as the mortgage or pledge would no longer be utilized.
The court pointed out that the Act merely controlled trust re-
ceipts, did not actually or by implication repeal laws relating to
other security devices, and the mere fact that mortgages and
pledges might not be employed as extensively as theretofore could
not be construed to be a statutory restriction on their use.
The Act bears two separate titles, the short or popular title
used for reference purposes8 3 and the more formal title appearing
as the heading which, under most state constitutions, should
fairly express the substance of its contents. s4  Both have been
the object of criticism. One writer has condemned the use of the
phrase "Uniform Trust Receipts Act," claiming that it was
meant to cover up what, in his opinion, were certain undesirable
features of the statute. 5 , He made particular reference to the
inclusion of bi-partite transactions resembling chattel mortgages
under the heading of trust receipts,8 6 and contended that certain
of the legislatures would not have enacted the Uniform Act if
they had realized its true significance even though the rules gov-
erning trust receipts were admittedly in need of reform.
81 UTRA § 21; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 186.
82 96 F. (2d) 239 (1938), affirming 20 F. Supp. 748 (1937).
83 UTRA § 20; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 121/2, § 187.
84 See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
85 See Layton, "Beware of Laws Called Uniform," 40 Credit & Finan. Management
21 (1938).
86 The feeling among many was that trust receipt financing should be confined to
tri-partite transactions as originally developed under the common law. The inclu-
sion of bi-partite arrangements was the reason the Act received opposition from
many quarters: 146 Com. and Fin. Chron. 2781 (1938).
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The longer title has been attacked, on constitutional grounds,
in two cases arising in California.87  The title of the statute
there concerned purported to deal with trust receipts and pledges
of personal property accompanied by possession. The argu-
ment was advanced that the Act, in reality, permitted secret liens
and also repealed certain laws having to do with pledges and
mortgages, points not set out in the heading. No constitutional
objection was found to exist when the court pointed out that the
term "trust receipt" had always been associated with mort-
gages, unrecorded liens, and pledges, thus embodying all of these
items. The title to the Illinois Act is even broader in scope,s8
and it would seem reasonably safe to say that there can be little
argument as to its sufficiency.s 9
The Illinois statute embodies a section not found in the Uni-
form Act, one which declares that it is a felony for a trustee
to dispose of goods, documents, or instruments held under a
trust receipt and to fail to pay the amount of the debt where he
either had no liberty to make such disposition or, having it, was
under an obligation to account for the proceeds.90 There is no
record of a conviction under its provisions.
III. CONCLUSION
The object of the foregoing analysis has been of a two-fold
character: (1) to promote a clearer understanding of an act
which, because of its highly technical subject matter, has long
remained obscure to many; and (2) to point out the parts which
need clarification in the hope that they will be considered in any
87 In re Boswell, 96 F. (2d) 239 (1938), affirming 20 F. Supp. 748 (1937) ; Chi-
chester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 99 P. (2d) 1083 (1940).
88 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1211/, § 166, declares it to be an act "concerning trust
receipts and certain security transactions and to make uniform the law relating
thereto." The term "security transactions" would appear to be broad enough to
cover all provisions embodied in the statute, as well as devices not encompassed
thereby.
89 In Middleton v. Commercial Inv. Corporation, 301 Ill. App. 242, 22 N. E. (2d)
723 (1939), an attack upon constitutionality seems to have been predicated on these
grounds, but the Appellate Court noted that the contention was merely stated in the
brief, was not argued, and had been waived. Anyway, the question of constitu-
tionality should have gone directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 1212, § 183.
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future revision. No comment has been made concerning either
the phraseology or the format of the statute. It is obvious to
anyone who has examined its provisions that the Act is couched
in a language which is none too clear, even to one versed in the
subject, and contains many dependent clauses the true import of
which cannot be gathered at a single reading. It goes without
saying that, in any revision of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
for the purpose of its inclusion in a contemplated commercial
code, those commissioned to do the work of redrafting will face
an unenviable task. They should keep foremost in mind, how-
ever, that no future recodification will be of any value unless it
serves to simplify the law so that even a businessman can un-
derstand it.1
91 Beers, "The New Commercial Code," 2 gus. Lawyer 14 at 17 (1948), states: "A
commercial code is not just for lawyers. The merchant, the banker, and the ordinary
man have a right to have ordinary transactions governed by laws they can under-
stand."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Do "TAX CONSULTANTS" PRACTICE LAW?
There has recently come from the Appellate Division of. the New
York Supreme Court, through the medium of the decision in Application
of New York County Lawyers Association,' as succinct a statement of the
doctrine juris consultis interpretatio juris2 as has yet been announced
by any court. In meaning, that statement is as certain and exact as the
doctrine of stare decisis; in operation, it should prove as lasting and
helpful. Without doubt, for New York, it answers the question posed
above.
The origin of that decision lay in the fact that a New York corpora-
tion, which had not shown any profit for three years and had not paid
its sales and compensating use taxes due the state, suddenly made so much
money that it was faced with the prospect of having to pay a large
federal income tax. The question arose as to whether the payment, in
the current year, of the past due sales and use taxes would support de-
duction by the taxpayer of the amount thereof from the current large
profit. The company's accountant, who was also a lawyer, advised against
any such deduction. It was then that the company called upon one Bercu,
a certified public accountant, and requested his advice. He was not asked
to audit any books or prepare any tax returns but was simply asked the
abstract question: Does the law permit the taking of this deduction in
the current year? He answered the question, charged the company for
his advice,3 and when the company did not pay he sued. Recovery was
denied on the ground that Bercu had engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. Thereafter, the New York County Lawyers Association ap-
plied to the court to punish Bercu for his contempt as well as to enjoin
against his unauthorized practice in the future. Although the initial
tribunal denied relief, substantially on the theory that the giving of tax
advice was proper tax accounting practice, the Appellate Division, by a
divided vote, imposed a fine and issued the injunction. The majority
declared that when an accountant passes on a question of law, apart from
auditing books or preparing tax returns, he is engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1 Sub nom. In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524. 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 (1948), reversing
188 Misc. 406, 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 (1947). Glennon, J., dissented. It is understood
that the case is now pending before the New York Court of Appeals.
2 That maxim may be said to mean that interpretation of the law is the province
of lawyers.
3 What that advice was is immaterial to this discussion.
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Considering, as a matter of public benefit, whether accountants ought
to be entrusted to engage in the abstract interpretation of laws, attention
is first directed to differences in education and training between attorneys
and accountants. A survey shows that in at least forty states the general
educational requirement for the lawyer is a minimum of two years of
prelegal training at the college level as opposed to a maximum requirement
of only a high school education for the accountant. In over a fourth of
the American states, admission to the bar also demands a minimum of
three years of law school study, covering every branch of the law, as com-
pared to only two states which require any specialized college training for
the certified public accountant.4 Much more significant, however, is the
fact that the scope of the education and training of the great body of
self-styled "accountants" or "tax consultants" is absolutely unspecified
and uncontrolled. They are on their own and all is fish that falls in their
nets. To allow such persons, who have not made a study of the whole
body of the law, with its correlated system of statutes and decisions, to
interpret statutes would be as absurd as to permit persons who lack a study
of the whole human body to operate on the human anatomy.5
It must also be remembered that, in order to protect the public against
ill-considered interpretations of the law leading to wholesale litigation,
attorneys, made officers of the courts by the solemn judicial act of ad-
mission to the bar, are responsible directly for moral or professional mis-
conduct. No matter how fine the education and training of accountants
might grow to be, they still will not be, and cannot be, under the direct
disciplinary control of the courts. Except by enforcing liability for mal-
practice after the event, there is no way by which the courts can impose
upon the laymen the same high standards enforced among members of the
bar. For that matter, no accountant is subject to discipline for adver-
4 See Exhibit Four appended to statement of W. McNeil Kennedy, representing
the Chicago Bar Association, on H. R. 3214, made before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. That measure, as originally introduced, represented the considered
opinion of experts and had the approval of many bar associations. Among other
things, it was designed to make the Tax Court, now an administrative body, into
a court of the United States. On July 7, 1947, with debate limited, Section 2560
thereof was amended to read: "No qualified person shall be denied admission to
practice before such Court because of his failure to be a member of any profession
or calling." Necessarily, as amended, the bill was then opposed by the bar associa-
tions because it would operate to admit laymen to practice before a court in
violation of a principle, firmly rooted in law, that only lawyers shall represent
others in courts of record: Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed.
204 (1824), Robb v. Smith, 4 Ill. 46 (1841). The sponsors of the amendment refused
to concede this principle so the Senate, in order to insure passage of the bill as a
whole, struck out all provisions designed to convert the Tax Court into a judicial
body. It remains, therefore, an administrative agency. It is probable, however, that
its method of operation will have to be changed to meet the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, in accordance with the decision in Lincoln Electric
Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. (2d) 379 (1947), unless change is made in the law.
5 Walker v. Kahn, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (1938).
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tising or soliciting employment, while members of the bar are prohibited
from both of these practices.
In still other important respects, the law treats lawyers differently than
accountants. The client, when consulting a lawyer, is generally protected
in his right to make free disclosure by treating his communications to his
lawyer as privileged.6 Except as provided by statute,7 communications to
accountants are not so privileged. The security of the confidential rela-
tionship, found between attorney and client, may often be an important
element in consultations over tax matters; its absence, when the ac-
countant is called upon, may be productive of mischief. By and large,
the lawyer's main duty is to advocate his client's cause. The predominant
characteristic of a certified public accountant, on the other hand is his
independence or objectivity. Advocacy and objectivity are diametric
opposites. For these reasons, then, to allow laymen accountants to engage
in formulating abstract interpretations of laws would open the door to the
same irresponsibility that has jeopardized public welfare by other forms
of unauthorized practice. 8
6 The history of privileged communications between attorney and client is almost
as ancient as the legal profession: Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. 8, § 2290.
'Statutes on the subject may be found in Colo. Stats. 1929, Ch. 185, p. 642, Ga.
Stats. 1943, Tit. 84. § 84-216, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 110Y!, § 19, Iowa Code 1931,
§ 1905-c-17, Ky. Stats. 1946, Ch. 210, § 20, and N. M. Stats. 1941, § 20-112(e), Others
may be in the course of promulgation: Wigmore, op. cit., § 2286, n. 14.
8 The following cases illustrate other acts held to amount to unauthorized practice
of law: People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. (2d) 693 (1948), conduct of litiga-
tion by disbarred attorney; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman,
366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941, 111 A. L. R. 1 (1937), appearance of layman before
Industrial Commission; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor
Club, 362 111. 50, 199 N. E. 1 (1935), legal services capitalized for profit; People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. The Motorists Association of Illinois, 354 Ill. 595,
188 N. E. 827 (1933), association rendering legal service to members; People ex rel.
Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. D. 823 (1933),
lay intermediary between lawyers and their clients; People v. Schreiber, 250 IlL
345, 95 N. E. 189 (1911), fraudulent misrepresentation as to license to practice:
People v. Securities Discount Corporation, 361 Ill. 551, 198 N. E. 681 (1935), col-
lection agency practicing law; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931), corporation practicing law;
Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. B. (2d) 264
(1945), same; Chicago Bar Association v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Ill.
App. 243, 38 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), certified public accountant and corporation
practicing before Department of Finance; Midland Credit Adjustment Co. v.
Donnelly, 219 II. App. 271 (1920), collection agency practicing law; Bump v.
District Court, 323 Iowa 623, 5 N. W. (2d) 914 (1942), layman presenting tax
refund claims; N. Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. Dawkins, 262 App. Div. 56. 27
N. Y. S. (2d) 797 (1941), affirmed in 289 N. Y. 553, 43 N. E. (2d) 530 (1942),
appearance before Board of Assessors; People ex rel. Trojan Realty Co. v. Purdy,
174 App. Div. 702, 162 N. Y. S. 56 (1916), presentation of tax protests; In re
Standard Tax & Management Corp., 181 Misc. 632, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 479 (1943),
giving of tax law advice; Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 160 Misc. 656,
290 N. Y. S. 462 (1936), accountant securing sales tax refunds; Crawford v.
McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935), tax protests and refund claims:
Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau, Inc.. 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1939), utility and
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Argument in favor of eradicating the distinction between the lawyer's
and the accountant's function in the tax field 9 has been based upon the
fact that accountants are admitted to practice before the Treasury De-
partment and the Tax Court. There is no valid foundation for this
argument. The Treasury Department rules expressly prohibit account-
ants enrolled with it from practicing law,10 and the Tax Court has per-
mitted very few laymen to be admitted before it. Since January 1, 1943,
non-lawyers have been admitted by it only upon examination. In one
five-year period, ninety-two non-lawyers took the examination but only
seven passed, of whom five were certified public accountants. Up until
recently, not one of the seven has tried a case in the Tax Court," and
an analysis of the decisions thereof in the same five-year period shows
that out of 3661 cases decided only 166, or 4.5%, were handled by non-
lawyer certified public accountants who had been admitted prior to the
examination requirement. 12 Statistics such as these speak for themselves.
It cannot be denied that tax laws and tax regulations today are so
tightly bound up with interpretations of the courts that legal concepts
necessarily become the basis upon which accountants outline the facts
with which they must work. It is unavoidable that an accountant, when
performing his accounting duties, must attempt to understand and follow
the provisions of the law. In this process, he uses his knowledge of the
law, perhaps even interprets it, for his own purposes in the performance
of his accounting duties, but he does so merely as an incident to his
primary hiring as an accountant. What he gets paid for, what he sells
to the public, however, is not legal advice but an accounting product the
legal sufficiency of which has not been tested and may never need be. The
scope of accounting practice is well understood 13 and the province of the
certified public accountant is well defined.1 4 When an accountant in-
interstate commerce consultants: Walker v. Kahn. 31 Pa. D. & C. 620 (1938).
insurance agent executing bonds and applications for license. But see State ex rel.
Johnson v. Childe. 147 Neb. 527. 23 N. W. (2d) 720 (1946). noted in 25 CHICAGO-
KENT LAw Rvitw 238. appearance before state commerce commission.
9 See nisi prins opinion in the instant case. 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 at 741, and also
78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 at 218. Compare with discussions between groups of account-
ants and lawyers seeking to reach harmony on the point to be found in 63 Am. Bar
Rep. 325, 69 Am. Bar Rep. 189. 263, 264. and 469. 70 Am. Bar Rep. 267. and 32 Am.
Bar Ass'n Journ. 5. There is indication in 34 Am. Bar Ass'n Journ. 519 that the
instant case was in the nature of a "test" proceeding.
10 Treas. Dept. Circular 230, § 10.2(f).
11 See statement of V. McNeil Kennedy referred to in note 4, ante.
12 Ibid., Exhibit One.
13 An analysis thereof may be found in Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau,
Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 at 431 (1939), and in Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623.
5 N. W. (2d) 914 (1942).
14 See definitions in Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 11012 , § 7, and New York, State
Education Law. Art. 57. 1489(6). See also Am. Inst. of Accountants, Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 9.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
terprets the law for his own use in connection with these limited fields,
time-honored forms and formulas will tend to be a check upon his interpre-
tations. But interpretation of the law by accountants, apart from prepara-
tion of financial statements or when needed in the process of auditing books,
falls clearly beyond the realm of accounting practice.
Insofar as the preparation of income tax returns is concerned, some
courts have indicated that the preparation of anything but the simplest
of returns amounts to practicing law.15 The view expressed in the instant
case is that the accountant should be allowed maximum freedom of action
within the field of "tax accounting" to the end that a taxpayer be not
required to go to a lawyer to have his tax return prepared. 16 Somewhere
between these extremes, the line of demarcation will eventually be drawn.1
7
In the meantime, when an accountant comes face to face with a difficult
tax law problem in his legitimate practice, one which he recognizes re-
quires interpretation hence calls for legal research and an analysis of
court decisions, he should not hazard a guess at the solution but should
guarantee to his client the best possible solution by recommending that he
consult legal counsel.
With respect to drawing that line of demarcation, it should be re-
membered that a Pennsylvania court once said, "It is obvious that no
wall can be built around the field of the law that will keep all lawyers
within it and all laymen outside it."18 Likening the situation to an old
English case where a railroad's fence was defective and defendant's pigs
strayed and did damage to a trolley car,19 that court also quoted from the
learned Baron Bramwell's remarks therein as follows: "Nor do we lay
down that there must be a fence so close and strong that no pig could
push through it, or so high that no horse or bullock could leap it. One
could scarcely tell the limits of such a requirement, for the strength of
swine is such that they would break through almost any fence, if there
were a sufficient inducement on the other side... [It is] bound to put up
such a fence that a pig not of a peculiarly wandering disposition, nor under
any excessive temptation, will not get through it. ''20 Putting it differently,
15 Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co.. 107 F. (2d) 271. 71 App. D. C. 72.
cert. den. 308 U. S. 625. 60 S. Ct. 380. 84 L. Ed. 521 (1940) ; Lowell Bar Ass'n v.
Loeb, 315 Mass. 176. 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943). See also note in 42 Mich. L. Rev.
1122. and the issues of Unauthorized Practice News, particularly Vol. X, No. 2 and
No. 4, and Vol. XII, No. 1.
16 See 78 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 at 220.
17 The amicable discussions between accountants and lawyers referred to in note
9. ante, should some day lead to an acceptable compromise.
1s Blair v. Motor Carriers Service Bureau. Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 at 421 (1939).
19 The court referred to Child v. Hearn. 9 L. R. Ex. 176 (1874).
20 9 L. R. Ex. 176 at 181.
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the doctrine of the instant case should be applied sensibly2' to avoid any
imputation that the legal profession seeks to establish a monopoly.
Lawyers are not artisans joined into a trade union acting to serve only
their own selfish ends. In fact, the term "monopoly" has no place in the
vocabulary of the learned professions. It does not apply to those who
are bound to their calling by a vow; it belongs in the jargon of the
market-place. Lawyers are not, nay cannot be, in the market-place so the
problem as to what shall constitute the practice of law is not to be solved
by the competition of the market-place. Truly, in the public interest,
22
it is up to the courts to solve that problem. The instant case supplies a
proper solution to at least one aspect theieof.
GRACE THOMAS STRIPLING
21 It has been followed, with approval, by the highest court in New Jersey:
Auerbacher v. Wood. - N. J. Eq. -, 59 A. (2d) 863 (1948), affirming 139 N. J. Eq.
599, 53 A. (2d) 800 (1947).
22 In 28 Iowa I.. Rev. 116, at 117, appears the statement: "No person of intelli-
gence supposes that the organized medical profession makes war on quacks in order
to get more business for reputable doctors. If that were its real purpose, the better
professional strategy would be to let the quacks go ahead, since their practice
would inevitably increase both the number of patients for legitimate physicians
and the seriousness of their ailments. The same thought is true in the problem of
the unauthorized practice of law. The reports are full of cases which never would
have arisen had an attorney been employed at the start." The fight against un-
authorized practice of law is, most often, conducted by unselfish and uncompensated
groups acting solely in the public Interest.
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF PROCESS ON DESIGNATED STATUTORY AGENT
CONFERS JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT WHERE REGISTERED
LETTER TO SUCH DEFENDANT CONTAINING NOTICE OF SUIT REMAINS UN-
DELIVERF-In Powell v. Knight,' a case growing out of an automobile
accident between a resident plaintiff and a non-resident defendant, the
174 F. Supp. 191 (1947).
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plaintiff served process in the fashion directed by the local statute2 by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the designated
statutory official who thereafter forwarded the same by registered mail to
the last-known place of address of the defendant with a return receipt
attached. The return receipt for the registered article was signed by
defendant's mother-in-law, residing at the place of address, but the letter
never reached the defendant because she had, in the meantime, moved to
parts unknown and apparently never learned of the existence of the
action against her. Despite this, an attorney appeared for the defendant,
most likely acting to protect an insurance company who had issued a policy
on the car, and he moved to abate the action for lack of service of process,
basing such motion on the ground of failure to comply with the provision
in question. That motion, at plaintiff's request, was overruled by the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on the ground
that plaintiff's efforts to procure service were sufficient, under the statute,
to establish jurisdiction.
It is undoubtedly true that a court does not obtain in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless there be service of
process on him,3 or on his agent, while within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. If that agent is one who has been personally appointed by
the defendant, it can be presumed that knowledge of the pendency of the
suit has been conveyed to the principal. 4 If, however, the agent is one
not personally but only impliedly appointed by statute, some provision
must be made in the statute for the giving of notice to the non-resident
principal to meet the requirements of due process, 5 otherwise the attempted
service will prove ineffective to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.6  It is
not necessary that actual notice, in fact, be given to the non-resident
principal to sustain a service made upon his implied agent but, to meet
constitutional requirements, the provision for notice must be such as to
insure that he will, under ordinary circumstances, receive actual notice.
In the light of these requirements and in view of the prevalence of
statutes designating some local official as agent for service for all non-
2 Va. Code 1942, Tit. 18. Ch. 90B, § 2154(70) (i), directs: "... provided that notice
of such service and a copy of the process or notice are forthwith sent by registered
mail, with registered delivery receipt requested, by the director to the defendant ...
and an affidavit of compliance herewith .. be filed with the declaration or notice of
motion."
3 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
4 The general presumption that knowledge on the part of the agent is to be deemed
knowledge on the part of the principal should suffice for this purpose as well as for
other purposes: Curtis C. & H. Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 216, 43 S. Ct. 570,
67 L. Ed. 954 (1923).
5 Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
6 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230
(1928).
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resident drivers who use the highways of other states, at least as to causes
of action growing out of such use of those highways, there is occasion to
review the several provisions currently in force. One group of statutes,
found in twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia, 7 may be
exemplified by the language found in the New York act which directs
that "notice of such service and a copy of the summons and complaint
are to be forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant. The defendant's return receipt, the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance
and a copy of the summons and complaint shall be filed with the clerk
of the court in which the action is pending."" By requiring the filing of
record of a return receipt signed by the defendant, these jurisdictions
have gone to the extreme to insure notice short of requiring proof that
the non-resident defendant has opened the registered article and examined
the contents. Nothing less will suffice, for those courts which have had
occasion to pass upon the meaning of such a provision have interpreted
it to require that the defendant actually receive the notice of the pendency
of the suit.9
A second group of statutes, effective in thirteen states, 10 may be
typified by the Illinois provision which directs that "notice of such service
7 D. of C. Code 1940, Tit. 40, Ch. 4, § 40-403; Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 199; Ariz.
Code Ann. 1939, Ch. 66, § 227; Cal. Deering Vehicle Code Ann. 1944, Ch. 1, § 404;
Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, Ch. 16, § 48 (1) ; Del. Laws, Vol. 35, Ch. 225, § 2; Fla.
Stats. 1941, Tit. 6, Ch. 47, §§ 47.29-47.30; Ga. Laws 1937, Part 1, Tit. 6, No. 444, at
p. 732; Ida. Code Ann. 1932 (1940 Supp.), Tit. 48, Ch. 5a. § 32; Burns' Ind. Stats.
Ann. 1933, Vol. 8, Ch. 10, § 47-1043; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 1, Ch. 321, § 321.501; La.
Dart Civ. Code 1939, Vol. 4, Ch. 4, § 5297; Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, Vol. 1, Ch. 19, § 59;
Flack Ann. Md. Code 1939, Vol. 2, Art. 56, § 167; Mass. Laws 1933, Vol. 3, Ch. 90,
§ 3c; Mich. Stats. Ann. 1937, Vol. 8, Tit. 9, Ch. 74, § 9.1701; Miss. Laws 1938, Ch.
148, § 11; Mont. Rev. Code 1935, Vol. 1, Ch. 152, § 1760.14; Nev. Comp. Laws (1931-
41 Supp.), Vol. 1, § 4441.01; N. J. Stat. Ann., Tit. 2, Ch. 32, § 2:32-34.2; Cahill Cons.
Laws N. Y., 1937 Supp., Ch. 64-a, § 52; N. Car. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 1, Ch. 1,
§ 1-105; Okla. Stats. Ann. (Perm. Ed.), Tit. 47, Ch. 1, § 7; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
1940, Vol. 8, Tit. 115, Art. 5, § 115-129; S. Car. Code 1942, Vol. 1, Tit. 7, Ch. 16, § 437;
Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 6, Tit. 1, Ch. 5, Art. 4, §§ 8671, 8672 and 8673;
Remington's Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1937, Vol. 7a, Tit. 41, § 6360-129; W. Va. Code
Ann. 1943, Ch. 56, § 5555 (1).
8 Cahill Cons. Laws N. Y., 1937 Supp., Ch. 64-a, § 52. The statutes cited in note 7,
ante, are not identical in language but all possess similar purport to the New York
provision.
9 Smyrnios v. Weintraub, 3 F. Supp. 439 (1933) ; Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5
W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A. 327 (1932) ; Spearman v. Stover, 184 La. 620,
170 So. 259 (1936). In New York, the court has gone so far as to say that if the
defendant refuses to accept the registered letter, the plaintiff has not complied with
the statute: Dwyer v. Shalck, 232 App. Div. 780, 248 N. Y. S. 355 (1931). But see
contra: Creadick v. Keller, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 169. 160 A. 909 (1932) ; State
ex rel. Charette v. Dist. Ct. of Second Judicial District, 107 Mont. 489, 86 P. (2d)
750 (1939) ; and Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S. E. (2d) 595 (1942), where
it was held that, compliance with the statute having been rendered impossible by
the defendant's own wilful conduct, he was in no position to complain.
10 Ark. Pope Dig. 1937, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 1375: Conn. Gen. Stats. 1930, Tit. 58, Ch.
288, § 5473; II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , § 23; Minn. Stats. Ann. 1945, Vol. 12,
Ch. 170, § 170.55; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1939, Vol. 18. Ch. 45, Art. 1, § 8410.5; Neb.
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and a copy of the process are . . to be sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, at the last known address of the said defendant,
and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance herewith is to be appended to the
summons."11 Since these provisions merely direct that the notice be sent
to the "last known address" of the defendant, there is indication of a
legislative intent that actual delivery to the non-resident shall not be
deemed a prerequisite to jurisdiction. 12 That result, at least, was achieved
in the Ohio case of Henderskot v. Ferkel'3 although the statute there also
provides that the return receipt of the defendant should be filed in the
record. But strict construction must be given to the words "last known
address" in order to comply with fundamental constitutional concepts of
due process'4 as well as to prevent fraud in the obtaining of a judgment
by default. As the Connecticut court observed in the case of Hartley v.
Vitiello,15 unless the defendant has departed for parts unknown, that
phrase means his "actual address. If he has disappeared, it means his
last address so far as it is reasonably possible to ascertain it. This address
the plaintiff must learn at his own peril, and only if the copy is mailed
to it is there a compliance with the statute."16
Four other statutes, comprising the third group which includes the
one involved in the instant case,'1 7 are susceptible of two interpretations,
i.e. that actual delivery of notice is or is not required to effectuate process.
These statutes do not require that notice be sent to the "last known
address" of the defendant nor impose the requirement that the return
receipt be filed in the action. Those found in Kansas, Texas and Vermont
merely provide that the registered mail be sent "to the defendant,"
although the Virginia one adds the further proviso that a registered
delivery receipt be "requested." It would be possible, by giving a literal
Rev. Stat. 1943, Vol. 2. Ch. 25. Art. 5. § 25-530: N. Dak. Rev. Code 1943. Vol. 3, Ch.
28-06, § 28-0612; Page's Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 4a, Ch. 21, § 6308-2; Purdon's Pa.
Stats. Ann.. Tit. 75. Ch. 4, . 1202: S. Dak. Code 1939, Vol. 2. Ch. 33.08, § 33.0809;
Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 3. Tit. 57. Ch. 13, § 12; Wis. Stats. 1945. Ch. 85, § 85.05(3)
Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, Ch. 60, § 60-1101.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95y/_, § 23.
12 Hartley v. Vitiello. 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931) , Schilling v. Odlebak, 224
N. W. 694, 177 Minn. 90 (1929). approving .Tones v. Paxton, 27 F. (2d) 364 (1928);
Herzoff v. Homnell. 120 Neb. 475, 233 N. W. 458 (1930) : Ashbrook v. Otto, 2 Ohio
0. 534 (1935) : Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937) ; Sorrenson
v. Stowers. 251 Wis. 398, 29 N. W. (2d) 512 (1947) : State ex rel. Cronkhite v.
Beldon, 193 Wis. 145. 211 N. W. 916, 57 A. L. R. 1218 (1927).
i', 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N. E. (2d) 205 (1944).
14 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230
(1928).
15 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931).
16 113 Conn. 74 at 80, 154 A. 255 at 258.
17 Kan. Gen. Stats. 1935. Ch. 8. Art. 4. § 8-402: Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.. Vol.
5, Tit. 42, Art. 2039a; Vt. Pub. Laws 1933. Tit. 22, Ch. 208, § 5002; Va. Code, Tit. 18,
Ch. 901R. § 2154(70) (i).
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interpretation to the phrase "to the defendant," to reach the result that
actual delivery would be necessary, 8 but in view of the tenor of the lan-
guage used by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Wichter v.
Pizzutti'9 it would seem to be more in keeping with the policy underlying
these statutes not so much to require actual delivery of notice to the
non-resident as to expect that the plaintiff will make an honest effort to
effectuate that delivery.
20
If that is the policy, the burden should be placed upon the defendant
to apprize himself of the fact that a suit has been brought against him
rather than to deprive the plaintiff of his remedy because his honest
efforts have failed to accomplish the fact of notice. The court in the




CHARITIES-CONSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRATION, AND ENFORCEMENT-
WHETHER OR NOT CHARITABLE CORPORATION WHICH HAS INSURED AGAINST
TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE MAY INvOKE DEFENSE OF IMMUNITY-The
Appellate Court for the First District recently considered and decided the
case of Wendt v. Servite Fathers,' an ordinary negligence action brought
in behalf of a minor plaintiff to recover damages for injuries sustained
by him when playing in a stadium owned by defendant. The defendant
pleaded that it was an eleemosynary institution by reason whereof
plaintiff was not entitled to any damages against it for his injuries. The
reply filed by plaintiff alleged that the defendant carried a liability
insurance policy by the terms of which the insurance carrier had agreed
to pay on behalf of the defendant all sums which the defendant should
become obligated to pay for damages because of injuries sustained by
any person while on defendant's premises. After separate hearings before
18 Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 5 W. W. Harr. (35 Del.) 304, 165 A. 327 (1932).
19 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A. L. R. 1230 (1928).
20 Four other statutes are not capable of classification. N. H. Rev. Laws 1942.
Vol. 1, Ch. 116, § 43, requires filing of the return receipt but, against the possibility
that the registered article cannot be delivered, permits the court to order such addi-
tional service "as justice may require." Ky. Rev. Stat. 1946, Ch. 188, § 188.030,
likewise provides for filing of a return receipt but it was interpreted, in Morris v.
Argo-Collier Truck Lines. 39 F. Supp. 602 (1941), so as not to require delivery to
defendant. The New Mexico provision, N. M. Stats. Ann. 1941, Vol. 5, Ch. 68. Art. 10,
§ 68-1004, does not authorize service by registered mail at all but calls for delivery
"to the defendant personally without the state." together with proof of such service
by affidavit, in much the same fashion as is permitted in Illinois in order. to confer
in rem but not in personam jurisdiction: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 140. The
Rhode Island provision R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 103, § 1. requires the filing of the
"sender's postoffice receipt of sending" in the action, but says nothing about request-
ing a return receipt or the filing thereof.
' 332 Ill. App. 618. 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947).
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two judges in the trial court, the case terminated in a judgment dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.2 On plaintiff's appeal, the judgment dismissing
the complaint was reversed and the cause was remanded on the ground
that "where insurance exists and provides a fund from which tort liability
may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund, the defense of im-
munity is not available. "3
The law in the United States on the subject of the tort liability of
charitable corporations is lacking in uniformity, both as to reasons and
results. Immunity was originally granted an eleemosynary corporation
4
in the first case5 in this country, which arose in Massachusetts, on the
basis of an English precedent which had been overruled 7 before that
decision was achieved. The Massachusetts case was, nevertheless, followed
in the early cases, except in Rhode Island.8 After the adoption of this
non-liability rule, whether on the "trust fund," "waiver," or public policy
theories, the courts of this country attempted to skirt its effect, some by
rejecting the rule outright,9 while others laboriously achieved liability
despite the rule.'0 As a result, numerous exceptions were developed.",
It was with the suspected intention of directing attention to and, perhaps,
unifying this chaotic field of law that so meritorious an effort was made,
in the case of President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,
12
to reconsider the arguments theretofore used in support of immunity
granted to charitable institutions.
2 The case was heard first by Fisher, J., who, by his ruling striking out the defense
that defendant was an eleemosynary institution and allowing plaintiff's allegations
as to insurance to stand, plainly held that the defendant could be liable in damages.
At the trial, Anderson, J., refused to accept any evidence offered by plaintiff and,
with the record showing the prior ruling, entered an order dismissing the suit.
3 332 Ill. App. 618 at 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 at 349.
4 Immunity from tort liability has never been granted to individual volunteers:
Cavey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N. W. &S9, 12 A. L. R. 904 (1921), Depue v.
Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485 (1907).
5 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital. 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529
(1876).
6Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 192 (1861).
7 Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1871).
8 Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879). The
court, in passing, said that as the legislature created the corporation it ought to
grant the immunity too. It is understood that, following the suggestion thus made,
the Rhode Island legislature subsequently enacted a statute making charitable cor-
porations free from tort liability.
9 Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699
(1920) ; Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 A. 190, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 496 (1906).
10 See, for example, Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163,
7 N. E. (2d) 28, 109 A. L. R. 1197 (1937). See also McCaskill, "Respondeat Superior
as Applied in New York to Quasi-Public and Eleemosynary Corporations." 5 Corn.
L. Q. 409. 6 Corn. L. Q. 56 (1920).
11 A breakdown of the cases and their varied holdings appears in the case of
President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes. 130 F. (2d) S10 at 81S-22
(1942).
12 130 F. (2d) 810 (1942).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
Illinois courts were first called upon to determine the liability of
charitable corporations in 1905, at which time it was decided that the
funds and property of such organizations were held in trust and could
not be diverted for the purpose of paying damages in satisfaction of
injuries caused by the negligent acts of their employees to persons who
were enjoying the benefits of the charity.'3 It was not until 1942, in the
case of Myers v. Young Men's Christian Association of Quincy,14 that
the problem of the effect of insurance upon the immunity of an
eleemosynary institution came before an Illinois reviewing court. There
the count alleging coverage by an insurance company was stricken for
the reason that it would call to the attention of the jury the fact that the
defendant was protected by insurance, a point not permitted even in the
case of non-charitable defendants. 15 The course of the pleadings in the
instant case, however, avoided that possibility for no mention was made
of insurance until it became necessary for the plaintiff to file a reply
and, even then, no debatable issue arose for the defendant did not deny
the existence of insurance. Furthermore, the plaintiff skillfully avoided
any imputation that trust funds might be jeopardized by voluntarily
waiving any right to levy upon the property of the corporate defendant
and by keeping the demand for judgment within the policy limits.
Only one other Illinois case has involved the same problem, that of
Piper v. Epstein,16 but the court in the instant case felt that it was not
bound, under the doctrine of stare decisis,1 7 to follow the holding therein.
The court there did not decide the issue of liability as it might be affected
by insurance but rather interpreted the holding in Parks v. Northwestern
University' as establishing a rule of absolute immunity which, the court
said, "has been followed in an unbroken line of decisions."' 19 In the
forty-odd years between the determination in the Parks case and that in
the Piper case, there were fourteen citations of the initial decision in this
state, six in the Supreme Court and eight in the various Appellate Courts.
One has no bearing at all on the present question for it was a tax case.
20
1 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556,4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
14316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KEN'T LAW
RL-vEw 256, 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 211.
15 A related problem, that of disclosing the fact of insurance in the course of
interrogating prospective jurors, is discussed in Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74
N. E. (2d) 601 (1947). See also Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E. (2d)
499 (1938).
16326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945). See criticism thereof in 24 CHI1CAGO-
KENT LAW REvIEW 266.
17 A solitary decision of recent date never is held to irrevocably state the law:
Hopkins v. McCann, 19 Ill. 112 (1857), Frink v. Darst, 14 Ill. 304 (1853).
18218 Il1. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
19 Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400 at 406, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 at 143.
20 People v. Ravenswood Hospital, 238 Ill. 137, 87 N. E. 305 (1909).
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Three consider whether or not the receiving of paying strangers rather
than true recipients of charity operates to change the character of the
charitable corporation, 21 while a fourth flatly holds that the stranger who
has paid for the services cannot recover.2 2 The sixth case permitted
recovery when the suit was based on breach of contract,2 3 but the seventh
repudiated that holding, saying that the nature of the action should have
no bearing on the question of tort liability.2 4  Three more cases restate
the trust fund doctrine as originally set forth25 and, of the remainder,
four state the general proposition that charitable corporations are not
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior without mentioning the
theoretical basis, being content merely to cite the Parks case.2 6  Only in
Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 27 which did not cite the
Parks decision, was it held that a benevolent organization which maintained
a licensed bar and put the profits therefrom into the treasury could be
subjected to liability under the Dram Shop Act.2 8
From these cases it would appear that while the Illinois courts have
held that the doctrine of respondeat superior should not extend to
charitable institutions because the trust funds thereof might be destroyed
or diverted, yet in no case, except that of Piper v. Epstein,29 has it been
held that the exemption from liability is absolute. It would rather seem
that non-liability is to be the rule only when a contrary decision would
serve to deplete the trust fund. If that is so, it would follow that the
rule of non-liability should be cast aside when the charitable organization
does carry insurance, whether that insurance be indemnity or liability
protection. Other jurisdictions may have refused recovery when the
insurance was of the indemnity type,30 but there is no distinction made
21 Morgan v. National Trust Bank, 331 Ill. 182. 162 N. E. 888 (1928) ; Summers v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill. 564, 167 N. E. 777 (1929) ; Tollefson v. City of
Ottawa, 129 Ill. App. 139 (1906).
22 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 247 Ill. App. 331 (1928). That case might
involve a misinterpretation of the decision in the Parks case, for it was there said
that trust funds should not be diverted to pay damages for injuries due to the
negligent or wrongful acts of servants to "persons who are enjoying the benefit of
the charity."
23 Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
24 Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. (2d) 314
(1942).
25 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 355 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929) ; Marabia
v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 224 Ill. App. 367 (1922) ; Alton Mfg. Co. v. Garrett
Biblical Inst., 148 Ill. App. 23 (1909).
26 Hendricks v. Urbana Park Dist., 265 Ill. App. 102 (1932) ; Curtis v. City of
Paris, 234 II. App. 157 (1924) ; Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494, 101 N. E.
960 (1913) ; Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134. 81 N. E. 823 (1907).
27 309 I1. App. 145, 33 N. E. (2d) .161 (1941).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 135.
29 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945).
30 Williams v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753, 62 A. L. R. 721
(1928) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R.
110(; (1930).
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in Illinois31 and none should be for in either event the charitable corpora-
tion is needlessly paying out trust funds to purchase insurance to protect
it from a liability which does not exist if the courts fail to recognize
liability where there is insurance. The whole trust fund argument itself
is based on the concept that the donor would not give if he thought his
funds would be diverted to the purpose of satisfying judgments.
3 2  Is it
reasonable to suppose that he would donate if he thought the income from
such funds would be used to pay premiums to an insurance company
organized for profit to protect his favorite charity from a non-existent
liability? Other jurisdictions have felt that the presence of insurance is
enough to protect the trust funds so donated and they have, accordingly,
denied immunity.33 There is no legal objection to a similar holding here.
One other point deserves notice. The insurance policy in the instant
case contained a rider providing that the carrier would not use the im-
munity of the insured in the defense of its suits unless requested so to
do by the insured.3 4  There is occasion to believe that this provision
constitutes a highly unconscionable agreement between insured and
insurer, for the existence of public liability insurance has come to mean
a matter of benefit to the public as well as to the insured. 5 Once an
accident has occurred in the ordinary case, the liability of the insurance
company is fixed. No act or agreement on the part of the insured will
allow the insurance company to escape the liability assumed by it under
the insurance policy, for it has been said that the "rights of the injured
party arise immediately upon the happening of the accident. This right,
arising from contract, cannot be destroyed by an attempted subsequent
cancellation, release, or compromise by the insured and the insurer. ' '3"
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 73, § 1000, now gives the injured person a right to
maintain an action against the insurance company. The problem of insurance, and
of indemnity In particular, was treated in an unpublished opinion in the case of
Shaleem v. The Newberry Library, 39-S-11479, Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois. Fankhauser, J., there noted that "If you eliminate from this opinion the
court's concern [i.e. the concern expressed in Parks v. Northwestern University] for
the protection of the fund, what would be left upon which to base the opinion? ...
When the fund is not jeopardized and cannot be reached to satisfy a judgment
against the institute, the question of non-liability manifestly disappears." See also
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938),
where the judgment was expressly made payable out of the proceeds of the liability
insurance.
32 See the discussion of this point in Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill.
381 at 385, 75 N. E. 991 at 993 (1905).
• 3 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n. 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) &35.
133 A. L. R. 819 (1939) ; Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767.
167 S. W. (2d) 700 (1943) ; Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135.
127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
34 332 Ill. App. 618 at 620, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 at 343.
35 1l1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95/_, § 58b, is indicative of a legislative trend to insist
upon insurance for the benefit of third persons.
.36 Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas. 82 F. (2d) 593 at 599
(1936). quoted with approval in Scott v. Freeport Casualty Co.. 392 Ill. 332, 64 N. F
(2d) 542 (1946).
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Clearly, if this were not the rule, the insured could grant or withhold
assured compensation for its negligent acts as it pleased. If the insured
may not do so after injury, there is reason to believe it should not be
allowed to do so beforehand. No individual or corporate body should
be allowed such discriminatory power, much less so if it enjoys the
privileges accorded to charitable corporations. To the extent that they
see fit to carry insurance, they should provide protection without stint.
The holding in the instant case recognizes a modern trend which has
been argued for by legal scholars and jurists alike. But it presents only
the first step forward. The general immunity granted to charitable
corporations by the courts should be withdrawn. The legislature has not
seen 'fit to act and it is not necessary that it should for it was not the
legislature that granted this immunity, even though it has seen fit to grant
other privileges. The change can, and should, be brought about by the
courts.
Miss C. L. SAMUELSON
DEATH-ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH-WHETHER OR NOT FRAUD OF
DEFENDANT IN MISREPRESENTING FACTS BEARING ON PERSONALITY OF
PROPER DEFENDANT PREVENTS TIME PROVISIONS OF WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE FROM OPERATING TO BAR SUIT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-The
recent Ohio case of Sabol v. Pekoc' required that interpretation be placed
upon a time provision contained in a statute creating a cause of action
for wrongful death.2 In that case, the facts disclosed that plaintiff's
intestate had been employed as a janitress by the defendant in the latter's
building. In the course of that employment, the decedent met her death
through the negligence of the defendant. Upon hearing of this mis-
fortune, the defendant informed the plaintiff that his, the defendant's,
mother was the owner of the building and he recommended that suit be
brought against her as she was adequately insured. A suit was, accord-
ingly, promptly brought against the mother. The plaintiff subsequently
discovered that the present defendant, the son, was the actual owner of
the building and responsible for the death so another action was instituted
against him. To that action the defendant filed a demurrer, relying on
the ground that the action was not brought within the time fixed by the
Ohio statute,3 hence the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
trial court sustained the demurrer but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
of Ohio reversed, holding that the active fraud practiced by the defendant
148 Ohio St. 545, 76 N. E. (2d) 84 (1947).
2 Ohio Gen. Code 1947, §§ 10509-166 to 10509-169.
;; Ibid., § 10509-167, provides: ". . . every such action must be commenced within
two years after such death of such deceased person ... "
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was the cause of the failure to sue more promptly.4 It concluded that
the time for bringing the action did not begin to run until the fraud was
discovered and that the defendant was, by his own conduct, estopped
from asserting such a defense.5 On further appeal, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that general principles of law which might
serve to toll the time for bringing an ordinary action were not applicable
to actions such as the one in question and, in the absence of a special
saving clause, the suit was barred.
The wrongful death of a human being, at common law, did not give
rise to any civil cause of action whatever 6 but, to ameliorate the harshness
of such a rule, the English Parliament, in. 1846, passed the celebrated
Lord Campbell's Act 7 which has served as the model for similar acts in
this country. All such statutes contain within themselves a time provision
dealing with the period within which the action must be brought,8 and
such time stipulations have been the cause of much litigation and comment.
The problem created thereby resolves itself into one as to whether such
time period should be treated pre-emptively, i.e. as affecting the right, or
whether it should be treated prescriptively, thereby affecting the remedy
only. If the former, common law or other statutory reasons for tolling
the period would not apply; if the latter, they would.
The Ohio court in the instant case reasoned that, since the statute
providing for an action for death was in derogation of the common law,
a petition to recover thereon must be filed strictly according to the statute's
essential terms, for such was the sole source of the right upon which the
petition was based.9 If, therefore, such a statute requires that the action
should be commenced within a specified time after the death, the provision
is to be treated as a condition qualifying the right of action, and not a
mere limitation on the remedy. In other words, the time limitation is not
properly a period of limitation, as that term is generally understood, but
serves rather as a qualification and condition restricting the right granted.
4- Ohio App..-, 72 N. E. (2d) 270 (1947).
5 The court apparently relied on the general rule that one may not take advantage
of his own wrongdoing and seek refuge under the statute of limitations when he
has, by fraudulent conduct or representations, successfully concealed his liability
beyond the period fixed by law: Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 30 Cal. (2d) 165,
180 P. (2d) 900 (1947) ; Fortune v. English, 226 Ill. 262, 80 N. E. 781 (1907). See
also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 23.
6 Baker v. Bolten, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See also 25 C. J. S.,
Death, § 13, p. 1072.
79 and 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
8 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
9 Under a comparable provision in the Federal Employers Liability Act, the court
in American Ry. Co. of Puerto Rico v. Coranas, 230 F. 545 at 546 (1916), pointed
out that the bringing of the action within the specified time is a "condition to the
exercise of the right, and if the condition is not complied with, the parties stand with
respect to the wrongful act as though the statute had not been enacted."
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Not being a true statute of limitation, common law or other statutory rules
which would permit avoidance of a defense of the statute of limitations
would be inapplicable to a plea that the wrongful death action was not
commenced within the time prescribed. Such has likewise been the
holding of all the courts which have had occasion to decide the issue with
but a single exception.' 0 That holding has been achieved not only where
the facts on the face of the complaint provide clear evidence that the
action was brought too late"' but also where other grounds for tolling an
ordinary statute of limitations such as concealment of a cause of action,
1 2
absence from the jurisdiction,"3 legal disability,14 and inadvertent failure
of the prior action, 15 have been made to appear.
Although the courts of Illinois have never decided this exact issue,
the path pursued on a similar question has been a curious one. In Lake
Shore & Michigaln Southern Railway Company v. Dylanski,6 the problem
was whether or not one aspect of the saving clauses in the Limitation Act 7
could operate in a case arising under the Injuries Act,'8 and particularly
whether or not an involuntary nonsuit of an action promptly brought
thereunder could serve to save another wrongful death action begun after
the prescribed period but well within the time fixed by the saving statute
mentioned. The Illinois Appellate Court refused to extend the time period
fixed by the Injuries Act, despite the nonsuit of the original action, hence
held the second action was barred. That view was again reiterated in
Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company,19 where the court stated
that the bringing of an action for wrongful death within the time fixed
by the Injuries Act was a condition precedent to recovery, consequently
a declaration which did not, on its face, show that the action was brought
within such period was subject to demurrer. On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, however, that decision was reversed and it was indicated
that the time period might or might not be a condition precedent to
lo See cases cited in annotations in 67 A. L. R. 1059 and 132 A. L. R. 322. But
see Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 P. 571 (1930). The defendants there
concealed that they were responsible for the bombing that caused the death of the
plaintiff's intestate. The upper court, reversing an order which had sustained a
demurrer to the complaint, stated that the time provision in the Oklahoma statute
was merely a statute of limitation because the section giving the right to sue was
in the same chapter of the code as the one dealing with limitations in general,
hence bore evidence of a legislative intent that the time limit should be treated as
-in ordinary statute of limitation.
11 The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199. 7 8. Ct. 140. 30 L. Ed. 358 (1886).
12 Bell v. Wabash By. Co., 58 F. (2d) 569 (1932).
13 Tylor v. Southern fy. Co., 6 F. Supp. 259 (1934).
14 Westcott v. Young. 275 Mass. 82. 175 N. E. 153 (1931).
-, Partee v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 204 F. 970 (1913).
16 67 111. App. 114 (1890).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 23.
18 Ibid., Ch. 70, § 2.
19 101 Ill. App. 431 (1902).
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plaintiff's right to recover for each case had to depend on its own
particular facts, so the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to set up
any facts which might form an exception to the statute of limitations.
20
That line of reasoning was followed in two subsequent cases.
21
Within five years thereafter the Illinois Appellate Court, in Rabig v.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company,22 went
back to and reaffirmed the views expressed in the Dylanski case and refused
to permit application of the saving clause concerning new actions begun
after nonsuit to suits based on the Injuries Act. Since that time, the
decisions in this state have been uniform on the point that the time
provision in the Injuries Act serves as a condition precedent to the right
of action.
23
By so returning to the view followed by an almost unanimous majority
of courts elsewhere, the Illinois courts again gave logical application to
the fundamental premise that time limits in statutory actions such as the
one for wrongful death are to be treated pre-emptively. Reason demands
the conclusion attained under the majority rule for statutes of that
character are creative in nature and fix the necessary elements which
the plaintiff must allege and prove in order to qualify for the right
there provided. As prompt action is one of these elements, the plaintiff
should necessarily allege and prove compliance as a condition to the
enjoyment of the right rather than to expect the defendant to counter
with a claim that long delay should serve as a limitation on the remedy.
Yet it seems difficult to reconcile such logical reasoning with the fact
that the very purpose of wrongful death statutes was to relieve against
harsh results produced by the common law. No one could deny that the
result reached in the instant case, although logically correct, is gravely
unjust and apt to encourage fraud as a means to avoid liability. That sort
of injustice and deception has been prevented, as to ordinary suits, by
the adoption of general savings provisions. If they are not available
for use in wrongful death or similar statutory actions, it would seem high
time that they were made applicable through suitable statutory modification
in, or addition to, the statute which serves to create the right.
S. A. MALATO
20200 ni1. 66, 65 N. E. 632 (1902). Subsequent thereto, the case had a long and
eventful history culminating in dismissal of a writ of error in 256 U. S. 125, 41 S. Ct.
402, 65 L. Ed. 856 (1921).
21Heimberger v. The Elliott Frog & Switch Co., 245 Ill. 448, 92 N. E. 297 (1910);
Stephan v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 106 Ill. App. 13 (1903).
22 204 Ill. App. 493 (1917).
23 In Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939), and Friend v.
Alton Ry. Co., 283 Ill. App. 366 (1936), for example, the filing of an amended com-
plaint more than one year after the cause of action arose has been held insufficient
to sustain a wrongful death case begun in apt time, the amendment having been
denied retroactive operation. See also Bishop v. Chicago Ry. Co., 303 Ill. 273, 135
N. E. 499 (1922). and Corlin v. Peerless Gas Co.. 283 Il. 142, 119 N. E. 66 (1918).
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LANDLORD AND TENANT - TERMS FOR YEARS - WHETHER RENEWAL
CLAUSE IN LEASE GIVING TENANT RIGHT TO EXTEND TERM BUT SPECIvY-
ING THAT RENT FOR EXTENDED TERM SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF
PARTIES WILL SUPPORT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AT A REASONABLE RENTAL-
The question of whether a court of equity should grant specific perform-
ance at the request of a tenant, of an option to renew and extend a
lease was the issue in the recent Ohio case of Moss v. Olson.' The option
there involved fixed a definite term for the renewal period but left the
rental to be paid "to be subject to agreement between the parties" at
the time of renewal. The complaint alleged due notice of an intention
to exercise the option and also a request made on the defendant to enter
into negotiations for the purpose of agreeing upon the rental. It charged
that defendant refused so to negotiate but instead served the lessees with
a notice of termination of tenancy. Plaintiffs also alleged that they had
spent large sums in preparing the demised premises for use by them as
a food market; that such sums for improvements would not have been
expended if the lessor had not granted the option contained in the lease;
that plaintiffs were without adequate remedy at law, hence prayed the
court to fix a reasonable rent and to specifically enforce the option.
Defendant's general demurrer was sustained by the lower court on the
ground that the option was void for uncertainty and indefiniteness and
the suit was dismissed. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed that holding,
but, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the latter reversed and ordered
specific performance, directing the trial court to fix a reasonable rental
for the renewal period.
As in the case of contracts generally, an option or covenant for
renewal must be founded on a consideration,2 but there is general agree-
ment on the point that an option or covenant to renew a lease, when
contained in the lease itself, is based on a sufficient consideration, even
if unilateral in the sense that the lessee is under no obligation to renew,3
because such a covenant may well be considered as a material inducement
to the execution of the lease. Like any other mutual contract, however,
the option must be definite and certain in its terms in order to be enforc-
ible ;4 certain and definite both as to the duration of the renewal period
and the rent to be paid. 5
- Ohio St. -, 76 N. E. (2d) 875 (1947). Weygandt, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2 Fienberg v. Adelman, 260 Mass. 143, 156 N. E. 896 (1927).
3 Fuchs v. Peterson, 315 Ill. 370, 146 N. E. 556 (1925).
4 Giglio v. Saia, 140 Miss. 769. 106 So. 513 (1926) ; Swedish-American Nat'l Bank
v. Merz, 179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919) ; Moran v. Wellington, 101 Misc. 594, 167 N. Y. S.
465 (1917). The same rule is applied to an option to purchase the demised premises:
Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Il. 403, 37 N. E. 73 (1894).
Levin v. Munk, 97 Ind. App. 118, 169 N. E. 82 (1929) ; Baurman v. Binzen, 16
N. Y. S. 342 (1891). But see Metcalf Auto Co. v. Norton, 119 Me. 103, 109 A. 384
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A renewal covenant in a lease which leaves the amount of rental to
be determined under some future agreement between the parties would
generally be regarded as unenforcible and void for uncertainty and
indefiniteness6 by any court arbitrarily applying a strict view to the
subject. But the cases in point can be classified into two categories:
first, those in which the renewal provision makes no reference to the term
and rental yet the court might find an inference, from such omission,
that the rental and term were to be the same as that fixed in the original
lease;7 and second, those where the rental for the renewal period is
obviously not to be the same as controlled the original lease but is to be
made the basis of future ascertainment. The validity and enforcibility
of the latter will depend upon whether or not sufficiently definite standards
are set up by which to determine the new rental."
The option in the instant case clearly fell outside the first class for
there was evidence from its terms that a straight renewal was not within
the contemplation of the parties. Tested by the second category, it lacked
both standards and machinery by which the new rental could be determined
unless it was possible to find a tacit understanding that the future rental
was to be a reasonable one if the parties themselves could arrive at no
agreement as to the amount. In the absence of such an understanding,
the court would clearly be guilty of rewriting a contract for the parties
and then specifically enforcing it as so rewritten.9
As support for its decision that the option contemplated a reasonable
renewal rental, the court cited decisions from other jurisdictions but an
examination thereof reveals that most of them are not in point and are
easily distinguishable from the issue presented by the instant case. They
(1920), where the lease provided "with privilege on part of lessee to release at end
of term for a term of years to be agreed upon at same rental." The lessee elected to
renew for two years and the court sustained that action on the ground that "a term
of years" meant not less than two years.
6 Vartabedian v. Peerless Wrench Co., 46 R. I. 472, 129 A. 239 (1925).
7A simple covenant to renew which makes no provision as to the terms and condi-
tions of the renewal implies a renewal for the same rental, terms and conditions as
provided in the original lease, hence is sufficiently definite, according to Kean v.
Story & Clark Piano Co., 121 Minn. 198, 140 N. W. 1031 (1913) ; 58-59 Realty Corp.
v. Park Central Valet, 252 App. Div. 72, 297 N. Y. S. 40 (1937) ; Tracy v. Albany
Exch. Co., 7 N. Y. 472, 57 Am. Dec. 538 (1852).
s For example, in Duifield v. Whitlock, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 55 (1841), the lease
contained a covenant that at expiration the "lessor should grant a new lease for
twenty years upon such terms as he might think proper and as might be approved
by lessee." Specific performance was denied on the ground that the covenant was
too vague.
9 A comparable problem concerning specific enforcement of an option to purchase
the demised premises, where no price was fixed, was considered in Shayeb v. Holland,
- Mass. -, 73 N. E. (2d) 731 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 188.
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involved options under which the rent was to be fixed by arbitrators ;1o
or specifically provided that the rent was to be a reasonable sum ;11 was
to be ascertained by what responsible parties would agree to give for the
use of the premises ;12 or at what the rent would be worth at that time ;
13
or provided that the parties should agree on a rental if possible but if not
then that appraisers were to be appointed.' 4  Clauses of this character
sufficiently set up some method by which to determine the renewal rental
or else clearly support the inference that a reasonable rent was intended.
In the instant case, however, the parties expressly provided that the rent
was to be "subject to agreement" between the parties; an expression
capable of only one construction, i.e. the parties were to agree upon the
rental, an expression of intention so unequivocal as to leave no room for
any inference.
Only three cases cited would appear to substantiate the view taken by
the Ohio court. In the first, that of Rainwater v. Hobeika,'" the original
lease provided for a five-year term but after the execution thereof the
tenant procured an option for an additional five years "at a price to be
agreed upon at that time." The option was sought because the tenant
planned considerable remodelling at a cost twice the amount originally
contemplated as well as the installation of expensive custom-made equip-
ment and fixtures which would be practically worthless if removed. The
lessor, about three months before the original lease expired, gave notice
to vacate on the ground that the lessee had not communicated his intention
to renew and the lessor had, therefore, leased the premises to another
party. The court held that the fact of notice strongly indicated an
intention on the part of the lessor not to bargain in good faith and, as
the tenant had performed as planned, he would suffer serious financial
loss unless the court enforced the option. In direct contrast, there was
no charge of had faith in the instant case, the renewal clause there
involved was contained in the lease itself, and there was no special
lo Houston v. Barnett, 90 Ore. 94, 175 P. 619 (1918) ; Kaufman v. Liggett, 209 Pa.
S7. 58 A. 129, 67 L. R. A. 353 (1904). Courts are in general agreement that if the
terms are to be fixed by arbitrators a court of equity, on refusal by one of the
parties to arbitrate or if the arbitrators cannot agree, may determine what would
be a fair and reasonable rental and thereafter enforce the option accordingly:
Citizens Bldg. of West Palm Beach v. Western Union Tele. Co., 120 F. (2d) 982
(1941) ; Maas Bros. v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625, 286 N. W. 104 (1939).
11 Edward v. Tobin, 132 Ore. 38, 284 P. 562, 68 A. L. R. 152 (1930).
12 Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25, 100 Am. Dec. 252 (1869).
13 Bechman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68. 248 P. 262 (1926).
'4 Streicber v. Heimburge, 205 Cal. 675, 272 P. 290 (1928). There is language in
Bird v. Couchois, 214 Mich. 607, 183 N. W. 36 (1921), which would indicate that the
court would be willing to imply a "reasonable" rent, if necessary, but that case did
not deal with an option to renew but rather a determination of the amount of rent
to be paid for the balance of the original term.
15 208 8. C. 433, 38 S. E. (2d) 495, 166 A. L. R. 1228 (1946).
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equities in favor of the lessees beyond the fact that, after taking possession,
they had invested substantial sums in improvements which had been
made on the assumption of a binding option.
In the second case, that of Young v. Nelson,16 the option was for an
additional five years at such rental "as may then be agreed upon between
the lessor and lessee." The court held that such a clause was specifically
enforcible at a reasonable rental, even though it contained no provision
for determining the amount of the future rent, on the ground that as
the option was for the benefit of the lessee the covenant should be construed
most strongly against the lessor. That court admitted that its holding
was in a definite and distinct minority category but asserted that it was
doing equity by carrying into operation what it claimed to be the intention
of the parties. Courts generally desire to validate contracts wherever
possible, but they should refuse to read terms and conditions into a
contract which the parties themselves have failed to place therein even
though it might seem equitable to do so.
The third case, that of Hall v. Weatherford,17 provides even less
reliable support for it was a suit brought to quiet title to certain premises
which had been leased to the lessee by the husband alone. The original
lease contained an option to renew for a like period at a price to be agreed
upon or, if not, then to be fixed by the lessor at a figure at which he was
willing to lease to other parties. The husband had, in fact, granted a
renewal at an agreeable increased rental but the wife contended that, as
Arizona, the state in question, was a community property jurisdiction, the
original lease was void for lack of her signature as well as for uncertainty.
The court decided for the lessee on the ground of estoppel by conduct but
did adopt the reasoning of the case last above mentioned. By concluding
that the renewal was completely executed, the court did not have to decide
any issue as to uncertainty in the option, so that case provides little
authority for the reasoning adopted in the instant case. It may be said,
therefore, that the Ohio court has chosen to follow a view based on slender
precedent and definitely one in the minority on this issue.
No Illinois court of review has passed on this precise issue to date but
the decided cases definitely indicate that Illinois would be inclined to
follow the majority rule. In Sterenburg v. Beach,'5 for example, it was
16 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 30 A. L. R. 568 (1922). In the earlier case of
Anderson v. Frye & Bruhn, 69 Wash. 89, 124 P. 499 (1912), the lease contained an
option for a two year renewal at a rental satisfactory to both lessor and lessee
which the court said would be construed to mean a "reasonable" rental, but the
language was dictum for the original lease was held invalid because not properly
acknowledged.
17 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 56 A. L. R. 903 (1927).
18 219 Ill. App. 68 (1920). The earlier Ohio case of Braun v. Pociey. IS Ohio App.
370 (1923), is in accord with that holding.
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held that the words "lease to be extended if both parties agree" were
too vague and indefinite to constitute a valid covenant for renewal.
Likewise, in Streit v. Fay,19 the option did not fix the amount of rent to
be paid under the renewal in terms of dollars but instead provided that
the lessee might have the "privilege of five years longer by paying
additional rent on revaluation now fixed at $500." The court there con-
cerned, finding no provision as to when and how the revaluation was to
be determined, came to the conclusion that the option was also too in-
definite and vague to support renewal. These cases point to the fact that
courts ought not write contracts for otherwise competent parties and
certainly cannot force them to agree. A provision which depends upon
voluntary agreement for its effectiveness should be treated as unenforcible
and void if that agreement is not forthcoming.
R. A. LEwiN
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
WHETHER OR NOT SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT OF PERSON SITTING IN
AUTOMOBILE IS JUSTIFIED AS AN INCIDENT TO SEARCH OF AUTOMOBILE FOR
CONTRABAND--The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United
States v. DiRel presented a case in which an investigator of the Office
of Price Administration, having been informed by one Reed that he was
about to buy certain counterfeit gasoline ration coupons from one Buttitta,
went with a municipal police detective to where Buttitta's car was parked
and found the informer sitting on the rear seat of the car with two
gasoline coupons in his hand. Upon interrogation by the officers, Reed
declared that he had obtained the coupons from Buttitta, then sitting
behind the wheel of the car. Alongside the driver sat DiRe, defendant
in the instant case. The three occupants of the car were taken into
custody, were subjected to a tentative search for weapons, and were then
taken to a police station. DiRe was there directed to empty his pockets
and, in compliance with such direction, laid out two gasoline and several
fuel-oil ration coupons which he said he had found in the street. Some
two hours later, after questioning, he was "booked" and a thorough search
was then made of his person which disclosed a much larger number of
counterfeit gasoline rationing coupons concealed between his shirt and
underwear. The decisive evidence thus secured, obtained without a
warrant of any kind, was later used to secure DiRe's conviction on a
charge of knowingly possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons.2 The
19 230 Ill. 319, 82 N. E. 648 (1907). See also Pray v. Clark, 113 Mass. 283 (1873).
'332 U. S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 (1948). Vinson, Ch. J., and
Black, J., dissented.
2 50 U. S. C. App.. Supp. V, § 633.
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Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting,
reversed on the ground that both the search and the arrest were illegal. 3
Upon certiorari, the prosecution contended the search was justified either
as a proper incident to a lawful arrest or as an incident to the search of
a vehicle reasonably believed to be carrying contraband. Despite this,
a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the reversal of the conviction, thereby providing an emphatic reassertion
of the vitality of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure which have lately been threatened with attenuation.
Parts of the majority opinion dealing with search as an incident to
a lawful arrest and with aspects of conspiracy and waiver of constitutional
guarantees merely reiterate well-defined legal principles. The holding
on the claim that the search of DiRe's person was justified as an incident
to search of a vehicle reasonably suspected to be carrying contraband,
on the other hand, required consideration of a novel contention and led
to a well-reasoned refutation thereof. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for
the court, conceded that, since the decision in Carroll v. United States,
4
there has been an increasing tendency to believe that automobiles are
more vulnerable to search without warrant than are other forms of
property, but he ascribed the holding therein to the assumption by the
court that it was applying the intent of Congress to facilitate the enforce-
ment of the National Prohibition Act,5 a measure subsequently repealed.
He noted, however, that the decision "falls short of establishing a doctrine
that, without such legislation, automobiles nonetheless are subject to search
without warrant in the enforcement of all federal statutes."6 The most
that could be said of that case is that some of the language therein might
be used to make a distinction between what would be a reasonable search
when applied to an automobile in contrast to what would be proper if
the search was of a residence or of other fixed premises.7  Any doubt as
I
. 159 F. (2d) 818 (1947). Clark, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
4 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790 (1925).
5 U. S. C. A., Tit. 27, repealed Aug. 27, 1935, 49 Stat. 872.
6 332 U. S. 581 at 585. 68 S. Ct. 222 at 224, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 at 222.
7 Compare Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453
(1946), where the search of a business place for gasoline rationing coupons was
upheld. absent a search warrant, on the ground the coupons were public property,
with Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145. 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947),
wherein an exhaustive search of residential quarters without warrant was treated
as proper despite vigorous criticism from four of the justices. See also Hart v.
United States, 162 F. (2d) 74 (1947). It is interesting to note that Justice Murphy,
who dissented In the Harris case, quoted from the opinion of the Circuit Court of
Appeals In the DiRe case, 159 F. (2d) 818 at 820. when he repeated the words of
Learned Hand, J., to the effect that if "the prosecution of crime is to be conducted
with so little regard for that protection which centuries of English law have given
to the individual, we are indeed at the dawn of a new era; and much that we have
deemed vital to our liberties, is a delusion." See 331 U. S. 145 at 195, 67 S. Ct. 1098
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to the attitude of the federal courts on the subject should have been
dispelled by the recent case of Hart v. United Statess in which the court
declared: "If we now sustain the search of one's automobile without
inquiry into the validity of the search warrant, under authority of which
the search was made, simply because probable cause existed for such a
search, we will have gone a long way toward abdicating the idea that
judicial sanction is a condition precedent to the authority. If probable
cause is the only safeguard against unreasonable searches we have
dispensed with the precautionary requirements of the warrant and limited
the judicial function to a post mortem examination of probable cause.
We have thus permitted the exceptions to consume the rule, and rendered
impotent those safeguards, which in another day have been called 'the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security.' "9 It would seem,
then, that the heyday of promiscuous searches of automobiles and their
occupants is rapidly coming to an end. 10
That issue was not actually decided for, as the court pointed out, no
actual search of the automobile was made. The court was asked, however,
to extend an assumed right to search the car to include the right to search
the person of an occupant thereof on the theory that common sense
demanded that such a right should exist in cases where the contraband
sought was small in size and could readily be concealed on the person,
an argument which had been given some point by the majority holding
in the case of Harris v. United States." In pointed fashion, that request
was rejected on the ground that the relationship of the automobile to the
crime of illegally transporting liquor in the Carroll case was an in-
dispensable one whereas, in the instant case, it would take a violent stretch
of the imagination to assume that a passenger would know what pieces of
paper were concealed in the pockets of the driver.1 2  No federal cases
at 119, 91 L. Ed. 1399 at 1430. An appendix to the dissent in the Davis case tabulates
the legislation on the point while a similar appendix to the Harris case provides a
tabular analysis of all decisions since Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. 34 S.
Ct. 341. 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
8 162 F. (2d) 74 (1-47).
' 162 F. (2d) 74 at 76.
10 See State v. Miles. - Wash. (2d) -, 190 P. (2d) 740 (1948), for example.
where the court relied upon and quoted extensively from the decision in the instant
case for support of the proposition that it was error to admit evidence seized from
bystanders or taken from an automobile belonging to one of them parked near the
scene of a crime for which crime they were not prosecuted but instead were tried
for possessing the articles so seized.
11331 U1. S. 145. 67 S. Ct. 1098. l L. Ed. 1399 (1947), noted in 96 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 128. 33 Va. L. Rev. 640.
12 The opinion in the instant ease stattes: "We are not convinced that a person.
by mere presence in a suspected car. loses immunities from search of his person to
which he would otherwise be entitled." See 332 U. S. 581 at 587, 68 S. Ct. 222 at 225,
92 L. Ed. (adv.) 218 at 222.
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were cited to support the holding declaring it improper to extend the
scope of the search to include persons present at the time, but the case of
United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles, 8
wherein a general search and seizure of everything contained in several
warehouses and the indiscriminate arrest of several persons merely
present at the time was held unreasonable, seems to support the view.
There are also state cases in point. In Jokosh v. State,14 for example,
a warrant to search certain premises was held not to authorize a search
of persons found therein and, according to Purkey v. Maby,15 this is
particularly true if the persons searched are not named in the affidavit
upon which the search warrant issues.'
6
Viewed as a dry legal conclusion, the holding in the instant case super-
ficially discloses a narrow refusal to extend a rule of law which was
probably an unwarranted extension of fundamental principles to begin
with. But it is difficult to read the opinion therein, or that in any decision
on the question of search and seizure, without putting the immediate case
against the background of man's halting struggle to attain a system of
government which will be strong enough to protect him and yet against
which his right as an individual to live with a minimum amount of
governmental interference will prevail. Any conflict in the cases, whether
caused by variance in the construction given to constitutional guarantees,
7
by attempts to view the issue from the standpoint of the officer, with his
skill and knowledge, rather than that of the average citizen under similar
circumstances,"8 or by a refusal to define what constitutes an unreasonable
search except as required by the immediate case under examination, leaves
the fundamental problem remain. Every decision on the subject, there-
fore, assumes an importance that cannot be overemphasized for it can
carry connotations of tremendous significance. The holding in the instant
case may rightfully be considered as a landmark one for it tends to insure
to the individual a maximum of personal freedom which the holding in
Harris v. United States 9 bad subjected to jeopardy.
I. STEIN
is 52 F. (2d) 49 (1931).
14 181 Wis. 160, 193 N. W. 976 (1923).
15 33 Ida. 281, 193 P. 79 (1920).
16 See also Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132, L. R. A. 1915E 399 (1914)
Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567. 65 N. W. 530, 31 L. R. A. 163 (1895) ; People
v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559. 171 N. W. 557, 3 A. L. R. 1505 (1919), which contains
an excellent dissertation on the historical background of the origin of search war-
rants; and State v. Massle, 95 WV. Va. 233, 120 S. E. 514 (1923).
17 In an official headnote to the decision in McIntyre v. State. 190 Ga. 872. 11 S. E.
(2d) 5 (1940). appears the statement: "Under repeated decisions by this court, the
admission in evidence in a State-court trial of articles taken from the defendant
and his automobile by State officers without a search warrant would not violate
[the sections] of the constitution of this State ... prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures and compulsory self-incrimination."
is See United States v. Sebo, 101 F. (2d) 889 (1939).
1- 331 U. S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098. 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INSURANCE AND PUBLIC FUNDS-
WHETHER OR NOT EMPLOYER WHO PAYS ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION TO
ILLEGALLY EMPLOYED MINOR MAY SECURE REIMBURSEMENT FROM
INSURANCE CARRIER-The plaintiffs in the case of Carmack v. Great
American Indemnity Company' were proprietors of a retail grocery
market operating under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act and
had an illegally employed minor working for them. 2 This minor employee
sustained an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his
employment and, in direct consequence thereof, he died. The deceased's
mother, because of her dependency and the circumstances of his employ-
ment,3 became entitled to additional compensation 4 which the plaintiffs
paid under a lump-sum settlement by which they specifically reserved
their right to claim reimbursement from their insurance carrier for the
added compensation so paid. The plaintiffs then sued the insurance
carrier claiming to be entitled to reimbursement under paragraph I(a)
of the standard form of workmen's compensation insurance policy, pur-
suant to which the insurer expressly agreed with the employer to pay
promptly to any person, entitled thereto under the workmen's compensa-
tion laws, the entire amount of any sum due. The plaintiffs also relied
on Section 26(a) (3) of the Illinois act 5 which provides that the employer's
insurance policy must insure his entire liability to pay compensation
awards and further directs that any provision in the policy attempting
to limit or modify the liability of the insurer shall be wholly void. The
defendant, on the other hand, contended that if the plaintiff was to
recover at all it had to be on paragraph I(b) of the standard policy
which grants indemnity only against the claims of those who are legally
employed, hence the additional benefits paid by reason of the illegal
employment constituted a penalty for which the employer was alone
liable. In affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the lower
court, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District held that as the
provision for additional compensation was distinct from the penal pro-
visions of the Child Labor Law6 the additional assessment was not to be
regarded as a penalty against the employer so was included in the policy
coverage. A certificate of importance was granted for appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court and it affirmed the holding for the plaintiff.
1400 Ill. 93, 78 N. E. (2d) 507 (1948), affirming 332 Ill. App. 354, 75 N. E. (2d)
521 (1947).
2 The employee had been hired in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 31.9,
in that no working certificate, as required thereby, had been obtained.
3 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 144(c).
4 Ibid., § 144(i).
5 Ibid., § 163(a) (3).
e Ibid., § 17 et seq.
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The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act and most other statutes
are silent on the character to be attached to the additional award due an
illegally employed minor, but Section 14-a(2) of the New York statute7
declares that the additional sum is to be regarded as a liability imposed
upon the employer alone8 and Florida, 9 New Jersey,10 Pennsylvania"
and Utah1 2 have incorporated similar provisions in their statutes. The
Wisconsin statute, in contrast, while- basically in accord with the New
York view in that the employer is made liable for the increased com-
pensation payable to illegally employed minors, directs that the insurer
is to be held secondarily liable,13 thereby providing an added security to
the injured employee in case his employer should turn out to be insolvent.
Illustrative of the operation of these statutes is the New York case
of Bogartz v. Astor1 4 which interprets the language of the section referred
to above. The plaintiff there, a minor, had been illegally employed by
the defendant' 5 and through the defendant's negligence he was injured.
The employer's insurance carrier paid the normal workmen's compensation
award to the minor. Subsequently a further sum equal to the amount of
the award was paid by the employer to the minor pursuant to Section
14-a(2). Thereafter the minor sought and was granted a recovery of his
damages from the defendant in a third-party action relying on the con-
tention that the additional payment under the statute was a penalty
against the employer for employing a minor in violation of the Child
Labor Law. The upper court in reversing held that the extra payment
required by that statute was not a mere pecuniary punishment or penalty
but was to be treated the same as any other monetary benefit secured by
the compensation law. As a consequence the injured employee was held
obliged to make full restoration of the total award received by him in
7 Cahill's Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 66, § 14-a(2).
8 It also directs that any provision in an insurance policy designed to relieve the
employer from such increased liability shall be void.
9 Fla. Stat. Ann. 1943, § 440.54.
10 N. J. Stat. Ann. 1940, § 34:15-10. See also Damato v. DeLucia, 10 N. J. Misc. 308,
159 A. 526 (1932).
11 Purdon Pa. Stats. Ann., Tit. 77. § 672, interpreted in McGuckin v. Keystone Dye
& Metal Works, 29 Pa. D. & C. 556 (1937). and in Lucia v. Capitol Pants Co., 29
Pa. D. & C. 590 (1937).
12 Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. III, Tit. 42, § 42-1-57.10, applied in Ortega v. Salt
Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P. (2d) 885 (1945).
13 Wis. Stat. 1943, Ch. 102, § 102.62.
14 293 N. Y. 563, 59 N. E. (2d) 246 (1944).
15 The employee there, as in the instant case, had been hired in violation of Cahill's
Cons. Laws N. Y. 1930, Ch. 32, § 131(1), in that no working certificate had been
obtained.
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the event he should be made whole thereafter by recovery from a third
party for the same injury.16 In the event nothing was recovered, however,
it would seem that the employer would be unable to shift the burden of
the additional sum so paid to any other person but would be forced to
bear the same himself.
The decision in the instant case, although one of first impression in
Illinois, does not stand alone for there are two other decisions which
uphold the views expressed therein. In the Michigan case of Stuart v.
Spencer Coal Company17 and in the California case of Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Company v. Industrial Accident Commission' s it
was held that the insurer was liable for the additional compensation by
reason of the terms of the contract with the employer. In each instance
the obligation to pay the entire amount of the award was said to rest on
the language contained in paragraph I(a) of the standard policy, despite
the employer's illegal conduct in hiring a minor. The absence of designa-
tion in the statute that the additional compensation is a penalty to be
borne by the employer alone would seem to be the controlling and
distinguishing feature.
The admitted purpose of workmen's compensation laws is to promote
general welfare by providing compensation for accidental injuries or
death suffered in the course of employment. Similarly, the purpose of
requiring the employer to carry insurance is one to secure the employee
against being forced to bear the loss which would be produced in the event
of the inability of the employer to pay. But it would seem reasonable
that some further provision should be made to discourage employers from
illegally employing minors, in addition to the penal provisions of child
labor laws. Illinois, while assuring the illegally employed minor payment
16 Accord: Inland Steel Company v. Fries, 114 Ind. App. 119. 49 N. E. (2d) 382
(1943) ; Wynkoop v. Superior Coal Co.. 116 Ind. App. 237, 63 N. E. (2d) 305 (1945) :
Damato v. DeLucia, 10 N. J. Misc. 308. 159 A. 526 (1932) : Sackolwitz v. Charles
Hamburg & Co., Inc.. 295 N. Y. 264. 67 N. E. (2d) 152 (1946): Molina v. B. D.
Kaplan & Co.. 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 662 (1943), affirmed in 293 N. Y. 700, 56 N. E. (2d)
586 (1944); Moreno v. Halstead Canning Co., Inc., 258 App. Div. 829, 15 N. Y. S.
(2d) 765 (1939): McGuckin v. Keystone Dye & Metal Works. 29 Pa. D. & C. 556
(1937) : Lucia v. Capitol Pants Co., 29 Pa. D. & C. 5,90 (1937). If the employee elects
to qualify for additional compensation under the statute he may, according to In re
Dearborn Manufacturing Co., 18 F. Supp. 763 (1937), reversed on other grounds in
92 F. (2d) 417 (1937). and Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1,
156 P. (2d) 885 (1945), be precluded from maintaining a civil action for damages.
17 307 Mich. 685. 12 N. W. (2d) 443 (1943). In giving judgment for the employer,
the court stated that the additional compensation, although payable because of the
illegal employment, was not a penalty against the employer but that the insurance
carrier must pay the entire award as it had contracted to do.
18 19 Cal. App. (2d) 583. 65 P. (2d) 1349 (1937). The court found that the policy
expressed in the act itself required the employer to secure payment of all compensa-
tion to persons entitled thereto and held the insurance carrier liable for the full
amount, basing its decision squarely upon the carrier's agreement embodied in
paragraph I (a) of the standard policy.
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of his award by making the insurer liable, does nothing to deter the
employer from entering into illegal contracts for hire when it permits him
to shift the loss to others. The New York view tends to discourage illegal
employment by making the employer solely liable but at the potential
expense of the minor employee if the employer should turn out to be
insolvent. The Wisconsin statute, on the other hand, not only discourages
illegal employment by making the employer liable but, by making the
insurer secondarily liable, guarantees the employee complete compensation.
It, therefore, seems to carry out most fairly the underlying objectives
and design of workmen's compensation laws.
H. G. BATES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PROCEEDINGS TO SECURE COMPENSA-
TION-WHETHER OR NOT INJURED MINOR EMPLOYEE IS REQUIRED TO GIVE
NOTICE OF INJURY WITHIN TIME PRESCRIBED BY WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION AcT-The minor employee involved in the recent case of Ferguson
v. Industrial Commission' sustained what appeared to be an insignificant
injury in the course of his employment so no immediate report thereof
was made to the employer. The minor's condition became worse, however,
and required hospitalization some twenty-six days later. Although a
guardian had been appointed for the minor's estate about a year prior
to the injury he had no knowledge of the accident until the thirty-day
period fixed by statute for the giving of notice had expired2 but promptly
on learning of the facts he then notified the employer and began proceed-
ings to recover compensation. The claim was denied by the arbitrator
for failure to give prompt notice and that holding was affirmed by both
the commission and the circuit court. On writ of error obtained by the
guardian, the Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed despite the contention
that the minor claimant, being under a legal disability, was entitled to
the benefit of certain savings provisions, modified in 1927, which exempted
''mental incompetents" from the requirement of compliance with what
would otherwise be a jurisdictional element of the statute.' The court
pointed out that minors were, for this purpose, to be considered the same
as adult employees, 4 particularly if capable of legal representation through
a duly constituted guardian.
: 397 Ill. 348, 74 N. E. (2d) 539 (1947).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 161, requires that the notice be given within thirty
days after the accident.
3 Laws 1927, p. 513; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, §§ 145(h) and 161.
4 The term "employee," according to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48. § 142, includes
minors who are, for the purpose of that statute, to be "considered the same and
have the same power to contract, receive payments and give quittances therefor as
adult employees."
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It has been noted that "probably no question connected with work-
men's compensation law is more novel . . . than the question of the
status of minor employees under such law, and . . . that there is no
fixed rule or principle of decision established, but that the question is one
of the construction of statutes which vary materially in different juris-
dictions. '"5 The writer of that statement might have noted that the
problem is complicated even more because of changes made from time
to time in the statutes in any given jurisdiction, but there is, nevertheless,
some unity of intent expressed by both courts and legislatures for the
direct protection of minors. 6 Some statutes, for example, expressly direct
that limitation periods contained in workmen's compensation laws are
not to apply to minors until after the appointment of a legal representa-
tive.7 Others extend that saving provision to mental incompetents and
to minor dependents without representation.8 Only a small minority direct
that the minor employee shall stand, for all purposes, in the same relation
to the workmen's compensation laws as do adults.9
Illinois law has now, for the first time, been established by the
instant decision, but it was not always in that condition and, judging by
prior cases, was not such as would lead to the expectation that the
holding therein would normally be produced. In Walgreen" Company v.
Industrial Commission,"° for example, no claim was made on behalf of
the minor employee until four years after the injury. The statute then
provided that if the injured employee should be "incompetent" at the
time of the injury any time limitations imposed should not run "so long
as said incompetent employee is without a conservator or guardian."11
5 See opinion of Commissioner Hickman. in Latcholia v. Texas Employer's Insur-
ance Association, 140 Tex. 231 at 235, 167 S. W. (2d) 164 at 166 (1942).
6 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text (Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis,
Mo., 1945), Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, p. 197.
7 Ark. Laws 1939. p. 777, § 18(c) ; Cal. Deering Code, Labor, Part 4. Ch. 2. § 5408;
Ida. Code Anno. 1932, Ch. 12. § 43-1206; Ind. Burns Stat. Ann. 1933. § 40-1413; Kan.
Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 44, § 509; Ky. Rev. Stats. 1946, § 342.210; Me. Rev. Stats. 1944,
Vol. 1, Ch. 26, § 23; Mo. Rev. Stats. Anno. 1939, Vol. 11, Ch. 29, § 3727; Mont. Rev.
Code 1935, Ch. 256, § 2900: N. J. Rev. Stats. 1937, Vol. 2. Ch. 34:15, § 51; N. Y.
Baldwin Cons. Laws 1938. Vol. 7. Work. Comp. Law, Art. 7, § 115; N. Car. Gen. Stats.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 97, § 50; S. Car. Code 1942. § 7035-52; Vernon's Tex. Civ. Stats.
Anno.. Art. 8306. § 13; Va. Code Anno. 1942. Ch. 76A, § 1887(50); Wyo. Comp. Stats.
Ann. 1945, Vol. 4, § 72-107.
8 Okla. Stats. 1941, Tit. 85. § 106: Vt. Pub. Laws 1933. Tit. 30, § 6540.
9 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 296; Ariz. Code Anno. 1939: Ch. 56, § 56-974: Colo.
Stats. Anno. 1937, Ch. 97, § 288(b) ; Minn. Anno. Stats. 1941, Vol. 13, § 176-18.
lo 323 Ill. 194, 153 N. E. 831, 48 A. L. R. 1199 (1926).
11 Laws 1919, p. 544. then provided: "In case an injured employee shall be
incompetent at the time when any right or privilege accrues to him under the pro-
visions of this Act, a conservator or guardian may be appointed, pursuant to law,
and may, on behalf of such incompetent, claim and exercise any such right or privi-
lege with the same force and effect as if the employee himself had been competent
and had claimed or exercised said right or privilege; and no limitations of time by
this Act provided shall run so long as said incompetent employee is without a
conservator or guardian."
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
On the strength thereof, an award of compensation was affirmed, the
court reaching the conclusion that the "incompetent" person referred
to necessarily included a minor for another provision dealt with those
who suffered from mental incapacity. 12  In still another case, that of
Waechter v. Industrial CoMmission,'8 the court permitted a minor depend-
ent to recover death benefits over three years after the death of his parent,
the employee, by pointing out that the provisions of the workmen's
compensation statute, which purported to treat minors as possessing the
same power to contract, receive payments and give quittance thereof as
would adults,1 4 were to be confined to minor employees and were not
applicable to minor dependents. Even more striking was the holding in
Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation15 wherein the minor employee
was allowed to conduct a common-law action against the employer even
though he had not filed a rejection of benefits within the six-month period
fixed by law,' 6 especially since the minor himself had no legal power to
make a binding declaration and had no legal guardian at the time.1
7
The conclusion would, therefore, seem to be that, up to the present, there
has been a pronounced legislative and judicial policy in this state to
protect the rights of minors.
Support for the decision in the instant case, however, was said to
rest in the fact that, subsequent to the decision in the Walgreen case, the
legislature amended the statute, in essence, by prefixing the word "mental"
before the word "incapacity" in the section which had been construed
in that case' 8 and by adding certain other provisions with respect to
mental incapacity.' 9 These amendments, at first blush, would logically
make it appear that the several periods of limitation should run against
an injured minor employee, unless he was also a mental incompetent, for
while minors are "incompetent" in a strict legal sense they are not
usually classified as being "mental incompetents," for that term is usually
applied to idiots, lunatics or insane persons. Such at least has been the
12 That section is presently found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 48, § 145(h).
13367 Ill. 256, 11 N. E. (2d) 378 (1937), followed and approved in Skaggs v.
Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 535, 21 N. E. (2d) 731 (1939).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 142.
15324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 (1944), noted in 23 CH0cGo-KFINT LAw
Rmvgw 355. See also Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N. E.
(2d) 754 (1939), affirmed in 372 Ill. 311, 23 N. E. (2d) 703 (1939).
16 I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 143.
17 Much the same view has been reached with respect to suits on behalf of minors
against municipal corporations: McDonald v. Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E.
476, 2 A. L. R. 1359 (1918). Accord: Murphy v. Village of Ft. Edward, 213 N. Y.
397, 107 N. E. 716 (1915).
18 Laws 1927, p. 517.
19 Ibid., p. 501.
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holding in a number of other states possessing substantially similar laws,2"
but there are decisions to the contrary2' and one case even goes so far
as to excuse non-compliance with the statute where the minor had a
general guardian at the time of the injury.
22
It would seem, then, that much will depend upon the attitude brought
to bear on the problem. As the Illinois court seems bent to give strict
adherence to the express word of the statute, notwithstanding that it
marks a deviation from what had previously been an established policy
in favor of minors, the instant decision is worthy of more than passing
notice.
R. A. LEWIN
20 Royal Indemnity Company v. Agnew, 66 Ga. App. 377, 18 S. E. (2d) 57 (1941) ;
Porter v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 86, 166 S. E. 675 (1932) ; Williams v.
Cities Service Gas Co., 151 Kan. 497, 99 P. (2d) 822 (1940) ; Brenn v. City of St.
John, 149 Kan. 416, 87 P. (2d) 546 (1939) ; Suttle v. Marble Produce Co., 140 Kan.
13, 34 P. (2d) 116 (1934) ; Mallory v. Ward Baking Co., 270 Mich. 91, 258 N. W. 414
(1935) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Tatti, 258 Mich. 357, 242 N. W. 777 (1932) ; Gelewski
v. Cudile, 17 N. J. Misc. 49, 4 A. (2d) 9 (1939) ; Westrick v. Industrial Commission,
50 Ohio App. 234, 197 N. E. 823 (1935) ; Indian Territory Ilium. Oil Co. v. Crown,
158 Okla. 51, 12 P. (2d) 689 (1932) ; Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 157 Okla. 278, 12 P.
(2d) 177 (1932) ; Edge v. Dunean Mills, 202 S. C. 189, 24 S. E. (2d) 268 (1943);
Franse v. Knox Porcelain Corp., 171 Tenn. 49, 100 S. W. (2d) 647 (1937).
21 Walsh v. Flour City Ornamental Iron Co., 157 Minn. 396, 196 N. W. 486
(1923) ; Lineberry v. Town of Mebane, 219 N. C. 257, 13 S. E. (2d) 429, 142 A. L. R.
1033 (1941) ; Latcholia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 140 Tex. 231, 167 S. W. (2d)
164 (1942).
22 In Dulin v. Industrial Accident Commission, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 89, 149 P. (2d)
868 (1944), the court held that the provision tolling the limitation period "until a
trustee or guardian is appointed" was to be read with the provision authorizing the
industrial commission to appoint some one to represent the minor employee and did
not contemplate representation by a general guardian.
